The Constitutional Law of German Unification by Quint, Peter E.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 50 | Issue 3 Article 3
The Constitutional Law of German Unification
Peter E. Quint
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter E. Quint, The Constitutional Law of German Unification , 50 Md. L. Rev. 475 (1991)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol50/iss3/3
m@
.. .. .
. .... .. ....
....-'.'. 
. . . . .
~......> :. . -.. ,
..... ... ......
_ .- :i .:""- ..:!...... . :.
...........!!: "°
S . ... .. . ..
z:: ::   :::::: ::: . . . . : ' " '
.. . .. ..0 . = ..
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 50 1991 NUMBER 3
© Copyright Maryland Law Review, Inc. 1991
Articles
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
PETER E. QUINT*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
MAP: GERMANY, 1945
INTRODUCTION .............................................. 476
I. UNION AND DISUNION IN GERMAN HISTORY ............. 478
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF GERMANY, 1945-1989 .......... 480
III. POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN THE GDR, 1989-1990 ....... 483
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE GDR, 1989-1990 .... 488
A. Background: The 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR ... 488
B. Proposals for a New GDR Constitution-The Round
Table Draft ....................................... 493
C. Amending the GDR Constitution-The Old Volkskammer
and the Modrow Government ........................ 496
Copyright © 1991 by Peter E. Quint.
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland. A.B., Harvard University, 1961; LL.B.,
1964; Diploma in Law, Oxford University, 1965. For valuable comments on earlier
drafts of this article I am grateful to Winfried Brugger, Thomas Giegerich, Eckart Klein,
Alexander Reuter, William Reynolds, Edward Tomlinson, and Giinther Wilms. I
learned much from their comments, but I remain fully responsible for all positions taken
here and for any errors of law or of fact. For valuable research assistance, I am grateful
to Cherylle Corpuz, Joan Gavigan, Nancy Hoffmann, Kristin Klein, and Gerk Oberman.
Much of this article was written while I was a guest at the Max Planck Institute for
Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. I would like to express
my gratitude to the directors, fellows, and staff of the Institute for their extraordinary
kindness and hospitality on this as well as many other occasions.
The map on the facing page is from A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY by Hajo Hol-
born. Copyright © 1959 by Hajo Holborn. Reprinted by permission of Alfred A.
Knopf, Inc.
475
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
D. Amending the GDR Constitution- The New Volkskammer
and the de Maizire Government ..................... 501
V. METHODS OF UNIFICATION UNDER THE BASIC LAW ...... 506
A. Confederation ...................................... 506
B. Article 146 of the Basic Law . : ...................... 507
C. Article 23 of the Basic Law ......................... 510
D. A New Constitution Under Article 146 After Accession
Under Article 23 ................................... 513
VI. THE STATE TREATY ................................... 516
VII. RECONSTITUTION OF THE STATES IN THE GDR .......... 524
VIII. THE UNIFICATION TREATY ............................. 530
A. Purpose and General Structure of the Treaty ........... 530
B. Problems Relating to Expropriated Property ............ 541
C. A bortion .......................................... 562
D. The Civil Service in Eastern Germany ................ 570
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST ALL-GERMAN
ELECTION ............................................ 581
X. THE LEGAL STATUS OF DIVIDED GERMANY AND THE
ROLE OF THE WORLD WAR II ALLIES IN THE PROCESS
OF UNIFICATION ...................................... 588
A. Reserved Rights of the Allies ......................... 589
B. The Oder-Neile Line ............................... 599
C. NA TO ............................................ 605
D. The Two Plus Four Treaty and the Legal Status of
Germany .......................................... 611
XI. UNIFICATION AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY ........................................... 620
CONCLUSION ................................................ 624
APPENDIX A: CALENDAR OF EVENTS-THE BACKGROUND OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION ......................... 629
APPENDIX B: CALENDAR OF EVENTS- 1989-1990 ............ 630
APPENDIX C: GLOSSARY OF FREQUENTLY USED TERMS ....... 631
INTRODUCTION
In the mid-summer of 1989 the German Democratic Republic-
known as the GDR or East Germany-was an autocratic state led by
an entrenched Communist Party, a loyal member of the Warsaw
Pact and, in many ways, a haughty counterpart of the Federal Re-
public of Germany (West Germany), which it confronted with a mix-
ture of hostility and grudging accommodation across the divide
created by the Cold War. Over the following year and a half, a dra-
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matic process of change transformed the political system of East
Germany and culminated in the GDR's "accession" to the Federal
Republic itself. At the same time, the division of Europe, which the
division of Germany came to symbolize, had largely ceased to exist.
Viewed as a social and economic process, German unification
was by no means completed when the GDR acceded to the Federal
Republic on October 3, 1990. The two economic systems remain
distinctly-even startlingly-different, and the sharp psychic divi-
sions of four decades, which some Germans refer to as the "Wall in
the head," will probably continue to divide the two regions for years
to come.
The unification of October 3, therefore, represented primarily
an achievement in the realm of politics and law-the culmination of
a series of agreements and legislative provisions developed within a
highly articulated constitutional framework that was drafted more
than forty years ago with such an occurrence in mind. In the rapid
events of 1989-90, the legal and constitutional development seemed
to be one aspect of the process of unification that-unlike more un-
ruly economic and social phenomena-was subject to a measure of
deliberation and rational control.
The constitutional structure that emerged reflected both anxi-
ety and optimism; its drafters sought to diminish baneful legacies of
the past while opening opportunities for future social, political, and
economic development. Like many great constituent acts, this con-
stitutional structure will provide guidelines for the development of
more complex and difficult social processes, and one measure of its
success will be whether it can channel and guide those processes or
whether, in the end, it will be overwhelmed by them.
This Article seeks to explain the major events of German unifi-
cation from the constitutional perspective. In this overview, consti-
tutional law will be understood in a broad sense-7including not only
the interpretation of constitutional texts by co~irts, scholars, and
governments, but also extending to important international ar-
rangements that help define the nature of a state, as well as certain
central statutes, regulations, and practices that give concrete mean-
ing to the underlying principles of a constitutional system.
Although this review will outline the developments of 1989-90,
it will also illustrate how the issues of unification once again raised
critical disputes between left and right that have been present
throughout the history of the Federal Republic and even, in several
cases, have their roots in earlier German history. In many instances
these political issues were not resolved upon unification. Indeed
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they remain-along with numerous economic and social problems-
as part of the continuing program of political debate for coming
years. Longstanding political disputes in Germany have affected the
course of unification, but the fact of unification itself-and the terms
upon which it was accomplished-will have its own substantial im-
pact on the further development of these important political issues.
I. UNION AND DISUNION IN GERMAN HISTORY
Unification is one of the great themes of modern German his-
tory. Unlike England and France-which had formed unified na-
tion-states in the Middle Ages-Germany came into the nineteenth
century a variegated collection of kingdoms, duchies, city-states,
and other principalities, loosely held together in the political league
of the Holy Roman Empire. The Empire was dissolved in 1806 at
Napoleon's order and, following the Congress of Vienna and Napo-
leon's final defeat in 1815, the "Germanic Confederation" arose in
its place. Like the Holy Roman Empire, however, this was more in
the nature of a treaty community (Staatenbund) than any sort of real
political union. But it and the early nineteenth century Customs
Union were steps in that direction.
In the early nineteenth century-in sharp contrast with twenti-
eth century movements-political progressivism and nationalism
were often allied in Germany. A first attempt at an all-German con-
stitution was the Paul's Church Constitution of 1849, drafted under
the impetus of the 1848 Revolution. Although this document never
went into effect, it reflected the view that basic rights and a measure
of popular control could be more readily expected from a unified
Germany than from the absolutist monarchs and princes who con-
trolled most of the smaller political subdivisions. Yet when unity
did finally come in 1871, it was not the result of progressive move-
ments but rather the product of unification from above, through war
and Bismarck's political finesse. The German Empire formed by
Bismarck under Prussian control in 1871 excluded Austria-thus ac-
cepting the "small" German solution. Yet the political structure of
Bismarck's German Empire extended far to the east-beyond the
East Prussian city of K6nigsberg (now Kaliningrad) in the north, and
as far as Silesia in the southeast and the newly annexed provinces of
Alsace and Lorraine (including StraBburg) in the west. This broad
empire dominated central Europe politically, militarily, and eco-
nomically from 1871 until 1918.
With the end of World War I, however, the dismemberment of
Bismarck's ill-fated empire began. A large section of eastern Ger-
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many was detached in order to form part of the newly refounded
state of Poland. Part of the formerly German territory constituted
the "Polish Corridor" which gave Poland access to the Baltic Sea.
Even after World War I, however, substantial territory east of the
Oder and NeiBe Rivers remained within the German Empire, in-
cluding not only Silesia and parts of Brandenburg and Pomerania,
but also part of East Prussia east of the Polish Corridor.
The end of World War II resulted in further contraction of the
territories of Germany. Although Germany and the Soviet Union
had signed a non-aggression pact in August of 1939 (a pact that led
to the invasion of Poland), German forces attacked the Soviet Union
in June 1941. At the end of the war, the Red Army occupied much
of the eastern part of Germany, and the Soviet Union annexed the
northern part of East Prussia, including the territory around K6nigs-
berg. At the same time, the Soviet Union also annexed territory in
the eastern part of Poland lying on the Russian side of the so-called
"Curzon" line.
In order to compensate Poland for this loss, the Soviet Union
argued at the Potsdam Conference that all German territory east of
a line formed by the Oder and Western Neie Rivers should be
transferred to Poland. At Potsdam the English Prime Minister and
the American President were unwilling to agree that this territory
should be permanently transferred to Poland but did provide that it
would remain under Polish administration pending a final resolu-
tion to be adopted in a peace treaty. The peace conference contem-
plated at Potsdam was never held, and the territory east of the
Oder-NeiBe line-which, as a practical matter was soon treated as a
part of Poland-remained a constant problem of postwar German
politics. This shifting of borders was accompanied by the expulsion
or flight of millions of German-speaking people toward the west.
While these border adjustments were being made, the victori-
ous Allies, meeting at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences, divided
German territory into zones of occupation-a Russian zone in the
east and an American and a British zone in the west. Subsequently,
the two western zones were further subdivided, and a portion was
placed under control of the French government.'
Thus, beginning with the "unified" empire of Bismarck's time
1. Although France was not represented at Yalta or Potsdam, the French govern-
ment acceded to relevant portions of the agreements. See 5 Entscheidungen des
Bundesverfassungsgerichts (Decisions of Constitutional Court) [BVerfGE] 85, 114
(1956) (KPD Case). The decision to divide Germany can be traced back to preparatory
agreements signed by the Allies in late 1944. See v. Goetze, Die Rechte der Alliierten auf
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extending from StraBburg to Memel, German territory was first sub-
stantially contracted at the end of World War I and again at the end
of World War I-although part of the latter contraction may have
been in theory provisional only. Moreover, the remaining German
territory was divided into four occupation zones.
At Potsdam, the Allies contemplated that the four occupation
zones would be administered in a cooperative manner and that Ger-
many would eventually coalesce into a single political unit.
Although the advent of the Cold War and bitterly hostile relations
between the Soviet Union and the West prevented accomplishment
of this plan, the western Allies continued to support the principle of
German unification. In this sense, however, "unification" was not
intended to include any of the territories transferred from Germany
at the end of World War I or, most likely, the Oder-Nei~e territories
placed under Polish administration at Potsdam-although the latter
territories did play some role. Rather, the question of German uni-
fication referred to the proposed consolidation of the two German
states created from the occupation zones at the end of World War
II.
II. THE LEGAL STATUS OF GERMANY, 1945-1989
As a result of irreconcilable political differences between east
and west-differences that led to an independent western currency
reform and the Russian blockade of Berlin-two German states
were created in the remaining territory of Germany in 1949. The
territory of the three western occupation zones coalesced to form
the Federal Republic of Germany, under a Basic Law (constitution)
adopted in May 1949. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet occupation
zone was re-established as the German Democratic Republic (GDR),
also under a constitution adopted in 1949.
As a matter of theory, the framers viewed the West German Ba-
sic Law as a temporary or provisional document, pending subse-
quent unification with the territory in the east. Under the prevailing
doctrine, moreover, the government was constitutionally required
to work to achieve unification. A number of provisions of the Basic
Law were invoked for this position. The Preamble, for example,
stated that the "German people remain challenged to achieve the
unity and freedom of Germany in free self-determination" and spe-
cifically referred to the Basic Law as providing a constitutional order
Mitwirkung bei der deutschen Einigung, 1990 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT [NJW]
2161, 2162.
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"for a transitional period." Moreover, article 23 contemplated the
possibility that "other parts" of Germany would join the Federal Re-
public, and article 146 provided that the Basic Law would lose its
effectiveness when a constitution "chosen by the German people in
a free decision" came into effect. Furthermore, according to article
116, the term "German" was defined to include persons living in the
GDR, among others. Although the Basic Law did not claim to be
effective outside of the borders of the Federal Republic, all
"Germans"-including residents of the GDR-could claim rights
under the Basic Law as soon as they came within the territory cov-
ered by the document.2
The constitutional theory that supported the Federal Republic's
position on unification may have been subject to conceptual and his-
torical problems, but it was a view that was accepted (in part at least)
by the western Allies.' According to this view, the "German Reich"
never ceased to exist as a single state at the end of World War II.
The "Reich" maintained this ghostly existence because, at the end
of the war, only the German army (and not the government) offi-
cially surrendered to the Allied forces. Moreover, the Allies made
clear in the Berlin Declaration ofJune 1945 that by their occupation
they did not intend to annex German territory. According to this
theory, the founding of the Federal Republic was not the creation of
a new West German state, but rather the "reorganization" of a part
of the still-existing "German Reich." Indeed, the Federal Republic
was identical with the "German Reich" although-and here the the-
ory rested on a distinction of some metaphysical subtlety-its actual
practical power extended only over a part of the territory and popu-
lation of the "Reich." Since the Federal Republic was the only legit-
imate, democratically organized state on that former territory, it
bore a degree of responsibility for all Germans-including those
who resided beyond the reach of the Basic Law. In any event, the
Federal Republic was constitutionally required to seek unification
with the other parts of that territory.4
2. See 36 BVerfGE 1, 30-31 (1973) (Basic Treaty Case). Rights under the Basic Law
could also be claimed by GDR citizens who reached embassies or consulates of the Fed-
eral Republic in third countries.
3. See, e.g., 77 BVerfGE 137, 158 (1987).
4. For important earlier statements of this theory, see 36 BVerfGE at 15-17; 5
BVerfGE at 126-27. For an extremely detailed exposition of the theory, see 77 BVerfGE
137 (1987). For general discussions of the constitutional status of the two German
states, see Piotrowicz, The Status of Germany in International Law: Deutschland iber Deutsch-
land?, 38 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 609 (1989); Simma, Legal Aspects of East-West German Rela-
tions, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 97 (1985); Note, German Reunification: Historical and Legal
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Under this theory the Federal Republic at first refused to grant
any form of recognition to the GDR as a state and, under the so-
called "Hallstein doctrine" of the mid-1950s, threatened to break
diplomatic relations with any third government that recognized the
GDR. Meanwhile, in a treaty that took effect in 1955, the western
Allies returned to the Federal Republic much of the sovereignty that
they had exercised during the occupation. At approximately the
same time, the Soviet Union also returned a degree of sovereignty
to the GDR. The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 suspended
normal traffic between east and west and further exacerbated the
hostility between the two German states.
The period of unrelieved mutual hostility came to an end in
1972 when the Social Democratic government of Willy Brandt-as
part of a new eastern policy that also included relaxed relations and
agreements with Poland and the Soviet Union-entered into the
"Basic Treaty" with the GDR, with the intention of providing closer
relations and solving certain urgent problems such as those relating
to traffic to and from Berlin. This treaty could well have been
viewed as a rejection of the theory that the Federal Republic was
acting for all of a continuing "German Reich," because it could have
been seen as the recognition of the GDR as a separate state. In-
deed, the Treaty and its ratifying statute were challenged on those
grounds in the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many.5 The Court ultimately upheld the Treaty, but interpreted it
very narrowly and also firmly reasserted the theory of the continuing
"German Reich." In so doing, the Court's opinion may have signifi-
cantly limited the benefits and opportunities for cooperation that
the Brandt government hoped would flow from the Treaty.6 Yet
even the Constitutional Court seemed to acknowledge the reality of
the German Democratic Republic as a separate state and confirmed
Roots of Germany's Rapid Progress Towards Unity, 22 N.Y.U. J. Irr'L L. & POL. 253, 257-67
(1990).
5. See 36 BVerfGE 1 (1973); Simma, supra note 4, at 105-08. The Constitutional
Court is a special judicial organ created in the Basic Law principally for the purpose of
deciding constitutional questions. See BASIC LAw [GG] arts. 92-94. In the four decades
of its existence, the Court has come to occupy a role in the political life of the Federal
Republic that is not unlike that of the Supreme Court in the United States-although
there are also many important differences between the two courts in jurisdiction, proce-
dure, and composition. See D. KOMMERS, JUDICIAL POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: A STUDY
OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (1976); see also Quint, Free Speech and Private Law
in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 247, 248-49 & n.4 (1989).
6. See Simma, supra note 4, at 115. In his memoirs former Chancellor Brandt refers
to the "astonishing argumentation" of parts of the Court's opinion. See W. BRANDT,
ERINNERUNGEN 233 (1989).
482 [VOL. 50:475
1991] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
the legal effectiveness of its constitution.7
The views of the Soviet Union and the GDR on the legal status
of Germany developed in a somewhat different manner. At the out-
set, the eastern position resembled that of the west in viewing the
two German states as part of a larger entity, or at least as seeing
unification (as contemplated by the Potsdam Agreement) as an ulti-
mate goal.8 At this early period, the east presumably foresaw the
possibility of unification under its own political terms. In the mid-
1950s, however, the Federal Republic became a member of the
western military alliance, and the eastern position changed so that
the Federal Republic and the GDR were now viewed as two sepa-
rate, independent states. 9 Although the GDR Constitution of 1949
was originally intended as an all-German constitution, a revised con-
stitution of 1968-as further amended in 1974-emphasized the
special nature of socialist political organization and, in unambigu-
ous passages, emphasized a close, "irrevocable" relationship be-
tween the GDR and the Soviet Union.' °
Thus by the mid- 1950s, the governments of the Federal Repub-
lic and the GDR maintained inconsistent and irreconcilable posi-
tions on the question of the legal status of Germany. Although
relations between the governments were later improved to some de-
gree by Brandt's eastern policy, including the Basic Treaty, the two
states continued to maintain an uneasy relationship of mixed hostil-
ity and accommodation until the revolutionary events of autumn
1989 in the GDR.
III. POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN THE GDR, 1989-1990
From the beginning days of the Soviet Occupation Zone and
the GDR, emigration to the western part of Germany was a contin-
ual problem for the eastern authorities. The pace of emigration
often reflected economic conditions, diminishing during periods of
prosperity in the GDR and increasing in times of economic
difficulty.
In 1961, during a period of increased emigration, the East Ger-
7. See 36 BVerfGE at 22, 29; 3 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, art. 146, No. 3 (I. v.
Minch 2d ed. 1983) (Michael Kirn). See also Note, supra note 4, at 267-71 ("[olverall, the
treaty's text did a great deal more to bolster the GDR's claims to sovereignty and inde-
pendence than it did to further the Basic Law's reunification commandment.").
8. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 4, at 98-100.
9. See, e.g., Piotrowicz, supra note 4, at 620-21.
10. See Rauschning, Deutschlands aktuelle Verfassungslage, 1990 DEUTSCHES VERWAL-
TUNGSBLATr [DVBI] 393, 394.
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man government (with the agreement of the Warsaw Pact leaders)
closed the border of East Germany and built the wall separating
East and West Berlin." From that point on, the closed borders and
"the Wall" symbolized the East German government for those in
the west. For most citizens of the GDR, travel to the west became
almost impossible. With few exceptions, only those who had
reached retirement age were allowed to travel because their loss
would no longer impair the productive capacity of the nation.
During the tenure of Communist Party chief Erich Honecker
(1971-1989), the government of the GDR was maintained by physi-
cal barriers and by an elaborate system of internal security measures
operated primarily by the notorious Ministry for State Security
(Stasi). Behind this apparatus lay the power of the Soviet army
which demonstrated in Czechoslovakia in 1968 that significant liber-
alization of the existing system would not be tolerated.
In retrospect it seems clear that the advent of Gorbachev's poli-
cies of perestroika and glasnost led to the downfall of the Honecker
regime. 2 The state system could be fatally impaired by a massive
outflow of citizens, and the GDR was dependent on its Warsaw Pact
neighbors to do their part in keeping the population of the GDR
within the boundaries of the East Bloc. But under the impact of
Gorbachev's policies, the Warsaw Pact nations-and the Soviet
Union itself-no longer became reliable guarantors of the borders
of the GDR, and the power of the regime over its citizens quickly
disintegrated. '
In 1989, the government of Hungary, which along with Poland
had sought most fully to adopt the new Soviet policies, refused to
maintain its closed border with Austria.' 4 As early as May, part of
11. See H. WEBER, GESCHICHTE DER DDR 321-26 (1985). It is estimated that by 1961,
2.5 million residents of the GDR had emigrated to the west. See Geck, Germany and Con-
temporary International Law, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 263, 265 (1974).
12. See Hacker, Das unaufhaltsame Ende der DDR, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
[FAZI, Sept. 26, 1990, at 14, col. 1.
13. See Kaiser, Germany's Unification, 70 FOREIGN AFr. 179, 182-84 (1990/91). These
events were foreshadowed by ajoint declaration, signed by the Soviet and West German
governments in June 1989, which referred to a universal right of political self-determi-
nation. Id. at 183.
14. For useful summaries of the events described here, see, e.g., M. WIMMER, C.
PROSKE, S. BRAUN & B. MICHALOWSKI, "WIR SIND DAS VOLK!": DIE DDR IM AUFBRUCH
(1990) [hereinafter WIR SIND DAS VOLK]; NEUES FORUM LEIPZIG, JETZT ODER NIE-
DEMOKRATIE: LEIPZIGER HERBST '89, at 313-42 (1990). See also B. ZANETrl, DER WEG
ZUR DEUTSCHEN EINHEIT (1991); Stern, Der Staatsvertrag in volkerrerhtlichen und veifassungs-
rechtlichen Kontext, in I K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, VERTRAGE UND RECHTSAKTE
ZUR DEUrSCHEN EINHEIT 23 (1990).
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the wire fence along the Hungarian border had been dismantled,
and by the end of August thousands of citizens of the GDR (who
generally had been permitted to travel to Hungary and other East
Bloc countries) had made their way into Austria. During the same
period, hundreds of GDR citizens sought refuge in the Federal Re-
public's embassies in Prague, Budapest and Warsaw, and in desper-
ation the GDR announced that it would permit citizens in the
embassy in Prague to travel through the GDR into the Federal Re-
public in sealed trains.
In the GDR, meanwhile, there were stirrings of organized polit-
ical opposition, culminating in the founding of the first opposition
group "New Forum" in September,' 5 followed shortly thereafter by
other reform groups, "Democracy Now"' 6 and "Democratic Awak-
ening." Also in September, regular Monday night demonstrations
began to take place in Leipzig after prayer meetings in the Nikolai
Church, which had become a center of organized opposition. In the
coming months these demonstrations would grow to enormous
size-with hundreds of thousands of participants-and would be-
come an important factor in the political life of the GDR. t7
In the midst of these great changes, the GDR celebrated the
fortieth anniversary of its founding. Notwithstanding tight security
measures, many citizens of the GDR engaged in protest demonstra-
tions which were brutally suppressed by police. Arriving at the cele-
bration, Gorbachev warned Honecker that "life will punish those
who come too late," an indication that the GDR could expect no
Soviet military help in repressing reforms.' 8
15. See selections from the founding proclamation of "New Forum," Sept. 10, 1989,
reprinted in WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 28-30.
16. See WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 35-37.
17. For a first-hand account, see R. TETZNER, LEIPZIGER RING (1990). A significant
turning point was apparently reached at the great Leipzig demonstration of October 9.
The East German Communist party leader, Erich Honecker, was reportedly prepared to
dissolve the demonstration by force of arms, but was prevented or dissuaded from doing
so. Such a resolution-resembling that imposed by the Chinese government in
Tiananmen Square in 1989--could have had incalculable consequences.
These developments were accompanied by the beginnings of reform in the former
"bloc parties"--groups that had been founded in the immediate postwar period and had
been permitted to continue in existence as docile adjuncts of the Communist Party
(SED) government. These bloc parties included the CDU (Christian Democrats), LDPD
(Liberals), NDPD (National Democrats), and the German Farmers Party. (For an en-
lightening description of the previous relations between the SED and one bloc party, the
CDU, see FAZ, Nov. 9, 1990, at 14, col. 2.) Moreover, in October 1989, a new Social
Democratic Party (SDP, later SPD) was founded in East Germany, replacing the former
SPD that had merged with the Communist Party in the east to form the SED in 1946.
18. See Hacker, supra note 12.
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In the face of the continued departure of thousands of citizens
and massive antigovernment demonstrations in Leipzig, Erich Ho-
necker resigned on October 18 as General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party (SED), a post that he had held
since 1971.9 His replacement was Egon Krenz, an old-line party
functionary, who immediately announced relaxed travel policies for
citizens of the GDR.
On the evening of November 9, the government of the GDR
opened the Wall, precipitating historic scenes ofjubilation in Berlin.
Shortly thereafter, numerous additional border crossings were es-
tablished. On November 13, Hans Modrow, who had established
his reputation as a Communist Party reformer in Dresden, was
elected Prime Minister. Recognizing that fundamental change had
become inevitable in the GDR, the Volkskammer (Parliament) estab-
lished a committee to undertake constitutional reform.
The government of the Federal Republic had been observing
these events carefully, and on November 28-without consulting the
western Allies-Chancellor Kohl proposed a ten-point plan for co-
operation between the two German states.20 Welcoming a proposal
for a "treaty community" put forth by Prime Minister Modrow, Kohl
went further to propose a confederation with unification as the ulti-
mate goal. Before such steps could be taken, however, Kohl insisted
on basic reforms in the political and economic system of the GDR.
At the same time great popular outcry arose in the GDR over revela-
tions of luxurious villas and hoards of western consumer goods en-
joyed by former leading members of the SED and government.
At the beginning of December, reform in the GDR accelerated
swiftly. The Volkskammer amended the 1974 Constitution to delete
the reference to the leading role of the Communist Party and voted
to apologize for the GDR's participation in the invasion of Czecho-
slovakia in 1968. Reformer Gregor Gysi replaced Egon Krenz as
leader of the SED.2 l The CDU and other parties left the "Demo-
cratic Bloc," which had faithfully supported the Communist Party
for forty years. On December 7, a "Round Table" composed of
seven opposition groups, as well as the SED and the former bloc
19. On November 7 the entire government of the GDR resigned, followed on No-
vember 8 by the resignation of the entire politburo of the SED.
20. For Kohl's plan, see WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 182-89.
21. Later in December the SED sought to confirm its status as a reformed party by
changing its name to SED-PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism). Thereafter, the initials
SED were dropped entirely, and the party became simply the PDS. See Note, supra note
4, at 253 n.4.
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parties, began its deliberations as an unofficial but extremely influ-
ential organ exercising a degree of practical control over the actions
of the government. 22
In the middle of December the government announced that the
hated Office for National Security (successor to the Stasi) would be
dissolved, but the actual process of dissolution was a slow one.
Although Kohl and Modrow agreed on a series of treaties that
would build a "treaty community," calls for actual unification of the
two countries began to intensify in popular demonstrations in Leip-
zig and other cities. Yet in December andJanuary there still seemed
to be a substantial possibility that the GDR would continue-for
some time at least-as an independent country. Accordingly, nu-
merous local groups, often composed of representatives of the re-
form political parties, began to work on drafts of a new democratic
constitution for the GDR, to be submitted as proposals to the
Round Table's constitutional drafting committee. The most fre-
quently mentioned constitutional reforms included re-creation of
the historical states of the GDR, establishment of a constitutional
court and actual judicial review, insulation of the independence of
the judiciary, and some form of mixture of private and socialist
property.
The tide turned away from a possible continuation of the GDR
at the beginning of February, however, when Prime Minister
Modrow acknowledged the likelihood and desirability of unification
with the Federal Republic. 3 President Gorbachev also conceded
the likelihood of unification and seemed not to raise serious objec-
tions to such a goal in principle, although a number of specific res-
ervations no doubt remained.24 In light of a continued stream of
emigration from the GDR, the first free election for the GDR Volks-
kammer was moved forward from May 6 to March 18. In that elec-
tion a surprisingly strong vote for the CDU and its conservative
Alliance for Germany made clear that the majority of citizens in the
GDR sought unification as soon as possible. A desire to belong to
the west and to share in its economic prosperity had been a power-
ful motivating factor.2 5
22. See generally VOM RUNDEN TisCH ZUM PARLAMENT 23-26 (H. Herles & E. Rose ed.
1990).
23. See, e.g., Schiuble, Der Einigungsvertrag-Vollendung der Einheit Deutschlands in
Freiheit, 1990 ZEITSCHRIFT FtR GESETZGEBUNG 289, 291.
24. Rauschning, supra note 10, at 394-95; Kuppe, 1Modrow in Bonn, 1990 DEUTSCH-
LAND-ARCHlV [DA] 337.
25. See Bertram, The German Question, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 45, 47-48 (1990); see generally
Note, supra note 4, at 285-95 (discussion of factors favoring swift unification).
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IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE GDR, 1989-1990
The stirring political events of 1989-1990 in the GDR were ac-
companied by a profusion of constitutional developments-includ-
ing amendments of the existing GDR constitution as well as
proposals for an entirely new basic document. An understanding of
the role that constitutional reform in the GDR played in the course
of unification must begin with an understanding of the existing con-
stitutional system in the GDR at the point at which the revolutionary
developments of 1989 began.
A. Background: The 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR
The constitution in effect in the GDR in 1989 had been adopted
in 1968 and significantly amended in 1974. Although it was
adopted long after Stalin's death, it was more clearly Stalinist in its
nature than the earlier 1949 Constitution (adopted in Stalin's life-
time), which originally guaranteed federalism and certain individual
rights and possessed certain other traits of a liberal western consti-
tution. Indeed, the 1968/74 Constitution reflected the reality of
government and life in the GDR much more accurately than did the
1949 Constitution.
26
1. Basic Principles.-The two great principles of the GDR Con-
stitution as amended in 1974 were the establishment of Marxism-
Leninism and friendship with the Soviet Union. According to the
1974 version, "the German Democratic Republic is a socialist state
of workers and peasants. It is the political organization of working
people in city and country under the leadership of the working class
and its Marxist-Leninist party."' 27 Moreover, "the sovereignty of the
working people, realized on the basis of democratic centralism, is
the basic principle of the structure of the state."' 28 Thus, the leading
factor in the state was the Communist Party, which governed
through the technique of democratic centralism-a doctrine that al-
lowed certain differences of opinion within the leadership circles of
the Party but required that all leadership decisions be carried out in
a uniform manner throughout the government and society, once
26. See M. MCCAULEY, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC SINCE 1945, at 143
(1983). For an English translation of the 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR, see 5 CON-
STITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD--GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (A. Blau-
stein & G. Flanz ed. 1986).
27. CONSTITUTION OF THE GDR [VERF. DDR] (1974) art. 1. Unless otherwise indi-
cated, all translations in this Article are those of the author.
28. Id. art. 47, § 2.
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those decisions were made. Finally, "the economy of the German
Democratic Republic is a socialist planned economy." 29
The second major theme in the 1974 Constitution was close
friendship with the Soviet Union. According to article 6, "the Ger-
man Democratic Republic is forever and irrevocably bound together
with the USSR. The close and brotherly alliance with [the USSR]
guarantees the people of the German Democratic Republic further
progress on the path of socialism and peace. The German Demo-
cratic Republic is an inseparable part of the socialist community of
states .... Moreover, "in the interest of preserving peace and
the security of the socialist state, the National People's Army [of the
GDR] preserves close brotherhood of arms [enge Waffenbriider-
schaft] with the armies of the Soviet Union and other socialist
states."'3
2. Property Rules .- The definition of property relationships lay
close to the heart of the 1968/74 Constitution. In order to carry out
the "socialist planned economy," article 10 set forth three forms of
socialist property: "People's Property," "Collective Property," and
property of social organizations. These forms of property were to
be protected and increased by the state.
Of these forms of socialist property, People's Property-state-
owned nationalized property-was clearly the most important. Ac-
cording to article 12, People's Property included the basic means of
production-for example, minerals, mines, power plants, dams, in-
29. Id. art. 9, § 3.
30. Id. art. 6, § 2.
31. Id. art. 7, § 2. The emphasis on friendship with the Soviet Union is considerably
more pronounced in the 1974 amendments than in the 1968 Constitution itself; its in-
creasing prominence in the 1974 version replaces the more nationalist emphasis of the
1968 Constitution. See generally Zieger, Die Verfassungsdnderung in der DDR vom 7.10. 1974,
1975 NJW 143. Indeed, the most "national" constitution was the original document of
1949 which had been intended to cover all of "Germany." See infra note 103.
On the other hand, the 1974 amendments to a substantial extent removed vigorous
attacks on the west contained in the 1968 version. For example, the Preamble to the
1968 Constitution referred to the "historical fact that imperialism under the leadership
of the United States, in concert with circles of West German monopoly capital, has di-
vided Germany in order to construct West Germany as a basis of imperialism and the
struggle against socialism-all of which contradicts the life interests of the nation." In
the 1974 version this was replaced by a considerably more neutral passage. According
to article 9 of the 1968 Constitution, also deleted in 1974, "[t]he socialist relations of
production arise as a result of the fight against the monopoly capitalist economic system
whose aggressive and adventurist policy has brought only misfortune to the German
nation." On the other hand, the following passage from article 18, § I of the 1968
Constitution remains in the 1974 version: "[The GDR] combats imperialist non-culture,
which serves the psychological waging of war and human degradation."
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dustries, banks, and insurance companies. Moreover, article 12 pro-
hibited private ownership of these forms of property. As a practical
matter, therefore, under the Constitution of 1974, there could be no
private ownership of industrial organizations and other significant
factors of production. Thus article 12 was one of the first constitu-
tional provisions that had to be amended as the GDR began to shift
toward a market economy in the months before unification.
In contrast, Collective Property was property of groups of farm-
ers or other working people who were gathered together as collec-
tives.3 2 Indeed, much of the agricultural property of the GDR had
become Collective Property as a result of a two-step process. First,
as discussed more fully below, vast areas of agricultural property
were expropriated under the Soviet occupation regime between
1945 and 1949, and much of this land was distributed in small allot-
ments (generally less than twenty-five acres) to individual farmers.
Subsequently, in a movement that was completed in 1960, the gov-
ernment in effect required individual farmers to form collectives by
contributing their property to groups of farmers in the area. 3 Since
this property was devoted to the collective and was not owned by
the state itself, it was different in form from People's Property. But
even so, the use of Collective Property was subject to the directions
of the centralized governmental plan. 4
3. Basic Rights.-The 1968/74 Constitution contained a full ar-
ray of basic rights, including what appeared to be traditional defen-
sive rights as well as affirmative rights to social welfare. Yet under
socialist legal theory, constitutional rights were primarily intended
to further the "harmony of social and individual interests" and cre-
ate a "socialist personality," and were only to a lesser extent con-
ceived as providing protection of the individual against the state.3 5
In any event, many traditional defensive rights were heavily quali-
fied by a requirement that they be exercised "in accordance with the
principles of this constitution," or similar formulations.36 These
32. See VERF. DDR (1974) art. 13.
33. See H. WEBER, supra note 11, at 314-18; VERF. DDR (1974) art. 46 (agricultural
production collectives). Although the collective held the right to use the property, the
legal title remained in the individual owner. S. MAMPEL, DIE SOZIALISTISCHE VERFAS-
SUNG DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUBLIK 361 (2d ed. 1982). There were also
numerous collectives of workers engaged in the hand-working trades.
34. S. MAMPEL, supra note 33, at 361.
35. Brunner, Das Staatsrecht der Deuischen Demokratischen Republik, in HANDBUCH DES
STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 385, 433 (J. Isensee & P. Kirchhof
ed. 1987).
36. See, e.g., VERF. DDR (1974) art. 27, § 1 (right to free expression of opinion "in
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limiting principles presumably included the doctrines of Marxism-
Leninism, the primacy of the Communist Party, and a rigorous ad-
herence to democratic centralism. In a provision of wry candor, a
right to travel was limited to a right to travel "within the boundaries
of the German Democratic Republic."3 7
In contrast with the Basic Law, which contains a general charac-
terization of the Federal Republic of Germany as a "social" state,
the 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR set forth a detailed list of"so-
cial" rights. These included rights of: employment; 38 education
and training in a profession or calling;39 free time and rest (includ-
ing paid vacation);40 protection of health, including sickness and ac-
cident insurance;4' care in old age and disability;42 living space
"according to the economic possibilities and local conditions; ' 4 3 as
well as various special protections for single parents, families with
many children, and pregnant women and small children.44 On the
other hand, in accordance with the nature of many socialist constitu-
tions (which typically differ from liberal constitutions in seeking to
govern broad aspects of individual life) 45, some of these social rights
were accompanied by constitutional duties. The right to work was
accompanied by a duty to work;4 6 the right to learn an occupation
was accompanied by the duty to do so;4 7 and every citizen was obli-
gated to engage in service for the defense of the GDR.48
4. Governmental Organs.-Under the 1968/74 Constitution, the
important governmental organs of the GDR were federal because,
as will be discussed below, the East German Lander (states) were
accordance with the principles of this constitution"); id. art. 28, § 1 (right of assembly
"in the framework of the principles and goals of the constitution"); id. art. 29 (right of
association "in conformity with the principles and goals of the constitution"); see also id.
art. 39, § 2 (churches and religious communities "order their affairs and exercise their
activity in conformity with the constitution and the laws").
37. VERF. DDR (1974) art. 32.
38. See id. art. 24, §§ 1, 3.
39. See id. art. 25, §§ 1, 4.
40. See id. art. 34.
41. See id. art. 35.
42. See id. art. 36.
43. Id. art. 37, § 1.
44. See id. art. 38, §§ 2-3.
45. See generally Markovits, Law or Order-Constitutionalism and Legality in Eastern Europe,
34 STAN. L. REV. 513, 517-18 (1982).
46. See VERF. DDR (1974) art. 24, § 2.
47. See id. art. 25, § 4.
48. See id. art. 23, § 1.
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effectively abolished in the 1950s.4 9 Although the "principal organ
of state power" was a one-house parliament called the Volks-
kammer,' ° in reality this body ordinarily accepted measures pro-
posed by the Communist Party without dissent.5' The 1968/74
Constitution provided for two principal executive organs, the Coun-
cil of State and the Council of Ministers. The Council of State,
which had replaced the office of president of the GDR by amend-
ment to the 1949 Constitution, was originally conceived as perform-
ing certain functions typically undertaken by a "head of state," as
well as certain legislative functions. In contrast, the Council of Min-
isters was composed of functioning departmental ministers and was
referred to in article 76 of the 1974 Constitution as the "govern-
ment" of the GDR. During the tenure of SED party leader Walter
Ulbricht (1949-1971) the Council of State exercised substantial
power because Ulbricht was its chairman, but under the 1974 Con-
stitution, power largely shifted from the Council of State to the
Council of Ministers.52
5. Judiciary.-Although the Constitution emphasized the inde-
pendence of the judiciary-a supreme court and lower courts 53 -the
constitutional text itself called this independence into question. In-
deed, a number of provisions made clear that the Supreme Court
was to be responsible to the political organs-the Volkskammer and
the Council of State.54 For example, the Volkskammer chose the
judges of the Supreme Court and could remove them at any time.55
Moreover, provisions relating to the courts emphasized the impor-
tance of "socialist legality," a concept that sought to reconcile a de-
gree of legal certainty with a strong role of the Communist Party in
the making and interpretation of law. 56 In any case most accounts
49. See infra Part VII. The GDR Constitution, however, made provision for local gov-
ernment. See VERF. DDR (1974) arts. 81-85.
50. VERF. DDR (1974) art. 48.
51. See H. ROGGEMANN, DIE DDR-VEPFASSUNGEN: EINFUHRUNG IN DAS VERFASSUNGS-
RECHT DER DDR 218-19, 230-31 (1989).
52. See generally Brunner, supra note 35, at 385, 416-21; Zieger, supra note 31, at 149-
50.
The constitution also emphasized and defined the special role of unions in the
structure of the state. VERF. DDR (1974) arts. 44-45. That the central organization of
the unions (the Free German Federation of Unions or FDGB) was considered a part of
the state is suggested by its power to propose statutes in the Volkskammer. Id. art. 65,
§ 1.
53. VERF. DDR (1974) art. 96, § 1; see also id. art. 92.
54. See, e.g., id. art. 93, § 3; art. 74, § 1; art. 49, § 3.
55. See id. art. 50.
56. See id. art. 90, § 1; art. 97. For discussions of "socialist legality" and ideological
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agree that, as a practical matter, officials of the SED exercised sub-
stantial influence over judicial decisions in cases in which the party
took a political interest. 57
B. Proposals for a New GDR Constitution-The Round Table Draft
From the fall of the Honecker regime in late 1989, it was clear
that the necessary political, economic, and social reforms could not
be undertaken on the basis of the GDR Constitution of 1968 as re-
vised in 1974. It seemed clear that this constitution was based so
completely on discredited Stalinist ideas that it could not be ade-
quately reformed through amendment. Rather, most believed that
an entirely new document was necessary. 58 Because in late 1989
many still thought that the GDR would continue to exist as a sepa-
rate country for an interim period-perhaps for some years-the
Round Table established a drafting committee to prepare a new,
democratic constitution of the GDR. 59 The Round Table contem-
plated that its draft would be presented for adoption to the new,
legitimate Volkskammer after its election in the early part of 1990.
The Round Table committee was advised by a few constitu-
tional experts from the GDR who had gained the confidence of the
reformers. The committee also invited western advisors who gener-
ally came from the left-wing of constitutional law teachers in the
Federal Republic. 61 Moreover, in late 1989 and early 1990 an ex-
traordinary amount of informal work on constitutional drafts took
place in small working groups in various parts of the GDR-groups
very often consisting of nonjurists who were connected with one or
another of the new reform political parties. These informal groups
debates in the GDR concerning this concept, see S. MAMPEL, supra note 33, at 568-72; H.
ROGGEMANN, supra note 51, at 155-58; Brunner, supra note 35, at 405-07.
57. Indeed, more than 80% of all the GDRjudges (and more than 90% of the prose-
cutors) were members of the SED. See H. ROGGEMANN, supra note 51, at 298. As an
aspect of "democratic centralism," the Supreme Court of the GDR exercised supervi-
sory powers over the lower courts that included the issuance of mandatory special guide-
lines and went "far beyond the natural radiating force of high court jurisprudence." See
Brunner, supra note 35, at 430.
58. Occasional calls were also heard for reinstatement of the more liberal 1949 Con-
stitution of the GDR-at least as an interim solution. This position was asserted at an
early point, for example, by Lothar de Maiziere who later became Prime Minister (Minis-
ter-President) of the GDR. G. GAUS, DEUTSCHE ZWISCHENTONE: GESPR.CHS-PORTR.ATS
AUS DER DDR 38 (1990).
59. See Round Table Declaration of December 7, 1989, reprinted in ARBEITSGRUPPE
"NEUE VERFASSUNG DER DDR" DES RUNDEN TISCHES, VERFASSUNGSENTWURF FOR DIE
DDR 75 (1990) [hereinafter RT-ENTWURF].
60. The Committee was also advised by Helmut Simon, a retired justice of the Fed-
eral Constitutional Court.
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intended to submit their drafts as suggestions to the Round Table
committee.
Personal discussions at that time with individuals involved in
the process of constitutional reform indicated much agreement
about what a new GDR constitution should contain.6 It would cer-
tainly include a full range of liberal defensive rights, as well as a
detailed catalogue of social welfare rights-probably including
rights to shelter, medical care, and employment-along with a sys-
tem of property relations that included substantial amounts of both
private and publicly owned property. Because of the baleful. history
of misuse of the courts in the GDR, most drafters foresaw strong
assurances ofjudicial independence, as well as a constitutional court
that would apply the constitution as "directly enforceable law" and
would implement other values of the rule of law. The new constitu-
tional system would re-create the traditional states of the GDR (ef-
fectively abolished by the SED government in the 1950s), and the
central government would be based on a parliamentary system-
perhaps with a president in addition to a prime minister. The presi-
dent would not be a powerful officer, such as the president of the
Weimar Republic, but might not be an almost-powerless figurehead
as in the Federal Republic. Moreover, the parliament might well
share a significant amount of power with the people themselves act-
ing through popular votes on legislation.62
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm of its participants, the impor-
tance of this work waned in February and March 1990 as it became
clear that the GDR would not continue to exist for a substantial pe-
riod as an independent country, but rather that unification would
take place at an early date. It also became clear that, under the
method favored for unification, the West German Basic Law itself-
with certain limited amendments only-would become the constitu-
tion of the united country. 63 Thus no completely new GDR consti-
tution was to be adopted; nor would there be a need for a
completely new all-German constitution-at least in the first
instance.
Nonetheless, the drafting committee of the Round Table con-
tinued its work and produced a draft of a proposed new GDR consti-
tution in April 1990. Its provisions were an interesting mixture-
reflecting the fundamental underlying structure of the Basic Law,
61. For a contemporary report on these issues, see Quint, Building New Institutions in
East Germany, The Sun (Baltimore), Jan. 21, 1990, at El, col. 2.
62. Id.
63. For detailed discussion of the possible methods of unification, see infra Part V.
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but adding a substantial number of social rights and some plebisci-
tary elements, in accordance with the ideas of the GDR reformers
and the western advisors.64
In a moment of high drama, representatives of the Round Ta-
ble presented this constitutional draft to the newly chosen Prime
Minister of the GDR, Lothar de Maizi~re, in an open session of the
Volkskammer shortly after the GDR's first free election. This cere-
monial gesture could not conceal the hard political fact that, given
the political hegemony of the conservatives in the east as well as the
west, the possibility that such a constitutional draft would have an
immediate impact was negligible.65 As noted below, however, a new
all-German constitution could conceivably be adopted to replace the
Basic Law, even after unification.66 If the political constellation so
changes that a new constitution becomes a practical possibility, the
Round Table's extremely interesting draft will certainly play a role
in the accompanying discussion.67
64. See RT-ErwuRr, supra note 59. For commentary on the draft by one of the West
German advisors, see PreuB, Der Entwurf der Arbeitsgruppe "Neue Verfassung der DDR' des
Runden Tisches fir eine Verfassung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1990 KRITISCHEJus-
TIZ [KJ] 222; Preu3, Auf der Suche nach der Zivilgesellschafi, FAZ, Apr. 28, 1990, at 49, col. 1.
For a bitter attack on the Round Table draft on the grounds that it represents the "con-
stitutional ideas of a green-red [presumably, Greens and SPD] coalition," see Roellecke,
Dritter Weg zum zweiten Fall, FAZ, June 12, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
65. The coalition agreement of the GDR's new government did state that the Round
Table draft (along with the GDR Constitution of 1949) would be "taken into account" in
any constitutional developments, but a motion to adopt the Round Table draft as a new
constitution of the GDR was defeated at an early point in the Volkskammer. See Fischer,
Verfassungsgeschichte der DDR 1990, 1990 KJ 413; Mampel, Das Ende der sozialistischen Veifas-
sung der DDR, 1990 DA 1377, 1385-86.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 129-140.
67. Moreover, the State of Brandenburg-the only one of the five new East German
states that elected a primarily Social Democratic government-will make use of the
Round Table draft in preparing its own state constitution. See infra note 201.
The Round Table draft is characterized by an expansive catalogue of basic rights,
including detailed provisions for social rights, and the "direct" application of certain
constitutional rights against individuals and groups as well as against the state. The
structural provisions of the draft depart to a lesser degree from the fundamental struc-
tures of the Basic Law, but the draft does provide significant opportunities for the public
to take part in lawmaking through direct popular vote. The following are some of the
principal characteristics of this interesting document:
1. "Liberal" Defensive Rights. The Round Table draft contains a full complement of
traditional rights such as equality, free speech, and travel. Some of these "liberal" de-
fensive rights go beyond anything contained in the Basic Law or, for that matter, in the
Constitution of the United States. For example, life imprisonment is prohibited, as well
as the death penalty (as in the Basic Law), see RT-ENTWURF, supra note 59, art. 12, § 5,
and even a foreigner (who, unlike a citizen, might be subject to extradition) cannot be
extradited to a place in which he might be threatened by the death penalty. Id. art. 7,
§ 2. In sharp contrast with the doctrine under the Basic Law, women have a right to
determine whether or not to be pregnant (presumably a right to abortion), id. art. 4, § 3,
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C. Amending the GDR Constitution-The Old Volkskammer and the
Modrow Government
Even during the period when the eventual adoption of a new
and every person has the right to be free of medical experimentation without consent
and the right to dignity in dying, id. art. 4, §§ 1, 2. Long-lasting "living communities"
(nontraditional family-like groups) may not be discriminated against. Id. art. 22, § 2.
Everyone has a right to examine data collected with respect to him, and can indeed
prevent data collection by making an objection-although this right can apparently be
limited to some extent by law. Id. art. 8, § 2. With respect to power plants and other
large projects, every citizen has the right to be heard in the process of planning. Id. art.
21, § 4. Resident aliens have a right to vote in local elections. Id. art. 21, § 2. More-
over, citizens' movements (Biirgerbewegungen), such as those that came to the fore in
the revolutionary events of 1989, are granted special constitutional protection. Id. art.
35.
A number of constitutional rights apply directly against individuals and groups, as
well as against the state (Drittwirkung). These include rights of equality, id. art. 1, § 2;
rights of democracy within associations, id. art. 36, § 2, political parties, id. art. 37, § 2,
and unions, id. art. 39, § 3; certain rights of free speech within employment relation-
ships, id. art. 15, § 1; and employees' rights of co-determination in business enterprises
that are of particular significance for the community, id. art. 28.
On the other hand, some rights have interesting (and perhaps dubious) limitations.
For example, among the qualifications of free speech is the requirement that "war prop-
aganda as well as the public declaration of discrimination that injures human dignity is
to be prohibited by law." Id. art. 15, § 3. Moreover, "the permissibility of means or
methods of research can be limited by law," id. art. 19, § 2; the context of this provision
suggests that it refers to dangerous forms of scientific experimentation, but the state-
ment itself seems considerably broader.
The Round Table draft also strictly qualifies rights of property. Property for per-
sonal use as well as property of collectives is particularly protected. In case of expropri-
ation, only these forms of property are to yield full compensation; owners of other forms
of expropriated property will receive only partial compensation in a "balancing of inter-
ests of the community and those involved." Id. art. 29. Real property may be used only
in accordance with an overall property-use plan and, in a clear echo of rules relating to
the 1945-49 expropriations in the Soviet occupation zone (see infra Part VIII(B)), the
Round Table draft seems to prohibit private property in, or private use of, parcels of
agricultural or forest land that exceed 100 hectares (approximately 250 acres), by re-
serving such extensive holdings for collectives, public institutions, and churches only.
RT-ENTWURF, supra note 59, art. 32, § 1. Moreover, if changes in a land use plan result
in converting certain property into property available for construction, with the result
that the value of the property increases, the property owner must compensate the gov-
ernment for this increase of value--ordinarily by conveying a part of the property (not
exceeding one-half) to the local government. Id. art. 32, § 2.
In a complex series of provisions, the Round Table draft also confirms expropria-
tions that were undertaken by the Soviet occupation authorities from 1945 to 1949 and
approved by article 24 of the GDR Constitution of 1949. Id. art. 131, § 1. Moreover,
expropriations undertaken by the GDR government in accordance with its own law are
confirmed, id. art. 131, § 2, although expropriations in violation of GDR law would be
undone or would give rise to compensation. Id. art. 131, §§ 3-4.
2. "Affirmative" Social Rights. In sharp contrast with the extremely general "social
state" provision of the Basic Law (GG arts. 20, 28)-which guarantees social welfare to
an undefined degree-the Round Table draft sets forth a detailed catalogue of social
rights. These include a right to full social security with respect to sickness, accident,
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GDR constitution seemed to be a real prospect, most believed that
certain constitutional changes were needed so urgently that they
should be made by amending the old 1968/74 Constitution immedi-
ately-even though that document was generally agreed to be fun-
damentally unsalvageable. Because of the urgency of these
amendments, it was necessary that they be enacted by the un-
reformed Volkskammer, even before its replacement by a freely cho-
sen parliament that would be seen as legitimate.
Acting before the election of March 18, 1990, therefore, the old
Volkskammer under the government of Hans Modrow adopted four
sets of amendments which indicate the areas in which reform was
viewed as most urgent in that early period. 68 Although these
amendments lacked the full legitimacy of changes enacted by the
new Volkskammer after the election of March 18, 1990, they made a
more powerful public impression and were in a sense more impor-
tant. After the election of March 18, it was clear that unification
would soon be achieved, and subsequent amendments were steps
leading to that almost certain conclusion. The earlier changes, in
contrast, were measures still being undertaken by a more or less au-
disability, handicap, inability to care for oneself, old age, and unemployment. RT-
ENTWURF, supra note 59, art. 23, § 2. Moreover, the draft guarantees rights to appropri-
ate living space, id. art. 25, and to employment or assistance in securing employment.
Id. art. 27, § 1. In addition to providing equal access to education (including at least a
ten-year required public school education), the state is further required to establish day
care centers, id. art. 24, § 3, and give some support to private schools, id. art. 24, § 4. An
elaborate constitutional provision, id. art. 33, also requires the state and all citizens to
protect the environment.
3. Structural Provisions. The Round Table Draft creates a parliamentary system
analogous to that of the Federal Republic, with a Volkskammer (popular assembly) and a
Uanderkammer (representing the states). Unlike the rule in the Federal Republic, the
Volkskammer can dissolve itself at any time by a vote of two-thirds of its members. Id.
art. 55. Following the lines of the Basic Law, the Round Table Draft. provides for a
Minister-President (Chancellor), along with a cabinet and a president. Executive powers
can be conferred on the cabinet by law, but a statute can state that an executive regula-
tion will be invalid if disapproved by a committee of the Volkskammer. Id. art. 94, § 2.
(Thus the Round Table draft expressly permits a form of "legislative veto" found un-
constitutional in the United States. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)).
In addition to lawmaking by parliament, a complex provision allows for lawmaking
by popular vote: a petition will be presented to the electorate if it is signed by 750,000
voters and if its proposals are not adopted by the Volkskammer in a manner approved
by representatives of the proponents of the petition. RT-Entwurf, supra note 59, art. 98.
The Round Table draft also creates a court to decide constitutional matters, id. art. 109,
and prohibits amendment of the constitution to change certain basic principles, id. art.
100. The draft provides for the re-creation of states in the GDR. Id. art. 129.
68. For a comprehensive discussion of the 1989-90 amendments of the GDR consti-
tution, see Mampel, supra note 65.
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tonomous state in the process of groping toward a new and not en-
tirely foreseeable constitutional order.
1. Rejection of Leading Role of the Communist Party.-The first con-
stitutional change was an amendment of enormous symbolic impor-
tance: on December 1, 1989, the Volkskammer amended article 1 of
the 1974 Constitution to abolish the special leadership role of the
"working class and its Marxist-Leninist party." 69  In this brief
amendment the Volkskammer officially recognized what had been
established in the streets over the preceding two months-the over-
whelming popular rejection of the former political basis of the GDR
and, principally, the leadership role of the Communist Party, which
had manifested itself in numerous aspects of government and life.
This amendment abandoned the central Marxist-Leninist tenet that
historical laws justify the Party's monopoly power and generally
opened the way for the recognition of pluralist democratic forms.7"
2. Joint Ventures.-A second set of amendments, enacted on
January 12, 1990, was impelled by economic imperatives, particu-
larly the urgent need to procure investment from the Federal Re-
public and other western nations. Western investment in socialist
countries often took the form ofjoint ventures between the govern-
ment and foreign corporations. Although some of these projects
may already have been underway in the GDR by early 1990, they
actually violated the Constitution of 1974, which prohibited private
ownership interests in the basic means of production. The amend-
ment ofJanuary 12 removed that prohibition.7 At the same time, a
69. Gesetz zur Anderung der Verfassung der DDR, of Dec. 1, 1989, GBI DDR I 265.
At the same time the Volkskammer declined to alter language in article 1 proclaiming
that the GDR is "a socialist state of workers and farmers." See Mampel, supra note 65, at
1379. This language, which had been added in the 1974 revision, was drawn directly
from the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet Union. See Zieger, supra note 31, at 147. Aban-
donment of this phrase was apparently too much for the old Volkskammer.
70. See generally H. ROGGEMANN, supra note 51, at 193-94 (special role of Party in
Marxist-Leninist theory). Abolition of the leading role of the Communist Party was also
an initial step in constitutional reform in other countries of the East Bloc. On November
28, 1989, for example, the Czechoslovak Communist Party pledged to relinquish its mo-
nopoly of power, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1989, at AI, col. 6, and on January 15, 1990,
Bulgaria became the last of the Soviet Union's European allies to abolish the Party's
monopoly, by deleting the relevant provision from its constitution, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16,
1990, at Al, col. 2. On March 13, 1990, the parliament of the Soviet Union repealed
article 6 of its constitution, a provision that had guaranteed the Party's political monop-
oly. N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1990, at Al, col. 6.
71. Gesetz zur Anderung und Erginzung der Verfassung der DDR, ofJan. 12, 1990,
GBI DDR I 15. According to article 12, § I of the 1968/74 GDR Constitution, "the
minerals of the earth, mines, power plants, dams, large bodies of water, the natural re-
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new provision was added specifically permitting joint ventures if au-
thorized by law,7" and shortly thereafter the government issued reg-
ulations governing joint ventures.7"
This amendment evoked a bitter political dispute over the per-
centage of ownership interests that should be allowed to outside in-
vestors in joint ventures. Some argued that to permit more than
forty-nine percent ownership by private investors would deliver con-
trol of People's Property into the hands of capitalist exploiters;
others maintained that outside investors could be attracted only by
the prospect of control. In light of later developments-including
the swift disappearance of the GDR-this dispute seems to come
from another world; at any rate it suggests that, even in January
1990, many in the GDR still believed that the country had some fu-
ture as an independent nation. In any case, the government's initial
regulation ordinarily limited foreign investors to forty-nine percent
of a joint venture. A higher percentage could be permitted, how-
ever, if the people's general economic interest and the goal of the
undertaking justified it or if the enterprise was "of small or middle
size." 7
4
3. Structural Changes.-The third set of changes was more
structural in nature. On February 20, 1990, the constitution was
amended to abolish the "National Front," an amorphous collection
of organizations that served as an organ of Communist Party electo-
sources of the continental shelf, industrial concerns, banks, insurance companies ... are
People's Property. Private property therein is not permitted." The amendment ofJanu-
ary 12, 1990, removed the last sentence and added the statement, "Deviations from this
[rule] are permitted if authorized by statute."
72. See VERF. DDR art. 14a, added by Gesetz zur Anderung und Erganzung der Verfas-
sung der DDR, of Jan. 12, 1990, GBI DDR I 15. Article 14a also sought to preserve
employees' rights of co-determination in concerns with foreign participation in
ownership.
73. Verordnung iber die Griindung und Tatigkeit von Unternehmen mit auslind-
ischer Beteiligung in der DDR, ofJan. 25, 1990, GBI DDR 1 16; see generally Roggemann,
RechtsgrundlagenfuirAulandsinvestitionen in der DDR, 1990 NJW 671. Among other things,
these regulations required the approval of a government economic committee for the
founding of any joint venture; approval could be denied on the basis of environmental
concerns or if there was a danger that the foreign participant would dominate the con-
cern to the disadvantage of the GDR participants and the GDR economy. The joint
venture was required to establish a special fund "to assure the social and cultural rights
of the workers."
74. GBI DDR 1 16. In reality, these constitutional and statutory changes apparently
did not have substantial practical effect because characteristics of the GDR system of
property-reflected in regulations accompanying the amendments-made it difficult for
entities of the GDR to enter into joint ventures with foreign investors. See Turner &
Pflicke, DDR-Recht im L'mbruch, 1990 NJW 1637, 1639.
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ral control. 75 The amendment also provided for direct elections to
the Volkskammer and guaranteed local voting rights for aliens.76
The number of Volkskammer members was also reduced from 500
to 400. 77
4. Reform of Labor Unions.-The last set of constitutional
changes by the old Volkskammer transformed the nature of labor
unions in the GDR. As described in articles 44 and 45 of the 1974
Constitution-and also in reality-labor unions in the GDR more
closely resembled governmental organs that participated in the
planning of the economy than representatives of the work force in
an adversary relationship with managers of concerns.78 Indeed the
leader of the FDGB, the East German confederation of labor un-
ions, was one of the most powerful government officials in the
GDR.79
By a constitutional amendment of March 6, 1990 and an accom-
panying statute, the Volkskammer sought to change the labor un-
ions into adversary bodies along the lines of the western pattern.
Article 44 was replaced by a new provision which contemplated that
the unions would represent workers' interests in labor struggles,
guaranteed the right to strike, and prohibited lock-outs in any
form.8" This provision reflects a phenomenon that is absent in the
United States Constitution but not uncommon in more modern con-
stitutions-the description and regulation of social or economic in-
stitutions that are not completely governmental in nature. Indeed
the provision prohibiting lock-outs could in effect create constitu-
tional rights among "private" parties-in this case, rights of a union
75. Article 3, providing for the "National Front," was repealed. Gesetz zur
Anderung und Ergainzung der Verfassung der DDR, of Feb. 20, 1990, § 1, GBI DDR I
59. For interesting references to the National Front in the Constitutional Court's first
major opinion on issues arising from unification, see infra note 384. On the National
Front, see generally E. KLEIN & S. LORLER, UBERLEGUNGEN ZUR VERFASSUNGSREFORM IN
DER DDR 44-45 (1989).
76. Gesetz zur Anderung und Ergiinzung der Verfassung der DDR, of Feb. 20, 1990,
§§ 2, 3, GBI DDR 1 59 (amending VERF. DDR (1974) art. 22).
77. Id. § 3 (amending VERF. DDR (1974) art. 54). In addition article 23 was
amended to grant a right of civil alternative service instead of an exclusive requirement
of military service. Gesetz zur Anderung der Verfassung der DDR, of Feb. 20, 1990,
GBI DDR I 60.
78. See Markovits, supra note 45, at 590-95 (noting, however, that in recent years
unions sometimes represented individual workers in disputes about specific employment
decisions).
79. Harry Tisch, the last leader of the FDGB, was the first East German official to go
on trial for corrupt acts while in office. See infra note 226.
80. Gesetz zur A.nderung der Verfassung der DDR, of Mar. 6, 1990, GBI DDR 1 109.
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against an employing company. Interestingly, the Basic Law also
contains a provision that grants labor unions constitutional rights
against private individuals and groups.8 The Basic Law's provi-
sion-prohibiting agreements and other measures that limit the
freedom of joining a union-has its direct source in the Weimar
Constitution.82
D. Amending the GDR Constitution- The New Volkskammer and the
de Maizire Government
After the election of March 18, 1990, a freely elected Volks-
kammer replaced the old legislature composed of the SED, other
"bloc parties," and representatives of other social groups basically
dominated by the SED. The largest group in the new Volkskammer
was the CDU which, having abandoned its past as a compliant bloc
party, had received strong support from its corresponding party in
the west. Along with other conservative parties, the CDU formed
the "Alliance for Germany," which emerged from the election with
slightly less than one-half of the seats in the new Volkskammer. In a
coalition with the small liberal party, the Alliance would have had a
majority in the Volkskammer and would have been able to form a
government. The constitutional changes necessary for unification,
however, required a two-thirds vote of the Volkskammer. Accord-
ingly, the CDU also sought to include the Social Democratic Party
(SPD), the second-largest group in the parliament, and after difficult
negotiations this melange of political parties formed an uneasy coa-
lition government."s The CDU leader Lothar de Maizi~re was
elected Prime Minister by the Volkskammer.
81. See GG art. 9, § 3.
82. WEIMAR CONSTITUTION [WRVI art. 159.
A statute accompanying the constitutional amendment set forth details of the new
type of labor union in the GDR. Gesetz iber die Rechte der Gewerkschaften in der
DDR, of Mar. 6, 1990, GB1 DDR I 110. A vestige of the older system remained in the
unions' continued authority to propose legislation to the Volkskammer. See id. § 10(l),
at 110; compare VERF. DDR (1974) art. 45, § 2; art. 65, § 1. The right to strike set forth in
the constitutional amendment was qualified in the statute by provisions allowing strikes
only after unsuccessful attempts at mediation and allowing the government to suspend
strikes "on the basis of the general good." See Gesetz uber die Rechte der Gewerk-
schaften in der DDR, of Mar. 6, 1990, § 18(1), GBI DDR I 110, II1.
The Round Table draft also includes a provision on labor unions. See RT-ENrrwtJRF,
supra note 59, art. 39. It possesses some similarities to the March 6 amendment but is
much more detailed. Particularly interesting in the Round Table draft is an explicit
guarantee of members' free speech within the union. See id. art. 39, § 3.
83. See generally Coalition Agreement of the GDR Governing Parties, reprinted in
Bundesministerium Fir innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Beilage zu "Informationen" No. 8
(1990).
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On June 17, 1990, the new Volkskammer issued its most sweep-
ing amendment of the old 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR.84 This
amendment sought to alter the basic nature of the constitution by
proclaiming a series of new general principles, reflecting the revolu-
tion accomplished by the popular upheavals of 1989 and the elec-
tion of March 18, 1990.85 The changes also responded to
requirements set forth in the first State Treaty, which had been
signed by the Federal Republic and the GDR on May 18, 1990.86
The amendment declared that all constitutional and other legal
rules were henceforth to be applied in accordance with these new
principles and that any contrary constitutional provisions would be
nullified. Through this technique, the drafters sought to change the
basic nature of the GDR Constitution in a general way, without hav-
ing to undertake-in a very short period of time-the detailed work
that a full new constitutional draft would require.
Article 1, section 1 of the amendment proclaimed the GDR a
"free, democratic, federal, social and ecologically oriented state
based on the rule of law." This provision is similar to a key section
of the Basic Law-article 20(1)-except that it adds a new ecological
orientation. Article 1, section 1 thus impliedly takes a position on
attempts to include an ecological provision in West German consti-
84. See Gesetz zur Anderung und Erginzung der Verfassung der DDR (Verfassungs-
grundsitze), of June 17, 1990, GBI DDR I 299. In earlier amendments on April 5 the
new Volkskammer had revoked the preamble of the 1974 Constitution and enacted ad-
ministrative provisions relating to the Council of Ministers and Volkskammer; the con-
stitution was also amended to authorize an office of President of the GDR to replace the
Council of State, although this office was never filled or even officially established by
statute. Gesetz zur Anderung und Erganzung der Verfassung der DDR, of Apr. 5, 1990,
GBI DDR I 221.
In a somewhat self-contradictory provision, the Constitution was also amended to
make clear that the new government would not have to refer to the Constitution in
taking the oath of office-a change that suggests the profound ambivalence with which
the necessity of continuing to work under the 1968/74 Constitution was viewed. Gesetz
zur Anderung und Erganzung der Verfassung der DDR, of Apr. 12, 1990, GBI DDR I
229. Shortly thereafter, another statute, providing for self-government of local units,
deleted inconsistent provisions of the 1968/74 Constitution-articles 41, 43 and 81-85.
See Mampel, supra note 65, at 1386-87.
85. In May 1990, after the Volkskammer's rejection of the Round Table draft but
before the sweeping amendments of June 17, the Justice Minister of the de Maizicre
government appointed a commission of constitutional experts drawn from the Federal
Republic and GDR governments and from the universities. This group was charged
with the task of drafting a proposal for a new interim constitution based on the GDR
Constitution of 1949. The commission apparently finished its work in the extraordina-
rily short period of time allotted to it, but the results were ignored by the GDR govern-
ment, which chose to issue the constitutional amendments of June 17 instead. The
commission's draft was never published. See generally Fischer, supra note 65, at 419-21.
86. See infra Part VI; Stern, supra note 14, at 25.
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tutions-a movement that has succeeded with respect to some of the
state constitutions but not with respect to the Basic Law.87 Article 1,
section 2 of the June 17 amendment seeks to complement the basic
principles of section 1 by declaring that rules "binding individuals
or [state organs] to the socialist state and legal order, the principle
of democratic centralism, socialist legality, the social legal con-
sciousness, or the views of individual groups of the population or
parties, are revoked."-8 8 In all, the purpose of article 1 was to adopt
a basic order resembling that of the Federal Republic and to reject
the principles that had guided the constitution and the rest of the
legal order up to the 1989 revolution.
The next series of articles in theJune 17 amendment sought to
support capitalist property and economic relations by guaranteeing
private property rights in land and the means of production as well
as the freedom of economic activity.89 Nonetheless, according to
article 2, special forms of property would be permissible for govern-
ment participation in economic affairs, and the use of property
should serve the common good and preservation of the natural ba-
sis of life. To some extent, the latter provision seems to parallel the
statement in article 14 of the Basic Law that "property has its obli-
gations," 90 but the language of the amendment seems, if anything,
to qualify property rights to a greater extent than the corresponding
language of the Basic Law and also seems to recognize a qualifica-
tion in favor of environmental protection. 9 '
Article 5 of the June 17 amendments amplifies the declaration
in article 1 that the GDR is a state based on the rule of law, by
87. See Haberle, Verfassungspolitik fu'r die Freiheit und Einheit Deutschlands, 1990 JURIS-
TENZmrUNG UZI 358, 363; Mampel, supra note 65, at 1388.
88. A provision similar to that of article 1, § 2-rejecting various principles such as
socialist legality and the socialist legal consciousness in the GDR-had already been
contained in a protocol to the State Treaty. See infra Part VI. The reference to "views of
individual groups of the population or parties"-a phrase also contained in the proto-
col-is evidently a reference to provisions in the GDR Constitution referring to the
working class and the SED.
Article 1, § 3 of the June 17 amendment introduced the principle of judicial review
into the GDR but left the details to future regulation by statute.
89. As discussed above, private property interests in the principal means of produc-
tion had been totally prohibited until the constitutional amendment ofJanuary 12, 1990.
See supra text accompanying note 71.
90. See Mampel, supra note 65, at 1389.
91. Article 3 of the amendment goes on to set forth a right to enter into contracts
and economic activity in general. Article 4 sets forth rights to form labor unions and
employers' associations-a provision that to some extent complements the March 6 con-
stitutional amendment changing the nature of labor unions. See supra text accompanying
notes 78-82.
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strengthening the independence of the judiciary. As noted above,
the susceptibility of the judges to political pressure from the Com-
munist Party was one of the characteristics of the old GDR state
most criticized by the reformers. Article 5, section 1 is identical to
the first sentence of article 19(4) of the Basic Law, which guarantees
each individual the possibility of a legal remedy for a violation of
rights; this provision, which forms the basis of West German admin-
istrative law, secures an extensive system of review of administrative
decisions. According to article 5, section 2 of the June 17 amend-
ments, "The judges are independent and subject only to the Consti-
tution (in accordance with the provisions of this constitutional
amendment) and the law."9 2 To make the point absolutely clear,
article 5 also provides that the judges are "to that extent subject to
no supervision of state or societal organs."93
Articles 6 and 7 require the state to protect the environment
and to further the right to work-provisions that elaborate on the
general goals of article 1 and reflect an approach to social welfare
and environment that goes beyond that of the Basic Law.9 4
Although the Basic Law contains a very general provision declaring
that the Federal Republic is a "social state," there are few provisions
that render this guarantee more concrete, and any provision con-
cerning a right of employment has met strenuous resistance in the
Federal Republic. Finally, articles 8 and 9 make clear that the GDR
can confer certain rights of sovereignty on international organs or
organs of the Federal Republic and that state treaties and interna-
tional agreements of the GDR can effect constitutional changes; in
both cases approval by two-thirds of the members of the Volks-
kammer is necessary. The first of these provisions is similar to arti-
cle 24(1) of the Basic Law; it was necessary in order to authorize
those aspects of the State Treaty that conferred substantial authority
over economic matters in the GDR on the Bundesbank, an organ of
the Federal Republic. 95 The second provision made clear that the
92. This provision is a close adaptation of a portion of article 97(1) of the Basic Law
which states that "the judges are independent and subject only to the law."
93. Indeed this provision also states that "leadership of the jurisprudence of lower
courts by higher courts is not permissible"--a provision that seems to promote "inde-
pendence" of the judiciary to an extraordinary degree. This provision is probably a
reaction to the system through which the Supreme Court of the GDR set forth
mandatory guidelines that were intended to direct the lower courts as an aspect of dem-
ocratic centralism. See supra note 57; VERF. DDR (1974) art. 93.
94. Similar provisions were contained in the Round Table draft for a new constitu-
tion of the GDR. See supra note 67.
95. See Fischer, supra note 65, at 423.
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State Treaty and the later Unification Treaty could amend the con-
stitution upon approval of two-thirds of the members of the
Volkskammer.96
All in all, these provisions, which were criticized for their lack of
judicial precision," seemed to be an attempt to form a conceptual
bridge to unification by replacing fundamental principles of the
GDR Constitution with principles more in accord with those of the
Basic Law. Nonetheless, certain points of tension with the Basic
Law were also evident. By including specific social welfare and envi-
ronmental provisions, the Volkskammer seemed to indicate that
even the conservatives in the GDR were willing to support certain
constitutional changes that ,continue to meet the skepticism or op-
position of conservative political groups in the Federal Republic.98
96. This provision was useful because the June 17 amendments were adopted after
the State Treaty was signed, but before that treaty had been ratified by the Volks-
kammer. For critical commentary on the provision, see id. at 423; Mampel, supra note
65, at 1389-90.
97. For a particularly bitter criticism, see Fischer, supra note 65, at 421-24.
98. On July 5, 1990, the Volkskammer adopted additional constitutional amend-
ments relating to the subject ofjudges and state prosecutors, one of the areas of greatest
abuse under the old regime. Verfassungsgesetz zur Anderung und Erginzung des Ger-
ichtsverfassungsgesetzes, of July 5, 1990, GBI DDR I 634; Verfassungsgesetz zur
Anderung und Erganzung des Gesetzes iber die Staatsanwaltschaft der DDR, ofJuly 5,
1990, GBI DDR I 635. These constitutional changes, which were accompanied by de-
tailed statutory amendments, sought to create a professional and independent judiciary
and prosecutorial force in place of organs previously subject to political control. The
amendments abolished the previous power of the Volkskammer and the Council of State
to choose, remove, or supervise Supreme Court judges and chief state prosecutors, and
they removed the Supreme Court's power to control the lower courts. See VERF. DDR
(1974) arts. 49, 50, 74, 92, 93. Articles 94 and 95 were amended to establish a system of
professional choice ofjudges, replacing the previous electoral system in most cases. Ar-
ticles 97 and 98, binding prosecutors to the "strict preservation of socialist legality" and
providing unitary control of prosecutors, were repealed. These changes give greater
specificity to more general principles relating to the judiciary previously adopted in the
June 17 amendments. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. Like the June 17
amendments, these changes were designed to implement the provisions of the first State
Treaty. See supra text accompanying note 86.
Later in July, the Volkskammer enacted a statute that had the effect of amending the
constitution to re-create the five states of the GDR that had been effectively abolished in
the 1950s. Verfassungsgesetz zur Bildung von Laindern in der DDR-Landerein-
ftihrungsgesetz-ofJuly 22, 1990, GBI DDR I 955. Because the re-creation of the East
German ander is an important topic in its own right, this amendment will be discussed
in detail in Part VII below. Finally, in July the Volkskammer amended the GDR Consti-
tution to allow the creation of private schools, which had not been permitted in the GDR
under the Constitution of 1968/74. Verfassungsgesetz fiber Schulen in freier Trager-
schaft, ofJuly 22, 1990, GBI DDR 1 1036.
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V. METHODS OF UNIFICATION UNDER THE BASIC LAW
As calls for unification became more insistent, attention began
to turn to the question of how that goal should be achieved. There
were several possible constitutional methods of unification, and the
question of which method should be chosen had an important bear-
ing not only for the relations between the two parts of Germany, but
also for domestic political issues within the Federal Republic.
From the beginning, three possible methods of unification
seemed to be in prospect.
A. Confederation
At the commencement of the East German reform movement in
late 1989 some political figures proposed a confederation of the two
German states-or perhaps an even looser form of "treaty commu-
nity." Through this technique, the two states could preserve their
individual structures and governments while gradually merging
some specified functions. Indeed, Chancellor Kohl proposed a con-
federation in his ten-point plan on November 28, 1989, carefully
pointing out that this form of partial consolidation did not preclude
full unification-called for by the Basic Law-at a later point.99
Some of the new reform parties in the GDR, particularly Democracy
Now, also proposed a confederation,' as did an influential article
in Der Spiegel by two members of the Constitutional Court.'0 '
The impetus underlying Kohl's proposal, however, seemed to
differ considerably from that underlying the views of groups like De-
mocracy Now. Kohl's original call for confederation seemed to fol-
low the counsels of caution-a political impulse not to move too
quickly, for fear of domestic and foreign opposition-and perhaps
also uncertainty about the precise nature of the problems that lay in
the way. For some of the reform parties, however, confederation
was a means of preserving the possibility of developing a form of
democratic society different from that of the Federal Republic:
more social, less aggressively capitalistic, imbued with more plebis-
citary elements-perhaps a type of democratic socialism. Of course,
99. See WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 182-89; see also id. at 194, 236. Ironi-
cally, the idea of confederation had been first suggested (under quite different terms) by
GDR leader Walter Ulbricht in January 1957, and it was repeated by Soviet and GDR
officials thereafter. See M. MCCAULEY, supra note 26, at 87.
100. See, e.g., WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 224 (confederation as interim step
in unification plan). Some prominent members of the SPD also favored this method.
101. B6ckenf'orde & Grimm, ,Vachdenken tiber Deutschland, DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 5, 1990, at
72-77.
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the idea of confederation would not necessarily exclude substantial
economic support flowing to the GDR from the Federal Republic.
With this form of confederation-even if it were to exist only for an
interim period-a new GDR constitution would be necessary to re-
place the Stalinist document of 1968/74, and the original impetus
toward constitution drafting in the GDR can be viewed partly in this
light.
For all of its attractive possibilities, quasi-unification by confed-
eration had little political support. Kohl abandoned it as soon as he
saw that something more permanent was possible. Moreover, the
idea of confederation-as well as the reform parties supporting it-
were massively rejected in the election of March 18, 1990, which
showed that a substantial majority of GDR voters wanted complete
political unification as quickly as possible. 0 2
B. Article 146 of the Basic Law
The election of March 18 with its clear mandate for rapid unifi-
cation raised the question of how this goal was to be accom-
plished-a question which, in turn, required examination of the
status of unification under the constitutions of both German states.
The 1974 GDR Constitution said nothing about German unification
because by the 1970s the position of the GDR (and the Soviet gov-
ernment) was that the GDR and the Federal Republic were two sep-
arate states; as noted above, this was a change from an earlier
eastern view more favorable to unification.' 0 3 In any case, unifica-
tion in any foreseeable form would involve dissolution of the
GDR-an action that would require amendment of the GDR consti-
tution by a vote of two-thirds of the Volkskammer. 0 4
On the other hand, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic was
102. See, e.g., Starck, Deutschland auf dm Wege zur staatlichen Einheit, 1990 JZ 349, 352.
103. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. The GDR Constitution of 1949 was in-
tended to be used as an all-German constitution and therefore sometimes employs the
term "Germany" or "German people." See, e.g., VERF. DDR (1949) art. 1, § I ("Ger-
many is an indivisible democratic republic .. "); art. 51, § I ("The Volkskammer con-
sists of representatives of the German people."). The 1968 Constitution of the GDR
also contained references to "Germany" or "the German nation," see, e.g., VERF. DDR
(1968) Preamble; art. 1; art. 3, but these references were systematically removed in the
1974 amendments.
104. See VERF. DDR (1974) art. 63, § 2. The procedure necessary for amending the
GDR Constitution was rather simple compared, for example, with the elaborate and
difficult amendment procedure in the Constitution of the United States. The 1968/74
GDR Constitution could be amended by a two-thirds vote of the single-house legislature
(Volkskammer), so long as the statute so adopted explicitly stated that it was intended to
amend or add to the Constitution. See id. art. 63, § 2; art. 106. Under the GDR Consti-
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conceived as a provisional document that foresaw-and, as inter-
preted by the Constitutional Court, indeed required-steps toward
eventual unification. Consequently, in striking contrast with most
constitutions, the Basic Law contemplated its own termination, and
the constitutional provision governing termination set forth a possi-
ble method by which unification could be achieved. Article 146, the
termination provision, declared that "this Basic Law will lose its va-
lidity on the effective date of a constitution that has been chosen by
the German people in a free decision." This provision not only pre-
scribed the method for terminating the effectiveness of the Basic
Law, but also could be seen as explaining that German unification
could be accomplished by the adoption of a new constitution by the
people of both German states.
In accordance with this provision, therefore, some commenta-
tors proposed adoption of a new, all-German constitution that
would replace both the GDR Constitution and the Basic Law. There
was little authoritative guidance, however, on how this new constitu-
tion was to be adopted. According to the Constitutional Court, a
"certain minimal standard of free-democratic guarantees" must be
preserved in this process.' 0 5 Perhaps an all-German constitutional
convention could propose a draft, or perhaps the draft could be put
forward jointly by the West German Bundestag and the GDR Volks-
kammer-in either case the constitution might be ratified by both
populations in a plebiscite.'0 6 Some commentators argued that
upon the adoption of a new, all-German constitution under article
146, both the Federal Republic and the GDR would disappear as
legal subjects, to be replaced by a new entity: a united "Ger-
many."' 0 7 Most maintained, however, that unification under article
146 would not disturb the continuity of the Federal Republic as the
surviving legal subject-primarily because the prevailing doctrine
tution of 1949, as well as under the Weimar Constitution, it had also been possible to
amend the Constitution by plebiscite. See VERF. DDR (1949) art. 83, § 3; WRV art. 76.
It has been argued that the democratic revolution in 1989-90 in the GDR had the
effect of rendering the Stalinist Constitution of 1968/74 obsolete and therefore no
longer valid-except that certain structural provisions could continue on with the force
of statutory law only. See Isensee, Staatseinheit und Verfassungskontinuitit, 49 Veroffent-
lichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer [VVDStRL 39, 43 n.9
(1990). This argument did not gain wide acceptance, however, and all steps in the GDR
leading up to unification were taken on the basis of the existing 1968/74 Constitution-
as amended in accordance with the procedure of that constitution itself. See Mampel,
supra note 65, at 1382; Stern, supra note 14, at 24-25.
105. 5 BVerfGE 85, 132 (1956).
106. See, e.g., 3 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, supra note 7, art. 146, No. 5.
107. See Moschel, DDR-JI'ege aus der Krise, 1990JZ 306, 310.
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viewed the Federal Republic (but not the GDR) as in some sense
identical with the continuing "German Reich."' 0 8
It was possible that unification through article 146-and partic-
ularly the adoption of a new constitution by plebiscite-could cure a
democratic "deficit" in the adoption of the Basic Law in 1949. In
contrast with the Weimar Constitution and most of the Lander con-
stitutions after World War II, the Basic Law was not proposed by a
body that had been directly elected by the people. Rather, the Basic
Law was proposed by a "Parliamentary Council" that had been cho-
sen by the legislatures of the Linder.'0 9 The western Allies origi-
nally contemplated that this democratic deficit would be resolved by
submitting the proposal of the Parliamentary Council to a popular
referendum in each of the Linder." 0 The Parliamentary Council
ultimately decided, however, that the Basic Law should be ratified
by the legislatures of the Lander rather than the people them-
selves."' On the other hand, it can be argued that the Basic Law
has in effect been ratified by usage through its continual observance
under democratic forms.' 12
It is indeed arguable that the framers of the Basic Law intended
that unification would come about through the adoption of a new
constitution under article 146. Moreover, from the point of view of
democratic theory, the use of article 146 had another distinct advan-
tage: a new document presumably would be adopted after extensive
discussion of constitutional ideas from both the Federal Republic
and the GDR, including not only the more-or-less settled political
ideas of the western parties but also the new democratic self-under-
108. See, e.g., Frowein, Die Verfassungslage Deutschlands im Rahmen des V6lkerrechts, 49
VVDStRL 7, 25-26 (1990); Isensee, supra note 104, at 47-48; supra text accompanying
notes 3-4.
109. Accordingly, the Parliamentary Council included "only a narrowly drawn leader-
ship-elite of the political parties .... That the Parliamentary Council represented the
German people in its full extent was accordingly an obviously untenable fiction."
MuBgnug, Zustandekommen des Grundgesetzes und Entstehen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in I
HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 219, 254 (J. Isensee
& P. Kirchhof ed. 1987).
110. See Frankfurt Documents, July 1, 1948, reprinted in I DOKUMENTE DES GETEILTEN
DEUTSCHLAND 88-89 (I. v. Minch 2d ed. 1976) [hereinafter DOKUMENTE].
111. This decision was consistent with the Basic Law's general hostility to plebiscites.
See 3 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, supra note 7, art. 144, No. 12. Perhaps ratification by
plebiscite might also have suggested that the Basic Law would possess a permanence
that would have been inconsistent with the document's intended "provisional" status.
112. For the argument that the Basic Law received popular legitimation in the first
Bundestag election, on the ground that a large percentage of the population voted in
that election and chose parties that had voted for the Basic Law, see Muf3gnug, supra
note 109, at 255-56.
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standing arising from the reform movements of the GDR." 3
Although good arguments were thus available for the use of ar-
ticle 146, both on authority and principle, and although the use of
article 146 had some support (for example from some parts of the
SPD), it was clear after the election of March 18 that this solution
also had no practical political chance. Indeed it probably was the
democratic advantages of this process-the possibility of a cross-fer-
tilization of ideas from east and west-that assured its demise. The
CDU/CSU government in the west (which also largely controlled
the conservative coalition in the east) did not want to take the
chance that provisions that it considered dubious or even danger-
ous-for example, expanded social guarantees, such as a right to
employment or living space, or increased plebiscitary elements now
almost completely absent in the Basic Law-would make their way
into a new all-German constitution. Both governments may also
have feared that a risk of political instability might arise from the
time-consuming and contentious process of drafting a new constitu-
tion. Consequently, the prevailing political coalition sought unifica-
tion in a manner that would extend the Basic Law in its present form
over the newly united country, with as few changes as possible.
C. Article 23 of the Basic Law
The method that was most clearly designed to achieve the con-
servatives' goals was set forth in article 23 of the Basic Law which,
like article 146, did not specifically regulate unification but nonethe-
less presented a method for its achievement. The principal function
of article 23 was to describe the territorial coverage of the Basic
Law-a particularly important provision after the territorial rear-
rangements following World War II and the division of Germany
into occupation zones. According to article 23, the Basic Law would
be in effect at the outset in the states of "Baden, Bavaria [and all the
original states of the Federal Republic and Berlin.] In other parts of
Germany [the Basic Law would] be put into effect after their
accession."
This provision raises several interesting points. For instance, it
assumes that there are "other parts" of "Germany" that can "accede
to" (or join) the Federal Republic-the territory of the Basic Law." 4
When these "other parts of Germany" join the Federal Republic,
113. Cf. Haiberle, supra note 87, at 360 (emphasizing the importance of the new "con-
stitutional culture" that had arisen in late 1989 in the GDR).
114. The Basic Law was not the first German constitution to contain such a provision.
The Constitution of the North German Confederation (1867) and the Weimar Constitu-
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the Basic Law would be extended to cover them as well. The "join-
ing" parts of Germany would become unified with the Federal Re-
public, but it is the Federal Republic that would survive; the joining
parts, as separate legal subjects, would unquestionably disappear.
There was no possibility of arguing-as might have been the case
with unification under article 146-that both the Federal Republic
and the GDR would be replaced by a new legal entity.
Indeed, the relationship between article 23 and article 146 is
not entirely clear. Because article 23 speaks of parts "joining" or
"acceding to" the Federal Republic, and because article 146 seems
to cover the case of general unification, it could be argued that arti-
cle 23 was only intended to cover the case of relatively small parts of
"Germany" joining the Federal Republic. Indeed, the only previous
use of article 23 occurred in 1957, when it was invoked to allow the
Saarland to accede to the Federal Republic after the voters of the
Saar rejected a special "Europeanized" status in a plebiscite." 5 On
the other hand, the historical materials may indicate that the Parlia-
mentary Council also viewed article 23 as a possible method for
achieving unification of the Federal Republic with the GDR (or the
Soviet occupation zone, as it then was)." 6 Indeed, in the Basic
Treaty case the Constitutional Court explicitly stated that the GDR
was "another part" of Germany that could "accede" to the Federal
Republic under article 23, and that this provision had in no way be-
come obsolete.' 1 7
tion both contained sections contemplating the possible accession of additional terri-
tory. See Frowein, supra note 108, at 14.
115. In its argument before the Constitutional Court in the Basic Treaty case, see supra
note 2, the government maintained that article 23 of the Basic Law was intended solely
for the accession of the Saarland-a position ultimately rejected by the Court. 0. KIM-
MINICH, DIE EIGENTUMSGARANTIE IM PROZEB DER WIEDERVEREINIGUNG 20 (1990); Stem,
supra note 14, at 33. For historical background on the problem of the Saar, see 4
BVerfGE 157 (1955) (Saar Statute Case). See also R. DOLZER, THE PATH TO GERMAN
UNIrY: THE CONSTITUTIONAL, LEGAL AND INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK 17-18 (American
Institute for Contemporary German Studies, German Issues No. 8, 1990).
116. See Binne, Forum: Verfassungsrechtliche Uberlegungen zu einem "Beitritt'" der DDR nach
Art. 23 GG, 1990 JURISTISCnE SCHULUNG UuS] 446, 448. See also T. MAUNZ & G. DORIG,
GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR, art. 23, No. 37 [hereinafter MAUNZ-DijRIG].
117. 36 BVerfGE 1, 29 (1973). It is also worth noting that the expression "Ger-
many"--other parts of which may accede to the Federal Republic-may have been in-
tended to refer to the German borders of December 31, 1937 (thus including territories
east of the Oder-NeiBe line, now in Poland). A reference to these borders in article 116
of the Basic Law (defining the concept "German" for purposes of citizenship) may sug-
gest such an interpretation. Thus, in theory, these territories might also have sought to
accede to the Federal Republic under article 23, although this was a most unlikely pros-
pect. This theoretical possibility required, however, that article 23 be stricken from the
Basic Law after the accession of the GDR, as part of the final settlement of the Polish-
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For conservatives in the Federal Republic the use of article 23
was a reassuring solution." 8 Under this section the Basic Law-and
forty years of Constitutional Court case law interpreting its provi-
sions-would remain in effect and would be extended to the terri-
tory of the GDR. Almost all of the central governmental institutions
of the new, united Germany would be the familiar institutions of the
Federal Republic, with such alterations and extensions as would be
needed to accommodate the additional territory and population.
Only a few changes would be necessary in the Basic Law, and they
would not touch the basic structure of state or society. Rather,
these changes would be limited to those necessary to recognize that
full unification had been achieved and, in a few cases, to recognize
specific historical developments in the former GDR." 9
The steps necessary for "accession" under article 23 were gen-
erally accepted in the literature. 2 ' The accession had to be de-
clared by the GDR or by the states or other subdivisions of the
GDR. The decision to accede had to be made in accordance with a
democratic procedure-either by plebiscite or by the vote of a dem-
ocratically organized government,' 2 ' although that government
need not possess all of the specific democratic attributes of the Fed-
eral Republic under the Basic Law. Accordingly, it was necessary
for the GDR to amend its 1974 constitution to include sufficient
democratic attributes and to remove provisions that hindered unifi-
German border question, through which the Oder-NeiBe line was recognized by treaty.
Accordingly, the Unification Treaty, signed by the two German states on August 31,
1990, see infra Part VIII, required the deletion of article 23 from the Basic Law after
unification. A similar provision was also included in the treaty concluding the "Two
Plus Four" discussions. See infra Part X(D).
118. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 262 n.48 (conservatives favored accession under
article 23 because it would retain "tested" West German system; SPD sought new con-
stitution under article 146).
119. For example, along with the deletion of article 23 of the Basic Law, it was neces-
sary to amend the Preamble to indicate that unification had been achieved and was not
something to be sought in the future; retention of the original preamble could call the
Oder-Neie settlement into question by implying that some "German" territory re-
mained that must ultimately be reunited with the territory covered by the Basic Law. See
infra Part VIII(A). Treaty resolutions of questions of expropriated property and abor-
tion required amendments of the Basic Law, as did certain other (less controversial)
provisions in the Unification Treaty relating to the gradual introduction of certain as-
pects of the law of the Federal Republic into the territory of the former GDR. See infra
Part VIII.
120. See generally Binne, supra note 116; Heintschel von Heinegg, Der Beititt "anderer
Teile Deutschlands" zur Bundesrepublik nach Art. 23 Satz 2 GG, 1990 DIE OFFENTLICHE
VERWALTUNG [DOV] 425.
121. See, e.g., Degenhart, Verfassungsfragen der deutschen Einheit, 1990 DVBI 973, 974.
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cation or prevented economic reform.' 22 Moreover, because acces-
sion in effect required dissolution of the GDR and revocation of its
constitution, a vote to accede to the Federal Republic also required
a two-thirds vote of the Volkskammer.123
Under article 23, the government of the Federal Republic had
no power to reject the accession of "another part of Germany," 124
although it could examine the method of accession to determine
that it was the product of "free will.' 25 Thus, although the part of
Germany that was joining the Federal Republic must presumably
make its decision in a democratic manner, the populace of the Fed-
eral Republic had no power through democratic means to reject the
accession. This interpretation is consistent with the Constitutional
Court's view that the Basic Law requires the government of the Fed-
eral Republic to seek unification.' 26 Although some argued that a
specific statute of the Bundestag was necessary in order to extend
the Basic Law over the territory that "acceded,"'127 the Bundestag
may have been constitutionally obligated to enact such a statute.,
28
D. A New Constitution Under Article 146 After Accession
Under Article 23
Even after accession under article 23, however, the possibility
of a new all-German constitution under article 146 is not completely
foreclosed.' 29 Article 146 says nothing about when such a new con-
stitution must be adopted. Although a new constitution could have
been the final step in unification in place of accession under article
122. For a discussion of this process, see supra Part IV.
123. See supra note 104. In the Basic Treaty case, the Constitutional Court noted that
"other parts of Germany' have . . . found their statehood in the German Democratic
Republic," and therefore these "other parts" can declare their "accession" to the Fed-
eral Republic only through a process consistent with the Constitution of the GDR. 36
BVerfGE 1, 29 (1973).
124. See Stern, supra note 14, at 36; MAUNz-DURIG, supra note 116, art. 23, No. 40.
125. Id. art. 23, No. 44.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 2-4.
127. MAUNZ-DORIG, supra note 116, art. 23, No. 43.
128. MAUNz-DURIG, supra note 116, art. 23, No. 44; Rauschning, supra note 10, at 401.
It is not clear whether the entire West German legal system would extend to the
GDR immediately upon accession if no special provision were made for this purpose.
Article 23 declared that the Basic Law would extend to the acceding territory but it said
nothing about the rest of the legal system. One could argue, however, that the remain-
der of the legal system would be extended by implication. An intermediate position
might be that remaining GDR law would continue in effect as a form of state law in all of
the Linder constituting the GDR, but would be superseded to the extent inconsistent
with federal law. As a practical matter, these questions were subject to comprehensive
regulation in the Unification Treaty. See infra Part VIII(A).
129. See MAUNZ-DURIG, supra note 116, art. 23, No. 37.
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23, the provisions of article 146 seem to authorize adoption of a new
constitution by vote of an all-German parliament (or even by plebi-
scite, or by a combination of the two) after accession. Consequently,
as early as summer 1990, the Linder with SPD governments pro-
posed that within one year after unification the Bundesversamm-
lung-a special organ composed of the members of the Bundestag
and an equal number of members chosen by the state legisla-
tures°3 0-should elect a constitutional council or convention which
would prepare a new constitution modeled on the Basic Law, to be
presented to the people for ratification.31
Yet, from the outset, the permissibility of using article 146 in
this manner was not undisputed. Because article 146 was originally
intended as a method of accomplishing German unification, it could
have been argued that after unification under article 23 the provi-
sions of article 146 should be deleted from the Basic Law.' 32 In-
deed, some suggested that, after unification under article 23, the
provisions of article 146 would become obsolete and therefore in-
valid, even if the article remained in the text of the Basic Law.13 3
Perhaps with this problem in mind, the framers of unification
made a deliberate decision to retain article 146 as a functioning part
of the Basic Law. The Unification Treaty entered into by the Fed-
eral Republic and the GDR required the amendment of article 146
in a manner indicating that the provision retains its validity even
after unification.' 34 This amendment therefore changes the basic
nature of article 146 from a provision contemplating a new constitu-
tion in the course of German unification, to a provision providing a
broader opportunity for the adoption of a new basic document. 3 5
The governing CDU/CSU coalition might well have preferred to de-
130. See GG art. 54, § 3.
131. FAZ, July 26, 1990, at 2, col. 2.
132. Thus, upon unification, article 23 itself was repealed. See supra note 117.
133. See Degenhart, supra note 121, at 976 (suggesting that the GDR, having chosen to
accede under article 23, accepted the Basic Law and could not seek to replace it under
article 146). See also Badura, Deutschlands aktuelle Verfassungslage, 115 ARCHv DES 6FFENT-
LICHEN RECHTS [A6R] 314, 318-20 (1990) (discussing Professor Isensee's view that with
accession under article 23, the purpose of articles 23, 146 and the unification mandate of
the Preamble had been achieved and therefore, following accession, these provisions
should be considered obsolete).
134. For a discussion of this provision and the Unification Treaty in general, see irifra
text accompanying notes 238-241.
135. See generally Stern, Der veyfassungsandernde Charakter des Einigungsvertrages, 1990
DEUTSCH-DEUTSCHE RECHTS-ZEITSCHRIF-r [DtZ] 289, 293. The retention and amend-
ment of article 146 should be read together with other provisions of the Unification
Treaty recommending that parliament examine the possibility of constitutional reform.
Id.; see infra text accompanying notes 242-243.
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lete article 146 altogether, but it was probably forced to accept these
provisions by the SPD, Biindnis 90, and the Greens in order to
achieve the two-thirds vote necessary for ratification of the Unifica-
tion Treaty.
Neither the original nor the amended version of article 146 sets
forth a specific method for adopting a new, all-German constitution.
Arguably, therefore, a simple majority in a plebiscite might adopt
the new basic document-perhaps following its proposal by a simple
majority of a national convention convened for that purpose. Con-
sequently, conservative voices in the Federal Republic-including
political figures and legal scholars-have viewed the continued
existence of article 146 as a threat.' 3 6 Indeed, leaders of the CDU
have argued that those who favor such a plebiscite seek to create a
"different republic" without the necessity of achieving the two-
thirds majority required for an ordinary constitutional
amendment. ' 3 7
Some commentators have denied, however, that article 146 au-
thorizes adoption of a new constitution by a simple majority. Ac-
cording to this argument, article 146 must be read together with
article 79(2) of the Basic Law, which requires a two-thirds vote of
the Bundestag and the Bundesrat for a constitutional amendment:
since adoption of a new constitution is even more sweeping than
adoption of a single constitutional amendment, article 146 must be
read to require a two-thirds vote at some point in the process. For
example, a two-thirds vote of the Bundestag and Bundesrat might
be necessary to propose a constitutional amendment for a plebi-
scite.' 38 If article 146 is used to adopt a new constitution by simple
majority in the future, this widely debated question will certainly re-
quire resolution by the Constitutional Court.
Unless the political constellation changes considerably in the
months following unification, however, the same forces that sup-
ported the use of article 23 could probably prevent any subsequent
use of article 146 to work significant constitutional changes. Yet re-
cent deliberations in the Free Democratic Party (FDP) suggest that
this party-whose support is necessary to maintain the CDU coali-
136. See FAZ, Sept. 24, 1990, at 1, col. 5; Isensee, Selbstpreisgabe des Grundgesetzes?, FAZ,
Aug. 28, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
137. See, e.g., FAZ, Sept. 24, 1990, at 5, col. 1 (CDU official fears that right of employ-
ment and right to a dwelling might be introduced through Bundestag vote and plebiscite
under article 146). For a contrasting view, see, e.g., G6hring, Einigungsvertrag und Mie-
recht, 1990 DtZ 317, 318 (arguing that a right to a dwelling should be introduced into a
new all-German constitution).
138. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 293-94.
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tion-may side with the Social Democrats on the question of pro-
posing significant constitutional changes for approval through a
plebiscite.'39 A more modest proposal is that the democratic deficit
in the original adoption of the Basic Law be removed after accession
under article 23, by adopting the Basic Law itself as the new, all-
German constitution under article 146 through parliamentary deci-
sion followed by a plebiscite. 140
VI. THE STATE TREATY
Amalgamation of two quite different social, economic, and legal
systems could not be accomplished instantaneously; instead a pro-
cess of rapprochement and accommodation was necessary in which
the manifold problems could be faced and to some extent resolved.
The first official step in this process was the signing on May 18, 1990
of a "Treaty Concerning the Creation of a Currency, Economic, and
Social Union" between the GDR and the Federal Republic-gener-
ally known as the "State Treaty."' 4' With the signing of this agree-
ment, and the partial merger of the two economic systems, the
process of unification had reached a point of no return.
The most noticeable effect of the State Treaty was the introduc-
tion of the West German currency, the Deutsche Mark (D-Mark),
into the GDR onJuly 1, 1990. The immediate result of this currency
reform was the sudden appearance of western consumer goods in
the GDR. Bananas and other previously exotic fruits appeared in
stands on the streets of East Berlin. Over a weekend, shops in the
139. See FAZ, Oct. 9, 1990, at 1, col. 2; see also FAZ, Oct. 15, 1990, at 4, col. 4. Cf.
Frankfurter Rundschau [FR], Sept. 18, 1990, at 1, col. 2 (describing a "Curatorium"
founded by civil rights organizations, the Greens, Biindnis 90, and individuals from the
SPD and FDP, for the purpose of drafting a new constitution based on the Basic Law and
the draft of the GDR Round Table, to be proposed for adoption by plebiscite).
140. See Frowein, Das Grundgesetz behalten-per Volksentscheid, Die Zeit,July 6, 1990, at 9,
col. 1.
141. 1990 BGBI II 537 [hereinafter State Treaty]. The Treaty was accompanied by a
"Joint Protocol Concerning Principles" [hereinafter "Joint Protocol"] as well as nine
Attachments. The Treaty and its accompanying documents are reprinted with extensive
commentary in 1 K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, VERTRAGE UND RECHTSAKTE ZUR
DEUTSCHEN EINHEIT (1990). See also Schmidt-Bleibtreu, Der Vertrag iiber die Schaffung einer
Wahrungs-, HWirtschafts- und Sozialunion zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deut-
schen Demokratischen Republik, 1990 DtZ 138. A statute of the Federal Republic that ap-
proved the State Treaty also contained extensive provisions amending existing
economic, financial, and commercial legislation of the Federal Republic, for the purpose
of carrying out the Treaty's provisions. See I K. STERN & B. SCiMIDT-BLEIBTREU, supra,
at 239-317.
For an English version of the State Treaty and related documents, with commen-
tary, see 29 I.L.M. 1108 (1990).
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center of East Berlin filled with western clothes, cosmetics, electron-
ics, and running shoes-the insignia of the long-desired consumer
society replacing the more sober products of socialist planning.
Western banks erected temporary offices on vacant land, and poten-
tial customers crowded around parked trailers advertising travel to
the Mediterranean and other places now accessible to GDR citizens
with D-Marks from the currency reform. Yet these developments
were soon accompanied by difficult problems, which became even
more serious in succeeding months.
In order for the State Treaty to come into effect, it had to be
enacted by both German parliaments. 42 As an historical matter,
these votes were bound together with the vote of both parliaments
on another important issue-the German recognition of the Oder-
Neie line, separating the territory of East Germany from that of
Poland. According to Chancellor Kohl, the German confirmation of
this border was an essential precondition to the ratification of the
State Treaty because otherwise unification would face insurmounta-
ble objections from Germany's neighbors and from the victorious
Allies of World War II. 14 3 Accordingly, on June 21, 1990, the
Bundestag and Volkskammer passed a resolution recognizing the
Oder-NeiBe line as the permanent Polish-German border, and these
resolutions were officially communicated to the Polish government.
Chancellor Kohl attempted to pacify the right wing of his coalition
with words of consolation for those expelled from the eastern terri-
tories.1 44 Thereafter, on June 21 and 22, the Volkskammer and
Bundestag, and also the West German Bundesrat, approved the
State Treaty.
Although these votes were overwhelmingly favorable, the
Treaty was not adopted without some objection both to its content
and to the process of adoption. Members of the West German SPD
sharply criticized the government for negotiating the Treaty without
adequately consulting Parliament and the state governments.' 45 A
142. Moreover, because the Treaty effected constitutional changes in the GDR, a two-
thirds vote was necessary in the Volkskammer. See supra text accompanying note 96;
note 104.
143. FR,June 22, 1990, at 4, col. 1. Kohl's certainty on this point most likely reflected
the severe international criticism he received when he failed to take an unambiguous
position on the finality of the Oder-NeiBe line in public statements at an earlier point in
the process of unification. For further discussion of this issue, see infra Part X(B).
144. See FR, June 22, 1990, at 1, col. 1. Kohl referred to the "unspeakable pain and
injustice" inflicted by the Germans during the Second World War, but also stated that a
"great injustice" was done to Germans driven from their homes in the eastern territo-
ries. FR, June 22, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
145. See FR, June 23, 1990, at 1, col. 4; FR, June 22, 1990, at 4, col. 5.
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minority of SPD representatives also criticized the Treaty on the
ground that it constituted economic shock therapy by introducing a
market economy too abruptly-a process that would "heighten the
crisis of economic development and could result in dramatic mass
unemployment whose social results would necessarily endanger de-
mocracy in both parts of Germany."' 4 6
The State Treaty is in many ways an extraordinary document,
for it makes clear the depth of the changes to take place in the GDR
and the extent to which its economic system and political fate were
henceforth to be under the control of the Federal Republic. The
Treaty also makes clear how important-indeed omnipresent-were
the rules and standards of the European Economic Community for
the process of unification. As the most pressing problems were eco-
nomic, it is principally these problems that the State Treaty sought
to address. Yet the State Treaty also had more general political
implications. "'
In its economic sections, the Treaty was basically intended to
accomplish three tasks. First, it introduced the western D-Mark as
the official currency of the GDR and provided an exchange rate for
GDR-Marks. This exchange rate had been the subject of sharp de-
bate because it would determine how much wealth the citizens of
the GDR could salvage from the dissolution of their existing system
and the economic basis on which they would begin their new lives in
the Federal Republic. Many voices in the GDR, therefore, called for
a one-to-one exchange of GDR-Marks for D-Marks. On the other
hand, some western observers suggested that the ratio should be
two GDR-Marks for one D-Mark. 14 8
The State Treaty reached a compromise on this question. Sala-
ries, pensions, rents, and similar recurring payments were to be paid
henceforth at the ratio of one to one. On the other hand, ordinary
contract payments and other debts were principally to be paid at the
rate of one D-Mark for two GDR-Marks. 149 Savings accounts were
converted at a rate of one to one up to a maximum of 4000 GDR-
Marks, for people who were 14 to 59 years old. For GDR citizens
under 14 the maximum was 2000, and for citizens over 59 the maxi-
mum was 6000 GDR-Marks. Amounts over these maximums were
146. FR, June 22, 1990, at 4, col. 5.
147. Kriele, Diepolitische Bedeutung des Staatsvertrages, 1990 DtZ 188; see infra text accom-
panying notes 167-170.
148. This ratio was proposed, for example, by the Federal Bank (Bundesbank). See
FAZ, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1, col. 2; infra text accompanying notes 151-152.
149. State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 10, § 5.
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converted at a rate of one D-Mark for two GDR-Marks.' 5 °
In some ways these exchange rates seemed extremely favorable
to the GDR because, on the open market, the GDR-Mark was worth
considerably less than one-third of a D-Mark. On the other hand,
the elimination of government subsidies was clearly to be a conse-
quence of unification, and the resulting increase of prices-together
with a foreseeable increase in unemployment-could mean that sav-
ings would be deeply invaded or exhausted. Thus the fairness of
this arrangement cannot be measured solely according to the mar-
ket values of the respective currencies outside of the GDR. In gen-
eral, currency reform was under the control of the German Federal
Bank-a West German governmental organ with its own independ-
ent status under the West German Basic Law"'5 -which thus as-
sumed a major role in the fate of the GDR.'
The second function of the State Treaty was to introduce a "so-
cial market economy" into the GDR-a capitalist economy with a
significant social welfare component, similar to that of the Federal
Republic. Indeed, the goal was the eventual creation of a single
economy in the Federal Republic and GDR. It is perhaps in this
area that the sweeping changes sought by this treaty are most nota-
ble. The future economic order of the GDR was to be characterized
by "private property, competition, free formation of prices, and in
principle fully free movement of labor, capital, goods and serv-
ices"-although certain forms of public property in the GDR would
also be recognized.' 53 With respect to freedom of contract and
other economic principles, as well as the other basic principles of
the Treaty, "contrary rules of the Constitution of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic concerning the principles of its previously socialist
social and governmental order shall no longer be applied."' 54 In-
deed, the attached Joint Protocol Concerning Principles is even
more specific:
Rules that bind individuals or organs of state power (in-
150. Id. attachment I, art. 6, § I. This system may reflect the view that the youngest
are least in need of a favorable rate of exchange for savings-perhaps in part because
they will come of age in a different economic system-while the oldest, whose savings
represent their life's work, are most in need of this form of support.
151. GG art. 88; see also Gesetz uiber die Deutsche Bundesbank, ofJuly 26, 1957, BGBI
I 745.
152. See, e.g., State Treaty, supra note 141, attachment I, arts. 12-14 (summarizing au-
thority and duties of the Deutsche Bundesbank under the Treaty).
153. Id. art. 1, § 3; see also Joint Protocol, supra note 141, part A, § II (principles of
economic union under Treaty).
154. State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 2, § 2.
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cluding the legislative and judiciary) to socialist legality,
the socialist state and social order, the requirements and
goals of central leadership and planning of the economy,
the socialist legal consciousness, socialist views, the views
of individual groups of the population or parties, or social-
ist morality or comparable concepts, will no longer be
applied. 155
In these two provisions, therefore, the GDR agreed to change the
underlying economic structure of the state and to abandon the fun-
damental legal doctrines which supported that economic structure.
This is an extraordinary instance-but not the only example that we
will see in the process of German unification-of a treaty provision
mandating certain domestic constitutional requirements. 56
Moreover, the State Treaty obligated the GDR to take certain
concrete steps to further its conversion to a market economy. 157
Among other things the GDR was required to restructure its com-
mercial enterprises in a manner that would "ease the enterprises'
swift structural conformity with the new market conditions" with the
ultimate goal of creating "a modern economic structure ... through
the development of private initiative."'' 58 In general, state-owned
commercial entities were to be "structured for competition as
quickly as possible and, to the extent possible, converted into pri-
vate property." 5' Throughout this economic conversion, the legal
requirements of the European Communities were to be taken into
account. 60
To this end a bewildering array of laws in the GDR was to be
annulled, altered, or replaced by statutes of the Federal Republic.
For example, much of the corporation law of the Federal Republic
and parts of its antitrust and commercial law were to be adopted in
155. Joint Protocol, supra note 141, part A, § 1(2).
156. Accordingly, after the signing of the State Treaty but before its effective date, the
GDR amended its constitution to remove the concept of "socialist legality" and related
principles. See supra Part IV(D). Moreover, this amendment to the GDR constitution
made clear that the adoption of a treaty by a two-thirds majority would have the effect of
amending the constitution to the extent that amendments were required by the Treaty.
See supra text accompanying notes 95-96. Thus the adoption of the State Treaty by a
vote of two-thirds of the Volkskammer accomplished whatever constitutional changes
were required by its terms.
157. See generally State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 11; id. attachment IX.
158. Id. art. 14.
159. Joint Protocol, supra note 141, part A, § 11(7).
160. See, e.g., State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 11, § 3 (general economic policy should
be oriented to goals of the EC); id. art. 13, § 3 (in foreign commerce, the authority of the
EC is to be observed); id. art. 15, § I (central role of the EC in agricultural economy
requires adoption of a system conforming to that of the EC).
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the GDR. 16 ' Substantial provisions of the GDR's Civil Code, and
numerous other provisions of GDR law affecting the economy, were
to be repealed or amended. 6 2 Finally, the GDR agreed to enact
statutes that would allow individuals and corporations greater free-
dom to carry on business in the GDR, as well as legislation that
would liberalize commerce in goods, services, capital, and currency
exchange with foreign countries. 163
The third task of the Treaty was to convert the state system of
social security in the GDR into a system of comprehensive social
insurance, financed by contributions from employers and employ-
ees, along the lines of the system prevailing in the Federal Repub-
lic." 6 The Treaty required that gradual steps be taken to alter the
health service of the GDR through the introduction of private physi-
cians and dentists and related private enterprises. 65 Because it was
unlikely that private contributions in the GDR would be able to fi-
nance the social security system for an interim period, the Treaty
contemplated a substantial subsidy from the Federal Republic to the
GDR for this purpose. 166
Although the most conspicuous aspects of the State Treaty
were economic, the agreement also possessed a fundamental-in-
deed an essential-political component.' 67 As noted above, article
2 of the Treaty required that the GDR introduce an economic order
characterized by private property and declared that contrary rules of
the GDR Constitution must be disregarded; similarly, the Joint Pro-
tocol explicitly rejected future application of concepts such as "so-
cialist legality."' 168 Moreover, the same provisions required the
parties to institute a "free, democratic, federal and social basic or-
der, based on the rule of law"-words clearly intended to refer to
the fundamental political principles of the Basic Law and to reject
the prevailing principles of the GDR constitution.16 Thus, "central
constitutional principles of the Basic Law" were made applicable to
161. Id., attachment II, art. Il1.
162. Id. attachment III, art. II.
163. Id. attachment IV, art. I.
164. Id. arts. 18-25; attachment IV, art. II. The Treaty also sought to conform the
general structure of labor-management relations to that prevailing in the Federal Re-
public. See id. art. 17.
165. Id. art, 22, § 2.
166. See id. art. 25; id. art. 28, § 1.
167. See generally Kriele, supra note 147.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 153-155.
169. See State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 2, § I;Joint Protocol, supra note 141, part A,
§ I(l). Similarly, the Preamble of the State Treaty specifically refers to the "peaceful
and democratic revolution" of autumn 1989 in the GDR.
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the GDR through the adoption of the State Treaty.' 70
Finally, two additional themes seem to run throughout the State
Treaty. First, the Treaty in effect took note of the past control of the
judiciary by the executive and by Communist Party authorities and
prescribed special measures to ensure the independence of judicial
action.' 7 ' In related sections the Treaty also attempted to increase
the strength, scope, and independence of the legal profession in the
GDR. 17
2
Moreover, in a number of provisions the Treaty required the
GDR to take steps to improve the environment.' 73 Given the cata-
strophic absence of environmental control in the GDR, these sec-
tions must be viewed as pious exhortations that would require much
more in the way of legal implementation, and above all economic
support, before they actually could be put into effect. Yet these pro-
visions may have had some influence on an important amendment
of the GDR Constitution that acknowledged basic environmental
principles.
174
To assist the GDR in this transitional period, the State Treaty
required that the Federal Republic pay substantial subsidies to the
GDR. In the second half of 1990, the Federal Republic was to pay
22 billion D-Marks to balance the GDR budget, 750 million D-Marks
for GDR pensions, and 2 billion D-Marks for unemployment com-
pensation in the GDR.' 75 As early as July 1990, however, it became
clear that these amounts would be seriously insufficient. Even with
the required payments, the GDR foresaw a substantial deficit in the
170. See Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 141, at 140.
Indeed, fundamental amendments changing the principles of the GDR constitution,
see supra text accompanying notes 84-98, can be seen as elaborations of the basic require-
ments of the State Treaty and, in effect, required by its provisions. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text. As noted above, these amendments were enacted on June 17, after
the signing of the State Treaty but before it went into effect.
171. See State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 6 (judicial review of questions arising under
the Treaty); id. attachment III, art. II, § 21 (requiring the GDR to adopt laws strengthen-
ing judicial independence, limiting authority of prosecuting officials, strengthening
rights of the accused, and strengthening judicial review of certain administrative ac-
tions);Joint Protocol, supra note 141, part B, § 1 (GDR rules requiring judicial coopera-
tion with other organs or groups should no longer be applied; concepts such as
"socialist legality" should no longer be applied). This theme was also emphasized in the
ground-breaking amendments of June 17 as well as in a separate set of amendments of
the GDR Constitution enacted thereafter. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93; note
98.
172. State Treaty, supra note 141, attachment III, art. II, § 21(h).
173. See, e.g., id. art. 16.
174. See supra text accompanying note 87.
175. State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 28, § 1.
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1990 budget, because of unexpected expenses and a rapidly deterio-
rating economic situation. 176
The implementation of the currency reform on July 1, 1990,
together with the entire apparatus of the State Treaty, was thought
to be essential in order to avoid an early accession of the GDR to the
Federal Republic, with its attendant confusion, or perhaps a re-
newed outflow of thousands of GDR citizens to the Federal Repub-
lic. Whether it was wise to embark on currency reform before
accession is a problem that must be confronted by future historians.
The currency reform did indeed have the sudden effect of exposing
the eastern economy and society to the rigors of capitalism without
much preparation. By late summer of 1990, unemployment num-
bered in the hundreds of thousands because eastern business con-
cerns were unable to compete with their western counterparts. 177
Moreover, many of the reforms called for by the State Treaty-such
as the "privatization" of state-owned People's Property-could not
be effectively undertaken in the short period between the adoption
of that treaty and the ultimate unification of both German states in
October 1990. Indeed, unification occurred at an earlier point than
was contemplated when the State Treaty was signed, and the two
German governments adopted a second state treaty (the Unification
Treaty) in late August 1990 for the purpose of regulating the re-
maining problems in a comprehensive manner. 78 Thus, the State
Treaty was an important milestone in the process of unification, par-
ticularly with respect to currency reform and underlying constitu-
tional change in the GDR, but it was unable to work effective
changes in many of the other important areas that it was intended to
cover.
176. FR, July 31, 1990, at 1, col. 1. The State Treaty also required that certain pay-
ments be made to the GDR in 1991, see State Treaty, supra note 141, art. 28, § 1, but,
because unification occurred in 1990, these payments were presumably merged into the
overall budget of the Federal Republic.
177. Indeed, in the early months of 1991 the economic situation in the east declined
further, and the president of the German Federal Bank (Bundesbank) declared that the
"overly hasty introduction" of the D-Mark into the GDR, through the State Treaty, had
been a "catastrophe." FAZ, Mar. 21, 1991, at 1, col. 2.
178. In general, the Unification Treaty-the "second state treaty," entered into in
August 1990-provides that the obligations of the first State Treaty shall continue on,
except to the extent that those provisions have become obsolete or that contrary provi-
sions are contained in the Unification Treaty. See Treaty between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic on the Establishment of German
Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, art. 40, § 1, BGB! II 889 [hereinafter Unification Treaty]. For
more detailed discussion of the Unification Treaty, see infra Part VIII.
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VII. RECONSTITUTION OF THE STATES IN THE GDR
On the path from the first State Treaty to the Unification Treaty
and the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, the next im-
portant step was the reconstitution of the former states of the GDR.
When the GDR was founded in the Soviet occupation zone in
1949, it comprised five states (Linder) loosely drawn from the his-
torical subdivisions that composed Bismarck's empire. The original
states of the GDR were Mecklenburg, the most northerly of the five;
Brandenburg, a part of Prussia that lay west of the Oder-Nei~e line
(excluding Berlin, which was governed separately); Saxony-Anhalt,
composed of Prussian Saxony and the province of Anhalt; Saxony,
the largest of the states in population; and Thuringia, located in the
southwestern corner of the Soviet zone.' 7 9 Each of these states had
its own constitution. 180
In a centralizing move in 1952, however, the GDR government
effectively abolished the Linder and replaced them with fourteen
administrative districts. This significant change was carried out in
violation of the procedural requirements of the 1949 GDR constitu-
tion and may not have been authorized by statute until 1958.8l
This move was reminiscent of Hitler's abolition of the states of the
Weimar Republic and their replacement by administrative districts.
In both cases the central regime sought to consolidate its power by
abolishing potential sources of competing authority. 8 2 Yet in the
GDR strong regional loyalties persisted even after the abolition of
179. For a similar description, see Bastuck, Unity, Law, and Freedom: Legal Aspects of the
Process and Results of German Unification, 25 INT'L LAw. 251, 258 (1991). For the state
borders, see Map supra. Although the historical geographic units composing the Ger-
man states remained largely intact in 1871 and under the Weimar Constitution (1919),
the Soviet occupation did make some significant changes, such as creating the state of
Saxony-Anhalt from part of Saxony and the previously existing state of Anhalt. See
Blaschke, Alte Li'nder-Neue Lander: Zur territorialen Neugliederung der DDR, Das Parla-
ment/Beilage, June 29, 1990, at 42.
180. See VERF. DDR (1949) art. 109, § 1; see generally id. arts. 71-80 (providing for a
Landerkammer-a house of parliament representing the states); id. arts. 1, 109-116 (reg-
ulating relationship between states and central government). The original constitutions
of the five eastern Uinder are set forth in E. FISCHER & W. KUNZEL, VERFASSUNGEN DEUT-
SCHER LANDER UND STAATEN 274-335 (1989).
181. Czybulka, Zur Entwicklung des F6deralismus in der DDR und in Deutschland (mit einem
Seitenblick auf Europa), 1990 ZEITSCHRIFr FUR RECHTSPOLITIK [ZRP] 269, 270. Indeed,
some argue that the five states of the GDR were never properly abolished, although they
were not recognized in the 1968/74 GDR Constitution.
182. For the historical context of this action in the GDR-a general strengthening of
the principle of "democratic centralism" and implementation of the Soviet cadre princi-
pie-see H. WEBER, supra note 11, at 219-31. For Hitler's conversion of the states into
administrative districts of the central government, see G. CRAIG, GERMANY 1866-1945, at
582-83 (1978); 3 H. HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF MODERN GERMANY 730 (1969).
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the Linder, particularly in the southern states of Thuringia and Sax-
ony, and with the revolutionary activity of autumn 1989 these loyal-
ties, in many cases stronger than any loyalties that the GDR as a
whole had evoked, again came to the fore.
After the revolutionary events of autumn 1989, it was as-
sumed--even before unification became a certainty and at a time
when a new GDR Constitution seemed probable-that the historical
states of the GDR would be re-created. In reaction to prior central-
izing theory, many believed that strong states were necessary to re-
sist any possible authoritarian tendencies in a central government.
Interestingly, a similar view prevailed among the victorious western
Allies in 1948-49 during the drafting of the West German Basic
Law. One of the principal occasions on which the Allies intervened
in this process (after setting down certain basic outlines) was to seek
stronger state governments than the West German drafting group
had proposed.l8 3
The State Treaty was signed before the historical states were re-
created in the GDR, but its provisions clearly contemplated their re-
creation.'8 4 Then on July 22, 1990, in its last session before the
summer recess, the Volkskammer adopted a statute with the force of
a constitutional amendment providing for the re-creation of the his-
torical states in the GDR. l "5 The Law for the Establishment of the
Lander determined the general outlines of each state's territory, but
contemplated that a number of localities lying on or near state bor-
ders might petition, through votes of local councils and direct popu-
lar votes, to be transferred to the jurisdiction of an adjoining state.
An accompanying statute also provided that elections would be held
on October 14, 1990 for one-house state parliaments, and these
parliaments would have the power to adopt state constitutions. 18 6
Although the state constitutions were to be adopted after accession,
much work was being done in the summer of 1990 on proposals for
183. See, e.g., Stammen & Maier, Der ProzeB der Verfassunggebung, in VORGESCHICHTE DER
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 410-13 (J. Becker, T. Stammen & P. Waldmann ed.
1979).
184. Czybulka, supra note 181, at 270. For example, the Preamble and other provi-
sions of the State Treaty required that the GDR be a "federal" state. See supra text ac-
companying note 169.
185. See Verfassungsgesetz zur Bildung von Uindern in der DDR-
Lndereinftihrungsgesetz--of July 22, 1990, GBI DDR 1 955 [hereinafter inder Stat-
ute]; FAZ, July 23, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
186. In the elections for state legislatures, a five percent minimum vote for any party
would be required for its entry into the legislature, with the exception of parties repre-
senting the Sorbian minority in the east. This was the first time that a five percent re-
quirement had been adopted in the GDR.
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these constitutions, in some cases with assistance from legal experts
from the Federal Republic.' 8 7 The GDR statute contemplated that
these five states would become states of the Federal Republic after
accession, and this point was confirmed through its explicit inclu-
sion in the Unification Treaty. 18
Here as elsewhere, the status of Berlin raised special problems.
Until the Allies relinquished their reserved rights, Berlin could not
become a state in the full sense, and there was also uncertainty over
whether Berlin should remain a separate state or be merged with
the State of Brandenburg, which surrounds it. The GDR statute
provided, however, that East Berlin would receive "state authority"
which could be exercised by its city council and Magistrate. 189 After
unification with West Berlin, the united city could decide whether it
would be an independent state or become part of Brandenburg.' 9"
When the GDR's accession to the Federal Republic was first
seen as a significant possibility in early 1990, the prevailing view
seemed to be that, after the creation of the Ldnder, each state would
accede to the Federal Republic independently. This method would
ensure the continued existence of the individual states in the Fed-
187. See, e.g., FAZ, Aug. 28, 1990, at 12, col. 2. Models for these drafts included West
German state constitutions and the constitutions of the East German states promulgated
in the early postwar period. See Lapp, Funf neue Ldnder-Das Ende der DDR, 1990 DA
1315, 1317. Notwithstanding this early work, it appears that most of the new state con-
stitutions will not be adopted until mid-1991 or even later. See infra note 201.
188. See Unification Treaty, supra note 178, art. I, § 1.
The statute providing for the reconstitution of the Lnder also set forth elaborate
provisions allocating authority between the states and the central government (parallel-
ing the provisions of the Basic Law), along with certain interim administrative measures.
Because the date of unification was moved up to October 3-ultimately, the effective
date of the statute-these provisions had no effect because on the effective date of the
statute the Lnder became Lander of the Federal Republic. See Mampel, supra note 65,
at 1394-95.
189. Uander Statute, supra note 185, § 1(2). Even after accession on October 3, sepa-
rate East and West Berlin governments continued to exist-although they were to work
together through a joint council until a single local government for all of Berlin was
elected at the time of the national election in December 1990.
190. Article 29 of the Basic Law sets forth a process through which the borders of
states may be changed, and this procedure could also be used for the purpose of merg-
ing Berlin and Brandenburg. The procedure required by article 29 is extremely com-
plex, however, and ordinarily requires approval through popular referendum in the
states involved. Article 5 of the Unification Treaty contemplates the possibility of an
amendment of the Basic Law through which Brandenburg and Berlin might merge
through a state treaty, without the necessity of complying with the complicated provi-
sions of article 29.
Some commentators and political figures have advocated the creation of an entirely
new system of states in the united Germany. If such a sweeping measure is ever
adopted, it will presumably be accomplished through constitutional amendment rather
than through the procedures of article 29.
526 [VOL. 50:475
1991] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION 527
eral Republic. Although it was generally contemplated that this step
would be taken by all states simultaneously-pursuant to a joint de-
cision or a central resolution of the GDR Volkskammer-there were
occasional fears that one or two particularly impatient states would
seek to accede on their own.' 9 ' Eventually, however, it was agreed
that accession would be accomplished by the central government of
the GDR and not by the individual states, and article 1 of the Unifi-
cation Treaty clearly reflected this decision. The Treaty also guar-
anteed the existence of the five east German states as new Lander of
the Federal Republic."9 2
The inclusion of five new eastern Lander raised the issue of
their representation in the Bundesrat of the Federal Republic. The
Bundesrat, which is the second house of the West German parlia-
ment, is composed of members of the state governments and repre-
sents the states in the federal system.' 93 In contrast with the United
States Senate, the representation of the states in the Bundesrat is
not equal, but it is not precisely proportional to population either.
While the smaller states have no less than three representatives in
the Bundesrat, until the Unification Treaty was adopted the largest
states had no more than five.'" 4 Yet the proportional difference in
population is much greater. Under this system, for example, the
new states of the former GDR would receive a total of twenty seats
191. On the other hand, it has been argued that an individual state's attempt to ac-
cede to the Federal Republic against the will of the central GDR government would have
been invalid; such a move would have violated GDR law and contravened the principle
of nonintervention recognized by the Basic Treaty of 1972. See Tomuschat, Wege zur
deutschen Einheit, 49 VVDStRL 70, 76-77 (1990).
192. See Unification Treaty, supra note 178, art. 1, § 1.
193. In some ways this system reflects a representational theory not unlike that of the
United States Senate as originally conceived. Until the seventeenth amendment was en-
acted in 1913, senators were elected by the legislatures of each state, and thus could be
seen as representatives of the state governments. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. The Bundesrat
is not as powerful as the United States Senate because its ability to prevent enactment of
legislation passed by the popular house--the Bundestag-is only a qualified power in
many cases. If the Bundesrat objects to legislation enacted by the Bundestag, the legis-
lation will ordinarily go into effect if re-enacted by the Bundestag; if the Bundesrat
defeats the legislation by a two-thirds vote, the Bundestag must re-enact it by a two-
thirds vote before it can become effective. See GG art. 77. In certain matters closely
affecting the states, however, a negative vote of the Bundesrat will prevent enactment of
the legislation. See, e.g., GG art. 109, §§ 3-4 (certain matters affecting state budgets). In
the United States, of course, a negative vote (or a failure to vote) in the Senate always
prevents the enactment of legislation.
194. According to article 51, § 2 (in its original form), "each state has at least three
votes [in the Bundesrat], states with more than two million inhabitants have four, states
with more than six million inhabitants have five votes." GG art. 51, § 2. The votes of
each state cannot be split, but must all be cast for the same position on a particular
question. GG art. 51, § 3.
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in the Bundesrat. 9 5 On the other hand, the West German state of
North Rhine-Westphalia, which has a population slightly exceeding
that of the entire GDR, would have five representatives only.' 96
The existing apportionment of votes in the Bundesrat already
imposed considerable disadvantages on the large states and some
argued that the accession of the GDR, with its relatively small states,
would exacerbate that apparent unfairness. The Unification Treaty
addressed this problem, but undertook only a minor adjustment by
adding a clause providing that states with more than seven million
inhabitants would be accorded six votes in the Bundesrat. 19 7 This
change increases the representation of North Rhine-Westphalia
from five to six votes, but the five new states of the GDR-with ap-
proximately the same population-still receive twenty votes.' 98
The re-creation of the East German states suggested another
constitutional (and practical) problem that would have existed
whether the GDR acceded to the Federal Republic as a single state
or as five separate states. In sharp contrast with the Constitution of
the United States, the Basic Law requires that the richer German
states in effect make contributions to the poorer states, with the goal
of making living standards approximately equal throughout the na-
tion. These contributions are effected through the sharing of reve-
nues between the states and the federal government, coupled with
federal distributions to the poorer states, as well as by direct pay-
ments from the richer to the poorer states according to a complex
statutory scheme enacted pursuant to constitutional require-
195. The smallest of the new states is Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (2.1 million) and
the largest is Saxony (almost 5 million). See Rauschning, supra note 10, at 399. Because
each of these 5 states has between 2 and 6 million inhabitants, each will receive 4 votes
in the Bundesrat. See GG art. 51, § 2; see also Rauschning, supra note 10, at 400.
196. Id. at 399-400.
197. Unification Treaty, supra note 178, art. 4, § 3. This change required an amend-
ment of article 51, § 2 of the Basic Law. In this and some other respects, therefore, it
was necessary that the Unification Treaty be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the
Bundestag and of the Bundesrat, so that an amendment of the Basic Law would be ef-
fected. See infra Part VIII(A).
198. Before unification, the four largest states of the Federal Republic, voting to-
gether, possessed more than one-third of the votes in the Bundesrat and therefore could
block the adoption of any amendment of the Basic Law. The provision of the Unifica-
tion Treaty increasing the seats allocated to states with more than seven million inhabit-
ants was apparently intended to preserve this de facto veto power of the largest states,
even after expansion of the Bundesrat by the representatives of the five new lander.
If, as some have urged, unification is followed by a complete redrawing of state
boundaries, in the west as well as the east, a complete revision of the states' representa-
tion in the Bundesrat would also be required.
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ments.' 99 It seems clear that, for the foreseeable future, the five
eastern states will be considerably less affluent than the original
states of the Federal Republic, but the original states have strongly
resisted paying anything close to the daunting amounts that would
be necessary to equalize living standards in the two parts of Ger-
many, if indeed such a thing were possible. This difficult constitu-
tional problem was ultimately regulated in article 7 of the
Unification Treaty.2 °°
On October 14, 1990-less than two weeks after unification-
the five new Linder of the former GDR held elections for the state
parliaments. The conservative CDU received enough votes to form
a government, in various coalitions, in four of the five Linder-the
exception was Brandenburg. These results confirmed the political
trend that had led to rapid unification in the first instance. The or-
ganization of the states, however, was accompanied by substantial
difficulty and confusion. It was not clear, for example, that the five
new Liinder would be able to adopt new state constitutions in an
expeditious manner following the state parliamentary elections in
October.20 ' Moreover, many of the difficult social, political, and
199. See GG arts. 106-107; Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CHI. L. REV.
271, 294-98 (1977).
200. The success of these arrangements was called into question in the early months
of 1991 by what appeared to be the impending bankruptcy of a number of the new
eastern Linder. To stem further economic deterioration, the federal German govern-
ment agreed in February 1991 to transfer an additional $3.4 billion to states and cities of
the former GDR. N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1991, at Al, col. 1. The Minister-President of
the new state of Brandenburg declared, however, that a total of $22 billion would be
required. The Sun (Baltimore), Feb. 14, 1991, at 6A, col. 1. In March 1991 the central
government announced a two-year program of massive additional aid to eastern Ger-
many, to be financed by a tax increase. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at AI, col. 5.
201. On November 7, 1990, the Thuringian parliament adopted a "state statute,"
which would act as a governing document until replaced by an actual state constitution
before the end of 1992. FAZ, Nov. 8, 1990, at 1, col. 4. In Saxony-Anhalt it was unclear
whether a planned new state constitution would be limited to structural provisions, or
whether it would also reproduce the constitutional rights set forth in the Basic Law.
FAZ, Nov. 9, 1990, at 4, col. 4. In November 1990, the Parliament of Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania established a special commission to issue a proposed constitutional draft in
the summer of 1991. Until a constitution is adopted, the state will be governed through
a temporary "state statute." FAZ, Nov. 24, 1990, at 4, col. 5. According to the Minister-
President (Governor) of Brandenburg, a new constitution will be published by the state
parliament in the middle of 1991 and presented to the people for adoption in a plebi-
scite. The draft constitution of the Round Table, see supra note 67, will play an important
role in the drafting of this constitution. FAZ, Dec. 7, 1990, at 4, col. 4.
The recent constitutional history of Berlin is particularly complicated. From 1950
on, West Berlin had its own "state" constitution, although the Allies refused to recog-
nize Berlin as a state of the Federal Republic. On the other hand East Berlin-which
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economic problems arising upon unification will of necessity have
an impact on the functions and activities of the five new Linder.
Indeed, severe economic problems developing in East Germany in
1991 have left the governments of the new Linder almost bankrupt
and dependent upon massive infusions of credits from the central
government. 202 Moreover, the process of providing administrative
and judicial personnel to operate the governments of the East Ger-
man Lander has also proved to be deeply problematic. Until these
fundamental problems are resolved, it is doubtful that the five east-
ern states will fully assume their intended role as significant govern-
mental factors in the political system of the Federal Republic.
VIII. THE UNIFICATION TREATY
A. Purpose and General Structure of the Treaty
The problems addressed by the State Treaty, while extremely
important, were limited to certain specific areas. Even after the
State Treaty was signed-and even after it went into effect on July
1-there remained a host of difficult problems to be resolved before
political unification of the two German states. Negotiations and de-
liberations over a second state treaty-the Unification Treaty-oc-
cupied the summer months of 1990, and it was signed by
representatives of the Federal Republic and the GDR on August 31,
1990.213 After lively debate, the Treaty was approved by the GDR
was not a state even when states existed in the GDR-had no separate constitution. In
July of 1990, however, the first elected city council of East Berlin adopted its own consti-
tution. Thereafter, both the East and West Berlin constitutions continued in effect, even
after unification, until a single Berlin city government was elected on December 2, 1990.
See supra note 189. With the commencement of the first unified Berlin government in
January 1991, the West Berlin constitution of 1950 (as amended over the years- most
recently to include new rights such as a general guarantee of environmental protection)
became the constitution for all of Berlin, and the East Berlin constitution of 1990 ceased
to be valid. (Among other things, the East Berlin constitution had guaranteed a right of
abortion-something unique in German constitutions.) It is contemplated that in the
next five years the Berlin constitution will be revised and submitted to the people for
adoption in a plebiscite. Therefore, there is likely to be "a comprehensive constitutional
debate" in Berlin, "which certainly will have an influence on efforts toward a revision of
the Basic Law." FAZ, Jan. 11, 1991, at 6, col. 4.
202. See supra note 200.
203. Treaty between the, Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic
Republic on the Establishment of German Unity, Aug. 31, 1990, BGBI II 889 [hereinaf-
ter Unification Treaty]. See also Agreement on the Enforcement and Interpretation of
the Unification Treaty, Sept. 18, 1990, BGBI 111239. The text of the Unification Treaty,
together with its three extensive Attachments and other related documents, is reprinted
in 2 K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, VERTRAGE UND RECHTSAKTE ZUR DEUTSCHEN
EINHEIT (1990). An English version of the Treaty (without Attachments) is published by
the German Information Center, 950 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10022. For an en-
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Volkskammer and by the West German Bundestag and Bundesrat.
A two-thirds majority was necessary for approval in each body be-
cause the Unification Treaty in effect provided for revocation of the
GDR Constitution and contained provisions that amended the Basic
Law.204
In drafting the Unification Treaty, the negotiators confronted
three basic problems. First, accession would involve the addition of
16 million citizens to the Federal Republic, as well as a new territory
of almost 42,000 square miles. 2 5 These profound changes would
require significant modifications of the governmental institutions of
the Federal Republic. As we have seen, for example, the addition of
five new Lander would require changes in the size and composition
of the Bundesrat.2 °6 Moreover, certain alterations and additions in
administrative and judicial structures would be necessary. An im-
portant task of the Unification Treaty, therefore, was to establish the
basic structure of those changes.
Moreover, the legal systems and the substantive law of the two
German states differed widely. Because the accession of the GDR to
the Federal Republic under article 23 would result in extending the
Basic Law and its governmental system to the GDR-the GDR be-
coming a part of the Federal Republic-it might seem logical simply
to extend the law of the Federal Republic to the GDR, in every area
of life, at the time of accession. Yet for various reasons-practical
difficulty in some cases and political unwillingness in others-it was
impossible to adopt such a sweeping solution. Thus a second prin-
cipal task of the Unification Treaty was to determine the substantive
law that would apply to the GDR for a transitional period and to
specify the length of time such interim adjustments would remain in
effect.20 7
lightening essay on the Unification Treaty by its chief author, see Schiuble, supra note
23.
204. The requirements for amending the Basic Law are more complex than those nec-
essary for amending the 1968/74 GDR Constitution, see supra note 104, but still consid-
erably less onerous than the procedure required for amending the Constitution of the
United States. The Basic Law can be amended by a statute that receives the approval of
two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag and two-thirds of the votes of the
Bundesrat, so long as the statute expressly declares that it amends or expands the text of
the Basic Law. GG art. 79, §§ 1, 2. As discussed more fully below, the Basic Law itself
prohibits amendments that would impair basic constitutional principles of democratic
political organization and human dignity. GG art. 79, § 3.
205. N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1990, at A16, col. 2.
206. See supra notes 193-198 and accompanying text.
207. Of course, the process of legal adjustment and "harmonization" had already be-
gun under the provisions of the State Treaty and its accompanying documents. See supra
Part VI.
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Finally, international pressures as well as political and practical
exigencies required that the Basic Law itself be amended in a few
important respects. Accomplishment of these changes was the third
important task of the Unification Treaty. The agreement also makes
certain recommendations with respect to possible future constitu-
tional change.
1. Structural Provisions.-The central structural provision of the
Unification Treaty made clear that, although the GDR "acceded" to
the Federal Republic as a whole, the former territory of the GDR
would be divided into five new states of the Federal Republic. As
indicated above, the new states were Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-
West Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia. More-
over, all of Berlin would constitute a separate state, although it was
possible that Berlin would be included in the state of Brandenburg
in the future.20 8 Berlin would be the capital of Germany, but the all-
German Parliament would determine whether the Parliament and
the government should be located in Berlin or in Bonn, the former
capital of the Federal Republic.20 9
After 1952, the GDR as a practical matter possessed a central
government only, without separate state governments. It was neces-
sary, therefore, for the Unification Treaty to allocate the requisite
governmental functions among the five new states and the central
government of the Federal Republic. According to the Treaty, each
of the five new states will be responsible for administrative and judi-
cial organs that formerly exercised authority within its borders, but
only to the extent that those organs exercised powers that fall within
208. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, arts. 1, 5. For a more detailed discussion
of the reconstitution of the eastern inder and their constitutional development, see
supra Part VII.
209. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 2, § 1. The future location of the German
government was one of the most sharply debated issues in the period immediately fol-
lowing unification. Some argued that Berlin's historical role as German capital favored
its claim, while others maintained that the baleful history of Berlin as the capital of the
"Third Reich" required that the seat of government be located elsewhere. For some,
the choice of Berlin would be an important source of political and economic support for
the five new states of the east, because Berlin is located in the middle of the former
GDR. Others pointed out that moving most government offices would cost millions or
billions of marks, in addition to the other heavy financial burdens of unification. Cutting
across these arguments were regional rivalries-with roots deep in past centuries-
which prompted representatives of certain areas of the country to reject the idea that the
government should again be located in the former Prussian capital.
In a close vote in June 1991, the Bundestag resolved to move the seat of govern-
ment to Berlin over the next few years. The Bundesrat, as well as some administrative
offices, will remain in Bonn. See Wash. Post, June 21, 1991, at AI, col. 1.
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the authority of the states under the competence rules of the Basic
Law.2 10 In the case of former administrative districts that over-
lapped state borders, both states will have joint control. To the ex-
tent that former GDR administrative and judicial organs exercised
powers that fall within the competence of the federal government
under the Basic Law, these organs will be controlled by federal
authorities. 2 I
After the accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic, the five
new Linder were entitled to representation in the Bundesrat and, as
discussed above, the representation of the states in the Bundesrat
was adjusted slightly by the Unification Treaty.212 Moreover, article
42 of the Unification Treaty authorized the Volkskammer to choose
144 of its members to represent the territory of the former GDR in
the Bundestag from the date of unification until the first all-German
federal election on December 2, 1990.
It was also necessary to allocate property possessed by former
governmental institutions of the GDR. Government property that
was used for administrative purposes in the former GDR was allo-
cated in a manner similar to the allocation of administrative author-
ity: if particular "administrative" property was used principally for
purposes that fell within the competence of the states or localities
under the Basic Law, that property went to the relevant state or lo-
cality;2 '1 if the property served purposes principally within the com-
petence of the federal government under the Basic Law, it became
federal property-but it must be used to carry out federal adminis-
trative tasks within the territory of the former GDR.21 4 Of the GDR
government property not used for administrative purposes, one-half
is to go to the GDR Lander (divided proportionately according to
210. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 13, §§ 1-2. See GG arts. 70-75 (allocating
lawmaking power between states and federal government).
211. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 13, § 2. Understanding and carrying out
the administration of a broad range of powers will no doubt tax the capacity of the newly
formed states. Accordingly, the Unification Treaty obliges the federal government and
the western states to give administrative assistance to the newly formed states until June
30, 1991. Id. art. 15, § 3. In an example of interstate assistance, the western state of
Lower Saxony has assigned more than twenty of its judges and five of its prosecutors for
at least temporary work in the new eastern state of Saxony. See FAZ, Nov. 8, 1990, at 6,
col. 4.
212. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § 3. As noted above, this change ef-
fected an amendment of the Basic Law. See supra text accompanying notes 193-198.
213. This provision of the Unification Treaty bears some similarity to the section of
the Basic Law that allocated former property of the "Reich" among organs of the federal
government and the states at the time that the Federal Republic came into existence. See
GG art. 134, § 2.
214. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 21.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
population), and one-half is to go to the federal government for the
fulfillment of public tasks in eastern Germany. An exception to this
provision is People's Property used (or intended to be used) for
public housing; such property goes to the local communities, for
gradual privatization.21 5
As with government property, the debts of the GDR will also be
allocated between the federal government and the eastern states-
after an interim three-year period. Initially, all debts of the GDR
will be assumed by a special agency of the federal government
(Sonderverm6gen) under the administration of the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Until the end of 1993, the federal government and the state
Trust Agency 21 6 will each pay one-half of the interest on these
debts. From January 1994, however, the debts will be allocated
among the federal government, the state Trust Agency, and the
eastern Lander (according to population), pursuant to a principle
set forth in the State Treaty and further clarified by law.2 7
The central institution in the conversion of the former GDR
from a planned economy to a market system is the state "Trust
Agency" (Treuhandanstalt) authorized under a GDR law ofJune 17,
1990.2 "8 This institution, which developed into a massive bureau-
cracy in the months following unification, has the task of administer-
ing state-owned businesses and, to the extent possible, selling those
businesses into private hands. The proceeds of these sales could
then perhaps be used for the purpose of compensating certain indi-
viduals whose property was expropriated by the GDR government
215. Id. art. 22, § 4. To the extent that any public property was used primarily by the
former Ministry for State Security (Stasi), however, that property goes directly to the
state Trust Agency, see infra text accompanying notes 218-220, unless by October 1,
1989 the property had been devoted to some other public purpose. See Unification
Treaty, supra note 203, art. 21, § 1; art. 22, § 1.
216. See infra text accompanying notes 218-220.
217. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 23. Guarantee agreements and similar
obligations of the GDR are from the outset to be divided equally between the federal
government, and the states of the former GDR and East Berlin (and further subdivided
among these units according to population). Id. art. 23, § 6. In contrast with the above
provisions, international contractual obligations of the GDR will be handled exclusively
by the federal government without participation of the Lnder, although the state Trust
Agency will also play a role. Id. art. 24.
218. Gesetz zur Privatisierung und Reorganisation des volkseigenen Verm6gens
(Treuhandgesetz), of June 17, 1990, GBI DDR 1 300. With certain modifications this
statute remains in effect under the Unification Treaty. See Unification Treaty, supra note
203, art. 25.
In autumn 1990, the state Trust Agency founded a "Corporation for the Privatiza-
tion of Commerce," for the specific purpose of implementing the transfer of state-
owned commercial businesses into private hands. FAZ, Nov. 24, 1990, at 13, col. 3.
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after 1949.9 Under article 25 of the Unification Treaty, the state
Trust Agency is made a "public law institution" of the federal gov-
ernment, under the supervision of the Minister of Finance. 2
2. Law Applicable in Eastern Germany After Unification.-The sec-
ond central task of the Unification Treaty was to determine the ex-
tent to which the law of the Federal Republic would be applicable in
eastern Germany and the extent to which former GDR law would
continue to apply. A related task was to set forth appropriate modi-
fications of each of these bodies of law, in light of the special
problems of unification.
Although much of this extremely complex work is undertaken
in Attachments I and II to the Treaty, the basic outlines are set forth
in the text of the Unification Treaty itself. The first central principle
is that the law of the Federal Republic will extend to the GDR and
East Berlin except to the extent that the Unification Treaty-and
particularly Attachment I-determines otherwise. Attachment I oc-
cupies 244 pages in the version published by the Bundestag, and it
is clear that although West German law applies in principle to the
former GDR, numerous adjustments have been made, at least for an
interim period.22 '
The status of the law of the former GDR is also complex. The
GDR law that would fall within the authority of the Lander under
the Basic Law (as well as law that might be federal law under the
Basic Law but regulates matters that federal law has not comprehen-
sively regulated) continues on as law of the new eastern Linder-
but only if it is consistent with the Basic Law, applicable federal law,
European Community law, and the provisions of the Unification
Treaty.2 2 2 Moreover, law of the GDR that is specifically mentioned
in Attachment II (as modified in that Attachment) will generally
219. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
220. From the outset, the state Trust Agency has been plagued by numerous
problems stemming from the desperate condition of the enterprises that it must admin-
ister and the general economic conditions in the east. See, e.g., DER SPIEGEL, Mar. 25,
1991, at 34. Some have criticized the Agency on the ground that its steps toward priva-
tization have been unduly slow. Others argue that the Agency has increased unemploy-
ment by closing troubled businesses too quickly rather than seeking to keep them in
operation and improving their performance. The problems of the Trust Agency were
further compounded by the assassination of its director, Detlev Rohwedder, in early
April 1991. See Washington Post, Apr. 2, 1991, at A12, col. 5.
221. See Bundestag Drucksache 11/7760, at 19-263, reprinted in 2 K. STERN & B.
SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, supra note 141, at 209-730; Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art.
8. See also Bastuck, supra note 179, at 257-58.
222. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 9, § 1.
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have the status of federal law in eastern Germany if it falls within an
area of federal competence under the Basic Law, and if it is consis-
tent with the Basic Law and European Community law.223
Thus the underlying principle seems to be as follows: law of
the Federal Republic becomes applicable in the former territory of
the GDR, except as altered by the provisions of the Unification
Treaty, and that federal law invalidates any inconsistent law of the
GDR. Law of the GDR that is not inconsistent with applicable law of
the Federal Republic, however, continues in force as law of the
Linder, except that certain GDR law mentioned in Attachment II
will have the status of federal law within the former GDR (and there-
fore can presumably override any contrary law of the Linder) .224
The Unification Treaty also sets forth rules relating to the con-
tinued validity of GDR judicial decisions. These rules seek to com-
bine the practical necessity of respecting judgments in ordinary
cases with a deep suspicion that many decisions may have reflected
forms of political oppression. Thus, in principle, decisions of GDR
courts issued before accession remain valid. 'These decisions, how-
ever, may be subject to re-examination to ensure that they are con-
sistent with principles of the rule of law.2 2 5 Moreover, a statute will
provide "rehabilitation" and compensation for victims of politically
motivated criminal judgments or criminal judgments that are other-
wise unconstitutional or violate the rule of law.2 2 6 Similarly, admin-
223. Id. art. 9, §§ 2, 4.
224. On these provisions, see generally Schauble, supra note 23, at 298-99.
225. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 18, § 1; see also id. art. 18, § 2; attachment
I, ch. III(A), para. III (14)(d).
226. Id. art. 17; for this "rehabilitation" statute, see Rehabilitierungsgesetz, of Sept. 6,
1990, GBI DDR I 1459. Furthermore, the Unification Treaty provides a right of con-
victed criminal defendants in the GDR to seek review of judicial decisions. Unification
Treaty, supra note 203, art. 18, § 2.
In contrast, members of the former GDR leadership most likely will be tried for
corrupt or oppressive acts committed under the old regime, although the choice of ap-
plicable law may raise serious difficulties. One such prosecution, brought against former
GDR union leader Harry Tisch, took place in early 1991, see FAZ,Jan. 31, 1991, at 6, col.
5; FAZ, Jan. 29, 1991, at 9, col. 1, and constitutional doubts arising in this case were
referred to the Constitutional Court, FAZ, Mar. 25, 1991, at 5, col. 4. In June 1991
Tisch was convicted of misappropriation of funds for personal use, but he was acquitted
on what was generally considered to be a more serious count of diversion of union pen-
sion funds. See N.Y. Times, June 7, 1991, at All, col. 1.
In May 1991 four leading former GDR officials, including former Prime Minister
Willi Stoph, were arrested in connection with their alleged complicity in orders to shoot
persons attempting to escape from the GDR. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1991, at A3, col. 4.
Although these former officials may eventually be tried, it seems unlikely that SED chief
Erich Honecker will ever face a German court because he fled to the Soviet Union in
March 1991. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
536 [VOL. 50:475
19911 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
istrative rulings of the GDR remain in effect, unless they are
"inconsistent with principles of the rule of law or with this
treaty."
2 2 7
In the countries of western Europe, the law of the European
Communities has assumed a position of importance that is in many
ways comparable to that of national law. The Unification Treaty
makes clear that treaties of the European Communities will be effec-
tive in the former territory of the GDR.228 Other rules of the Euro-
pean Communities will also apply there except to the extent that the
Communities have made exceptions to avoid economic difficulties in
the GDR or to accommodate the administrative problems of
unification. 29
The drafters of the Unification Treaty also recognized that the
Federal Republic and the GDR were subject to numerous other-
perhaps conflicting-international agreements. According to article
11 of the Unification Treaty, the treaties of the Federal Republic will
remain in effect and will extend to the former GDR except to the
extent set forth in Attachment 1.230 With respect to the treaties of
the GDR the situation is, as might be expected, somewhat more
complicated. Under article 12, the federal government will discuss
the possible continuation, adjustment, or termination of each of
these agreements with the other party to the agreement, in light of a
number of specified factors. These include the preservation of in-
ternational confidence, the interests of the states involved, the treaty
obligations of the Federal Republic, the principles "of a free and
democratic basic order according to the rule of law," and the obser-
vance of the authority of the European Communities. 23 1 Thus, in
principle, the treaties of the Federal Republic will continue on, but
the treaties of the former GDR will be carefully evaluated in light of
the relevant factors to determine their future validity.
2 3 2
227. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 19. The Unification Treaty also sets forth
complicated provisions allocating judicial tasks to the courts of the five eastern UInder-
including interim jurisdiction over matters in administrative law, employment relations
and other areas that are ordinarily confided to special courts in the Federal Republic.
See id. attachment I, ch. III(A), para. III(l)(t)-(x). In the months following unification, it
seemed doubtful that the courts in the former GDR could cope with their increased
tasks, due to a lack ofjudicial personnel. FAZ, Feb. 12, 1991, at 1, col. 2.
228. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 10, § 1.
229. Id. art. 10, § 2. See infra Part XI.
230. If unification appears to require some alteration of a particular treaty of the Fed-
eral Republic, the all-German government will resolve the issue through negotiation
with the other party to the agreement. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 11.
231. Id. art. 12, § 1.
232. For the background of these provisions in the "state succession" doctrines of
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3. Constitutional Amendments and Future Constitutional Changes.-
a. Constitutional Amendments Effected by the Unification Treaty.-
Because of the important changes in political structure that unifica-
tion would bring, it was clear that the Basic Law, although remain-
ing fundamentally intact, would necessarily undergo a few
significant alterations. In consequence, chapter II of the Unification
Treaty sets forth a number of provisions expressly amending the
Basic Law.233 Because the Unification Treaty was ratified by a requi-
site two-thirds vote of both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, adop-
tion of the Treaty itself effected the necessary amendments.2 34
From a theoretical point of view, the most important constitu-
tional amendments were those confirming that the process of Ger-
man unification was complete with the accession of the GDR. These
amendments, which were insisted upon by the World War II Allies,
were necessary to obviate any argument that Germany retained a
claim to the territories east of the Oder-Nei8e line.235 Three consti-
tutional amendments were necessary to effect this result. First, the
Preamble of the Basic Law, which in its original form declared that
unification is something to be achieved in the future, was amended
to declare that the "Germans" in all of the German states-includ-
ing the five eastern Lander--"have achieved the unity and freedom
of Germany in free self-determination. '23 6 Because unity has been
international law, see, e.g., Doehring, Die Anwendung der Regeln der v'lkerrechtlichen Sukzes-
sion nach der Wiedervereinigung der beiden deutschen Staaten, in NATION UND DEMOKRATIE 11-
19 (R. Wildenmann ed. 1991). See also, Note, Taking Reichs Seriously: German Unification
and the Law of State Succession, 104 HARV. L. REV. 588 (1990).
233. See generally, Stern, supra note 135.
234. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
235. These amendments are not only contained in the Unification Treaty; they are
also required by the Two Plus Four agreement executed by the two German states and
the World War II Allies. See infra Part X(D). Thus any attempt to return to the former
provisions by subsequent amendment of the Basic Law would violate an agreement that
is binding in international law. The problem of the Oder-NeiBe line is discussed in de-
tail in Part X(B) below.
236. In its amended form, the Preamble states in full:
With consciousness of their responsibility before God and human beings,
and animated with the will to serve world peace as an equal member of a united
Europe, the German people have adopted this Basic Law by virtue of their con-
stitution-giving power.
The Germans in the states of Baden-Wiirttemberg, Bavaria, Berlin, Bran-
denburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Hessen, Mecklenburg- West Pomerania, Lower Saxony,
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia have achieved the unity and freedom of Ger-
many in free self-determination. Thus this Basic Law is effective for the entire
German people.
Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § I (emphasis added, indicating new German
states).
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"achieved," there is no further claim that additional territory must
be "unified" with Germany as it now exists.
The second of these necessary amendments deleted article 23
which allowed "other parts of Germany" to "accede" to the Federal
Republic.237 If this provision had remained in the Basic Law after
the accession of the GDR, it would have suggested that other parts
of Germany still existed outside of the present territory of the uni-
fied country.
Finally, it was necessary to amend article 146 of the Basic Law
which, in its unamended form, foresaw a later date upon which the
"German people" would adopt a constitution by a free decision. 238
Although this provision did not specifically state that unification had
not yet occurred, the original context of the provision clearly im-
plied that the "German people" adopting the future constitution
would include a group that extended beyond the population of the
Federal Republic. Thus, this provision also might have suggested
that additional territory and population remained to be incorpo-
rated into a united Germany in the future. One resolution of this
problem would have been to delete article 146 entirely, as the draft-
ers had done with article 23. The conservatives in the Federal Re-
public would almost certainly have preferred this result, but the
Social Democrats and GDR reform groups sought to retain article
146 and, with it, the possibility of adopting a new, all-German con-
stitution to replace the Basic Law even after accession under article
23.239 Accordingly, article 146 was amended to read as follows:
This Basic Law, which is applicable for the entire German people
following the achievement of the unity and freedom of Germany, will
lose its validity on the effective date of a constitution that
has been chosen by a free decision of the German
people.240
This provision makes clear that unification has been achieved but
nonetheless preserves the possibility of a new all-German constitu-
tion. As noted above, the amendment also obviates the argument
that article 146 had become obsolete as a result of unification.2 4'
237. Id. art. 4, § 2.
238. See generally supra Part V(B).
239. See supra text accompanying note 136.
240. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § 6. The language added by the
amendment is in italics.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 133-135. Whether a new constitution could be
adopted under article 146 by a simple majority in a plebiscite, or whether some form of
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b. Suggested Areas of Future Constitutional Change.-Of particular
political interest was article 5 of the Unification Treaty which "rec-
ommended" that the all-German parliament consider amending the
Basic Law within two years in order to deal with certain problems
raised by unification. Two of these recommendations dealt with the
relations of the Lander and the federal government-proposals for
a possible increase in the power of the Lander in accordance with a
decision of the western minister-presidents, and for a possible read-
justment of state lines involving Berlin and Brandenburg (including
presumably a merger of those two Lander).
More interesting, however, was the inclusion in article 5 of two
possibilities that seemed to show the strength of the Social Demo-
crats and reform groups in the GDR in the process of negotiating
the Treaty. Article 5 recommended, for example, that the all-Ger-
man parliament should review considerations relating to the adop-
tion of "state goals" in the Basic Law. In the dogmatic theory of
German constitutional law, such state goals generally relate to mat-
ters such as environmental protection or social welfare, and thus
this provision urges consideration of amendments long supported
by certain sections of the SPD but greeted with reserve or hostility
by the more conservative CDU/CSU.
Similarly, article 5 recommended that the parliament should
two-thirds approval would be required, is a subject of current debate. See supra text
accompanying notes 136-138.
Additional constitutional amendments were required to adjust matters of finance.
Article 7 of the Unification Treaty set forth rules for revenue-sharing by the former GDR
Lnder as well as provisions granting special support for those Lnder. Another section
amended article 135a of the Basic Law in a manner that made clear that the Federal
Republic would not be required to pay all obligations incurred by the government of the
GDR. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § 4; see infra text accompanying notes
266-267.
Certain other important constitutional amendments effected by the Unification
Treaty are closely related to the reconstitution of the Lnder and the constitutional
problems of expropriated property and abortion. Consequently, these amendments are
discussed in the context of those specific issues. See supra Part VII (Lnder); infra Part
VIII(B) (expropriated property); infra Part VIII(C) (abortion).
Shortly after the signing of the Unification Treaty the Constitutional Court rejected,
as clearly without merit, a constitutional attack on the provisions of the Treaty that
amended the Basic Law. 82 BVerfGE 316 (1990). The petitioners, eight members of
the Bundestag, argued that under the Basic Law any proposed constitutional amend-
ment must be presented to parliament as a separate statute (so that members of parlia-
ment could propose changes) rather than as part of a treaty (which must be voted on as a
whole without alteration). (The petitioners believed that the former German territories
east of the Oder-Neife line should be included in a future united Germany; thus they
objected to the amendment deleting article 23 of the Basic Law.) The Constitutional
Court rejected this complaint, emphasizing the broad degree of procedural discretion
possessed by the government in undertaking steps toward unification. Id. at 321.
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consider the question of whether article 146 of the Basic Law should
be employed to adopt a new German constitution, perhaps by plebi-
scite. The conservatives had strongly opposed the use of article
146, and they objected particularly to the adoption of a new consti-
tution by plebiscite. The appearance of these suggestions in the
Unification Treaty-guarded as they are-may reflect the fact that
the votes of the SPD were essential in order to obtain the two-thirds
majority necessary to ratify the Unification Treaty. That the SPD
could block a two-thirds vote for the Unification Treaty (and thus
secure inclusion of these provisions) does not necessarily mean that
an affirmative two-thirds majority could be found for any particular
constitutional amendment. Yet, under some interpretations at least,
the adoption of a new constitution under article 146 would not nec-
essarily require a two-thirds vote,2 42 and voices outside of the SPD
(particularly among the Free Democrats) suggest substantial sup-
port for at least some constitutional change. In any case, one of the
most vigorously debated issues in the period immediately following
unification was whether article 146 indeed ought to be employed in
the near future to adopt a new constitution, perhaps with some sig-
nificant changes from the Basic Law. 243
In addition to general provisions on structure and the future
legal regime, the Unification Treaty and its attachments included a
wealth of detail on the law that would apply in the eastern territory
during the inevitable transitional period of change and accommoda-
tion. Among the many issues covered by this massive document,
three were of particularly profound importance and stirred the
deepest political passions. These three topics-the treatment of
property expropriated by the Soviet occupation authorities and the
GDR, the future of the GDR's liberal abortion law, and the future of
the civil service in the territory of the former GDR-will be dis-
cussed in turn.
B. Problems Relating to Expropriated Property
One of the most difficult and potentially explosive problems of
German unification arose from the millions of acres of property ex-
propriated or placed under state administration during the Soviet
242. See supra text accompanying note 136.
243. See, e.g., Leicht, Vom Grundgesetz zur erfassung, Die Zeit (overseas edition), Mar.
22, 1991, at 3, col. 1. In March 1991, the Bundestag and Bundesrat announced the
formation of a joint committee to consider constitutional changes that might be indi-
cated as a result of unification. See FAZ, Mar. 20, 1991, at 4, col. 1.
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occupation and under the government of the GDR. Although some
real property remained in private hands, the GDR viewed itself as a
socialist society and much real property, and all significant means of
production, came to be held in various forms of "socialist" prop-
erty-principally People's Property and Collective Property.244 In
addition some private property was held under government
administration.
As unification became a real possibility, claims for the return of
expropriated property-some of it seized many years in the past-
were heard with greater insistence. Many, but not all, of the former
owners raising these claims were now living in the west.
At the outset, the legal basis of such claims was not entirely
clear. Confiscations occurring between 1945 and 1949, under the
Soviet occupation regime, were undertaken before the adoption of
either the West German Basic Law or the 1949 Constitution of the
GDR, and therefore these actions do not appear to have violated
any constitutional provision in effect at the time they were
completed .245
The constitutional status of GDR expropriations occurring after
1949 was somewhat different. Article 14 of the Basic Law provides
for a right of property and requires compensation in the case of a
taking by the government. Yet, although the Basic Law was adopted
in 1949, its provisions did not apply to the territory of the GDR at
the time of these expropriations. Of course, the Constitutional
Court's position was always that the German "Reich" (including the
GDR) continued on in some ideal sense and that the Federal Repub-
lic was "identical" or "partially identical" with the "Reich. '2 46 Yet
article 23 makes unmistakably clear that the Basic Law does not ap-
ply to "other parts of Germany" (including the GDR) until their ac-
cession to the Federal Republic-an act that took place in October
1990. Perhaps it might be argued that, upon accession, the Basic
Law requires that all existing property relations be traceable to mar-
ket transactions or to expropriations with compensation in accord-
ance with the general principles of article 14. Similarly, it might be
argued that article 14 imposes a duty on the legislature to provide
244. See VERF. DDR (1974) arts. 10, 12, 13; supra Part IV(A)(2). This system was basi-
cally drawn from the model of the Soviet Union. H. ROGGEMANN, supra note 51, at 257.
245. It was sometimes suggested, however, that the property guarantees of the Wei-
mar Constitution remained in effect during the occupation period. See 6 Ent-
scheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 270, 274 (1952); 0.
KIMMINICH, supra note 115, at 43-44.
246. See supra Part II.
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for compensation in the event that expropriated property falls
within its jurisdiction through accession of a part of Germany under
article 23. Without an ex post facto argument of this sort, however,
it is difficult to see how article 14 of the Basic Law can apply to
expropriations by the government of the GDR.
On the other hand, the expropriations in the GDR after 1949
did take place under written constitutions. The GDR constitutions
of 1949 and 1968/74 both protected private property and seemed
to contemplate at least some degree of compensation for govern-
mental takings. Article 22 of the 1949 Constitution protected prop-
erty, subject to "the social duties in favor of the community," and
article 23 allowed expropriations "only for the good of the commu-
nity on the basis of a statute." Article 23 also required compensa-
tion, "as long as the law does not determine otherwise"-a
provision that may have allowed expropriation without compensa-
tion if authorized by statute. 4 7
The 1968/74 Constitution of the GDR guaranteed "personal
property," but the use of property "may not contradict the interests
of the community. "248 Nonetheless, article 16 of the 1968/74 Con-
stitution stated that expropriations could only be undertaken "in re-
turn for appropriate compensation." Although both GDR
constitutions indicated that they were directly enforceable law, 249 in
reality there was no judicial enforcement of their provisions.250 In
247. VERF. DDR (1949) art. 23; see also id. art. 27 (socialization of property). More-
over, article 24 of the 1949 GDR Constitution explicitly ratified the expropriations of
Nazi activists and large landowners undertaken under the Soviet occupation regime. See
VERF. DDR (1949) art. 24, § 3 (expropriating businesses of "war criminals and active
National Socialists," as well as enterprises that serve a war policy); id. art. 24, § 5 (redis-
tributing "great land holdings" of more than 100 hectares). See also id. art. 24, § 2 (ex-
propriating property "[misused] to establish economic power to the damage of the
common good"); id. art. 144, § 2 (constitutional rights cannot prevail against past or
future provisions undertaken to "overcome National Socialism and militarism and to
afford compensation for the injustice of which [those forces] are guilty"). For discussion
of the expropriations undertaken during the Soviet occupation, see infra Part VIII(B)(1).
248. VERF. DDR (1974) art. 11. The term "personal property" basically referred to
"property in consumer goods purchased from income from work"-a considerably nar-
rower concept than "personal property" in the Anglo-American sense. See H. ROG-
GEMANN, supra note 51, at 258.
249. See VERF. DDR (1949) art. 144, § 1; VERF. DDR (1974) art. 105.
250. The 1949 GDR Constitution provided for a Constitutional Committee of the
Volkskammer, which was also to include three members of the Supreme Court and three
"German teachers of constitutional law." This committee-and not the judiciary-
would have the power to review the constitutionality of statutes, although the Volks-
kammer was apparently to have the ultimate decision on these issues. VERF. DDR
(1949) art. 66; art. 89. The Constitutional Committee, however, was never established.
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any case, few would argue that the federal Constitutional Court
could now enforce the provisions of those superseded constitutions.
In negotiations with the GDR, nonetheless, the government of
the Federal Republic argued strenuously that prior property rights
should be respected and the expropriations undone to the greatest
extent possible. Accordingly, on June 15, 1990 after very compli-
cated negotiations, the two governments entered into a "Joint Dec-
laration on the Regulation of Open Property Questions." This
Declaration, in turn, was made part of the Unification Treaty, and
was appended to the Treaty as Attachment III.25 The Unification
Treaty also set forth two additional statutes, generally known as the
"Property Statute ' ' 25 2 and the "Investment Statute,- 253 which were
intended to clarify and expand the general provisions of the Joint
Declaration. After unification, discussion of property issues focused
on these statutes, and in March 1991 they were significantly
amended in an effort to accelerate the lagging pace of investment in
the former GDR.254 The Declaration and these related statutes cov-
ered a number of separate points, which will be discussed in turn.
1. Expropriation Under the Soviet Occupation Regime, 1945-49.-As
noted above, a distinct and extremely important series of expropria-
tions took place during the Soviet occupation regime, before the
founding of the GDR. The Soviet authorities seized the businesses
and certain other property of numerous groups and individuals, in-
cluding those found to be Nazi Party officials or prominent party
members. As the first stage of a comprehensive land reform, the
authorities of the newly created East German Linder-acting under
Soviet inspiration-also expropriated property of large landowners;
this category included not only the aristocratic Junkers of the east
but also any person who owned more than 100 hectares (approxi-
251. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 41, § 1. In addition, article 41, § 3 of
the Treaty provides that the Federal Republic will not make any future legal changes
that would contradict the rules of the Joint Declaration.
252. Statute on the Regulation of Open Property Questions, printed in Unification
Treaty, supra note 203, attachment II, ch. III(B), para. 1(5) [hereinafter Property
Statute].
253. Statute Concerning Special Investments in the German Democratic Republic,
printed in Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment II, ch. III(B), para. 1(4) [herein-
after Investment Statute].
254. The Property Statute, as amended in March 1991, is set forth in FAZ, Mar. 27,
1991, at B1, col. 1. Unless otherwise noted, all citations of the Property Statute refer to
this amended version. For the statute effecting these changes, see Gesetz zur Besei-
tigung von Hemmnissen bei der Privatisierung von Unternehmen und zur F6rderung
von Investitionen, of Mar. 22, 1991, BGBI I 766.
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mately 250 acres).255
The Joint Declaration clearly states that expropriations "on the
basis of occupation law or occupation authority"-that is, the expro-
priations of 1945-49-are not to be undone, although the all-Ger-
man parliament may decide on some form of governmental
compensation in the future.256 This important decision may have
reflected a number of factors. In particular, the vast amount of
property involved-3.3 million hectares, apparently still one-third
of the agricultural property of the GDR 257-doubtless played a cen-
tral role. The GDR government apparently feared substantial social
unrest if thousands of farming families, who had exercised some
control over collective property, were suddenly to see this property
transferred to large landowners from the west.2
58
In any case, it is clear that the relevant authorities of the GDR-
and also, apparently, the Soviet Union-believed very strongly that
the legality of these occupation measures should not be called into
question. These views were made clear in a well-known letter that
GDR Prime Minister Hans Modrow wrote to President Gorbachev in
March 1990-seeking Gorbachev's assistance in preserving existing
255. The Soviet occupation authorities established Uinder governments in the Soviet
zone substantially before the founding of the GDR. Although these governments were
clearly acting under Soviet inspiration and control, it was the legal acts of the Ufnder
that expropriated the property taken for the land reform. In addition to the property of
large landowners, the land reform also extended to real property of those found to be
war criminals, Nazi leaders, or active members of the Nazi Party.
In the second stage of the land reform, most of the property seized by the UInder
authorities was distributed to individual farmers in small plots of seven to nine hectares
on the average. This property accounted for approximately 35% of agricultural land in
the Soviet zone. See M. MCCAULEY, supra note 26, at 22-24. In the decade following the
founding of the GDR, these plots were combined-often on a mandatory basis-into
collective enterprises. By 1960 all private farms had been collectivized in this manner.
Id. at 98.
Postwar measures of land reform (with compensation) were also undertaken in cer-
tain of the West German states. See 0. KIMMINICH, supra note 115, at 51; 46 BVerfGE
268 (1977).
256. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 1. The provision of the Uni-
fication Treaty that confirmed the 1945-49 expropriations was repeated in a letter
signed by representatives of the GDR and the Federal Republic as part of the matters
regulated at the end of the Two Plus Four discussions. See infra text accompanying notes
511-513. Therefore, this provision may now also have the force of a treaty in interna-
tional law.
257. DER SPIEGEL, June 18, 1990, at 29.
258. See supra note 255. Indeed, GDR legislation in 1990 reformed the collectives and
accorded farmers the right to withdraw their individual property at will; these new ar-
rangements would have been imperiled if the underlying 1945-49 expropriations were
undone.
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property relations in the GDR 259-and also in subsequent state-
ments of the Soviet government and GDR Prime Minister de
Maizibre.26 ° It is quite possible that unification would not have oc-
curred without the explicit confirmation of the 1945-49
expropriations.
The government of the Federal Republic also had strong views
on this issue, and they were quite different from the views of the
GDR and the Soviet Union. Although the eastern position pre-
vailed, it is interesting that the differing positions of the separate
governments were specifically acknowledged in the Joint Declara-
tion, immediately following the passage which made clear that the
1945-49 expropriations were not to be undone. Thus section 1 of
the Joint Declaration states that the Soviet Union and GDR "see no
possibility of revising (revidieren) the measures that were taken"
during the Soviet occupation period; this view clearly rejects resto-
ration of the property. The crucial role of the Soviet Union in insist-
ing on the confirmation of these expropriations can be seen in the
extraordinary fact that the Soviet Union-which was not a party to
the Joint Declaration or the Unification Treaty-is specifically men-
tioned at this point. The same section goes on to state, however,
that the Federal Republic "takes note of this [result] in light of the
historical development," but then declares that, in the view of the
Federal Republic, "a final decision over possible government com-
pensation payments must remain reserved for a future all-German
parliament. '261 This latter statement held out the possibility of
some measure of compensation, without creating an enforceable
obligation. 26
2
It should be noted that, with the possible exception of the sec-
tion on abortion, this provision on the 1945-49 expropriations was
the single most bitterly disputed portion of the Unification Treaty.
In the weeks following the signing of the Treaty, a constant drum-
beat of outraged letters-presenting personal recollections of ex-
propriation as well as prolific legal arguments-appeared in the
259. See FAZ, Mar. 8, 1990, at 2, col. 1. At the same time Modrow also sent a similar
letter to Chancellor Kohl.
260. See Fieberg & Reichenbach, Zum Problem der offenen Verm6ensfragen, 1991 NJW
321, 322 (quoting Soviet responses to Modrow letter).
261. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 1.
262. The language of this provision does not appear to foresee compensation for the
full value of the expropriated property but may contemplate the possibility of settle-
ments (Ausgleichsleistungen) in some lesser reasonable amount See Papier, Verfassungs-
rechtliche Probleme der Eigentumsregelung im Einigungsvertrag, 1991 NJW 193, 197; see also infra
text accompanying note 271.
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respected pages of the conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
protesting the failure to provide for repossession or compensation
for property expropriated during the Soviet occupation. Moreover,
a number of constitutional complaints were filed in the Constitu-
tional Court seeking a declaration that this treatment of the 1945-49
expropriations violated the Basic Law. The challengers argued that
even if the expropriations violated no constitutional provision when
they occurred, a present recognition by the Federal Republic of
property relations created in such a manner would constitute a pres-
ent violation of the protection of property contained in article 14 of
the Basic Law."' s The complainants also urged that exclusion of the
1945-49 expropriations from a general regime of compensation or
return of property, applicable to GDR expropriations after 1949, vi-
olated the constitutional guarantees of equality contained in article
3 264
Because of the central importance of this provision in the nego-
tiations leading up to the Unification Treaty, the drafters sought to
protect the 1945-49 expropriations against attack in the Constitu-
tional Court by amending the Basic Law specifically for the purpose
of preserving those expropriations. Under article 4 of the Unifica-
tion Treaty, a new article 143(3) was added to the Basic Law, stating
in part that "article 41 of the Unification Treaty [regulating property
questions], and regulations in pursuance thereof, will remain per-
manent to the extent that they provide that incursions on property
[in the GDR and East Berlin] are not to be undone. ' 26 5 Since it is
the 1945-49 expropriations that, in accordance with the Joint Decla-
ration, "are not to be undone," this constitutional amendment de-
clares that those expropriations are permanent. An accompanying
provision of the Unification Treaty amends article 135a of the Basic
Law, to make clear that the Federal Republic need not pay all debts
of the GDR.266 This amendment was also primarily designed to ne-
gate any governmental obligation to afford compensation for the
1945-49 expropriations.2 67
263. For an early statement of this view, see FAZ, July 30, 1990, at 2, col. 5 (discussing
the view of Professor Kimminich of Regensburg that any recognition of the confiscations
of 1945-49 in the Unification Treaty would be a violation of article 14 of the Basic Law,
unless requisite compensation was paid). See also 0. KIMMINICH, supra note 115, at 84.
264. See GG art. 3, § 1. For the treatment of post-1949 expropriations under the Uni-
fication Treaty, see infra text accompanying notes 272-302.
265. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § 5.
266. Id. art. 4, § 4.
267. These constitutional amendments, however, were not necessarily the end of the
story because the Basic Law imposes limitations on its own amendment. Article 79(3)
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In a decision of fundamental importance issued in April 1991,
the Constitutional Court unanimously upheld the provision of the
Unification Treaty which stated that the 1945-49 expropriations
were "not to be undone. ' 268 In general, the Court found that, in
light of the constitutional amendment adding article 143(3) to the
Basic Law, the legislature had remained within its constitutional
powers. The Court first noted that the expropriations of the Soviet
occupation regime were not subject to the Basic Law because that
document did not apply to the eastern territory until its accession in
1990; indeed, at the time of most of the 1945-49 expropriations, the
Basic Law was not even in effect. The Court also rejected claims
that the Unification Treaty violated fundamental guarantees of
equality by excluding the 1945-49 expropriations from the provi-
sions favoring return of property, applicable to later GDR expropri-
ations. According to the Court, the government had discretion to
take steps-like preservation of the 1945-49 expropriations-that
appeared necessary to achieve the constitutionally required goal of
unification. 69 The Court did indicate, however, that some form of
compensation to the former owners of the expropriated property
would be constitutionally required under the equality principle.27 °
Even so, compensation need not be made at full market value; the
legislature could decide upon a reasonable lesser amount in light of
the government's other obligations incurred upon unification and in
prohibits certain amendments of the Basic Law- particularly those that affect "human
dignity" or interfere with the basic democratic structural principles of the government
or the rule of law. In the Constitutional Court the complainants argued that this provi-
sion prohibited the amendments of the Basic Law that were designed to confirm the
1945- 49 expropriations. See generally infra text accompanying notes 268-271; note 269.
268. Decision of Constitutional Court (First Senate), Apr. 23, 1991, 1991
EUROPXSCHE GRUNDRECHTEZEITSCHRiFT [EuGRZ] 121. For initial commentary on the
decision, see Fromme, Viele Worte und wenig Klarheit, FAZ, Apr. 24, 1991, at 1, col. 5. For
an earlier decision denying a preliminary injunction in this case, see 1990 EuGRZ 556.
269. See 1991 EuGRZ at 131. At oral argument in the expropriation case, Lothar de
Maizire and others argued that unification could not have been achieved without this
provision in the Unification Treaty. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 259-260.
In the Court's view, therefore, the amendment of the Basic Law confirming the 1945-49
expropriations did not violate the limits on amendment of the Basic Law set forth in
article 79, § 3. 1991 EuGRZ at 129-31; see supra note 267.
270. 1991 EuGRZ at 131-32. In the Court's view, the Unification Treaty had
amended the equality principle in order to exclude return of the property expropriated
between 1945-49, but had not amended the equality principle to the extent that com-
pensation-rather than return of property-was at issue. Thus the equality principle did
require the government to afford some measure of compensation for the 1945-49 ex-
propriations, so that the disparity between the treatment of that property and the prop-
erty expropriated later by the GDR would not be so great. See id. The Court also
appeared to suggest that a similar result might be required under the "social state" and
rule of the law principles of the Basic Law. Id. at 130-3 1.
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light of the fact that during the same period of history many people
had undergone serious deprivations without compensation.2 7
With this decision the Constitutional Court has taken a substan-
tial step toward settling the largest open constitutional question
arising from unification. The decision frees much of the real prop-
erty in the former GDR from clouds on ownership and, in that re-
spect, will certainly further investment in the east. The question of
required compensation, however, remains a political issue that must
soon be confronted.
2. Property Expropriated After 1949.-For property expropriated
after 1949-that is, property expropriated by the GDR government
rather than under the Soviet occupation regime-the situation
under the Unification Treaty is significantly different. The basic
principle adopted by the Joint Declaration is that these takings are
to be undone. In some cases this property must be returned to the
former owner or the heirs of the former owner, and in other cases
compensation will be paid instead.272 This principle reflects a very
strong conception of property, as indicated in part by the fact that
the heirs of the former owner can pursue these claims even though
in many cases they have had no personal contact with the property.
Moreover, this right of recovery extends all the way back to 1949-
now more than forty years in the past. Earlier proposals to draw a
line at 1972 (when a large number of confiscations occurred), and to
extend rights only for confiscations occurring after that point, have
been rejected.
For this purpose, the Joint Declaration and statutes adopt a
broad view of "expropriated property," which is defined to include
not only property taken by confiscatory decree but also certain
property acquired by the state "as a result of economic coer-
cion."' 2 73 Accordingly, former owners may be able to recover prop-
erty that was transferred to the state when permissible rents, as
determined by GDR law, were insufficient to pay the costs of main-
taining the property.2 74 Moreover, in most cases in which a claimant
has a right to return of the property, the claimant may choose com-
pensation instead.2 75
271. See 1991 EuGRZ at 132.
272. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3.
273. Id. attachment III, § 4.
274. See Property Statute, supra note 252, § 1(2); DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 8, 1990, at 50; cf.
Property Statute, supra note 252, § 8(1).
275. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(c); Property Statute,
supra note 252, § 8(l). For a useful collection of materials on these problems, along with
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When the Unification Treaty was originally adopted, its framers
contemplated that property expropriated by the GDR would be re-
turned to the original owner in most cases, and that the former
owner would be required to accept compensation instead of restitu-
tion in three categories of exceptional situations only. This princi-
ple seemed to reflect the view that compensation can rarely be a
fully adequate substitute for return of expropriated property. Yet
the exceptional situations, in which the former owner would be re-
quired to accept compensation, were also important, and they will
be discussed in turn below. Indeed the first of these exceptions-.
the exception for property to be used for investment purposes-has
become so significant as a result of recent statutory amendments
that some believe that its expansion has impaired the basic principle
that property should generally be returned to the former owner.2 7 6
a. Property to be Used for Investment.-In its only substantive pro-
vision on expropriated property (other than the Joint Declaration
commentary, see VERMOGENSRECHTLICHE ANSPRUCHE DER DDR-ENTEIGNUNGSGE-
SCHADIGTEN (1990); see also Giuson & Thoma, Investments in the Territory of the Former Ger-
man Democratic Republic, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 540 (1990-1991).
In July 1990, the GDR government issued a regulation requiring that all claims with
respect to confiscated property be filed byJanuary 31, 1991 and seeking to prohibit the
future sale of property whose ownership is disputed. FAZ, July 31, 1990, at 9, col. 4. Six
weeks later, however, the de Maizi~re government moved the date for filing claims up to
October 13, 1990-a move that was bitterly criticized as an attempt to achieve the effec-
tive forfeiture of western property rights. Shortly before the deadline, it was estimated
that by October 13, 150,000 claims for the return of property would be filed in Berlin
alone. DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 8, 1990, at 51.
The Property Statute also provides for compensation for-or the return of-prop-
erty confiscated or forcibly sold as a result of racial, political, religious, or ideological
discrimination by the Nazi regime in the territory that later fell within the borders of the
GDR. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 1(6). The rules applicable to the post-1949
expropriations generally apply in these cases also, except that a somewhat longer period
is permitted for the filing of these claims. Claimants of property confiscated between
1933 and 1945 also take precedence over later holders of the property who may claim in
turn that their property was expropriated by the government of the GDR. See id. § 3(2).
The inclusion of provisions requiring return of property lost as a result of oppres-
sion under the Nazis reflects the fact that, after World War II, the government of the
GDR refused to accept financial responsibility for acts of oppression undertaken in its
territory during the Nazi period. (The GDR maintained that, because the Communist
Party opposed Hitler, the CDR government bore no responsibility for acts of the Na-
tional Socialist regime.) Unlike the Federal Republic, therefore, the GDR provided no
compensation or other relief for expropriation or other discriminatory acts of the Nazi
regime. Now after 45 years, therefore, the opportunity for repossession of seized prop-
erty, or compensation, arises for the first time.
276. Except as specifically stated, the rules discussed in this section do not apply to
businesses expropriated by the GDR. The special rules applicable to expropriated busi-
nesses are discussed in Part VIII(B)(4) below.
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and statutes incorporated as attachments), the Unification Treaty set
forth the first exceptional situation in which compensation could re-
place the general principle of return of property. Article 41(2) of
the Unification Treaty contemplated that a former owner of expro-
priated property could be granted compensation rather than restitu-
tion if the property is urgently needed for investment uses that
would yield general economic benefits-principally the creation or
preservation of jobs.277 Accordingly, under the Investment Statute,
the present manager of expropriated property (the Trust Agency or
a local government) was empowered to sell the property to an inves-
tor, notwithstanding the claims of a prior owner, if the property was
urgently needed for a business that would create jobs, for significant
housing needs, or for necessary infrastructure for such projects.278
In this way, the economic reconstruction of the former territory of
the GDR would take precedence over the specific property rights of
former owners, and the former owner would be relegated to the
proceeds of the sale or to other compensation. 79 Yet the required
procedure for such sales posed some difficulties. The prospective
investor was required to obtain a certificate from a local government
office approving the proposed investment goals-often a time-con-
suming process-and an objection by the former owner could fur-
ther delay the sale.
In early 1991 the economic situation in the former GDR be-
came desperate, and government officials believed that accelerated
sales of property for investment purposes were essential. Conse-
quently, statutory amendments in March 1991 greatly simplified the
process of selling expropriated property for investment purposes.
In effect, the current manager of the property would make the final
decision on whether a prospective purchaser's investment plan is
adequate; no immediate judicial review of this decision was possible
and no objection by the former owner could delay the decision. 28"
After this accelerated decision, the investor could -receive the prop-
erty and the original owner would only be entitled to the proceeds
of the sale or compensation. Some commentators claimed that this
accelerated process constituted a"'second expropriation" of the for-
mer owners, and argued that many local governments managing ex-
277. The Investment Statute, see supra note 253, was enacted to carry out this
provision.
278. Investment Statute, supra note 253, § 1.
279. Id. § 3.
280. Of course the former owner could also propose an investment plan which would
then be considered along with the plans of any other prospective purchasers of the
property.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
propriated property were still controlled by former SED cadres
which were basically hostile to those whose property had been
expropriated .*28
In any case, the new rules will probably expand the number of
instances in which the original principle of return of expropriated
property will be replaced by compensation.28 2 Indeed, some main-
tain that this expanded exception fatally compromises the principle.
Yet the amendments did not accept the more sweeping argument of
some, including the SPD, that investment would best be furthered if
the principle of the return of property were abandoned altogether
and all former owners received compensation. Such a proposal evi-
dently went too far for the strong property views held by the gov-
erning coalition.
b. Impossibility of Return.-In a second exception to the princi-
ple of restitution, the Joint Declaration recognized that in certain
cases an actual return of the property would be impossible, imprac-
tical or inequitable, and it provided special rules for these situa-
tions.283 In some cases property has been so merged with other
property that it cannot be extricated and separately returned. For
example, numerous pieces of expropriated property may have been
combined to form the site of a large apartment building, or property
may have become an inextricable part of a business enterprise. In
these cases, the former owner will receive compensation-to the ex-
tent that compensation has not already been paid to a GDR citizen
under GDR law.284
c. "Honest"Acquisition by Third Person.-A third exception to the
principle of return of expropriated property is made when individu-
als or certain institutional owners have acquired interests in real
281. These commentators also doubted that the previous property rules had actually
been the cause of delays in investment. See FAZ, Apr. 2, 1991, at 8, col. 4; FAZ, Mar. 20,
1991, at 1, col. 5.
282. The March amendments also extended the principle of sale for investment pur-
poses to business enterprises, in addition to real property in general. See infra text ac-
companying note 318.
283. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(a). See also Property Stat-
ute, supra note 252, § 4(1) (return of property will not be required "when according to
the nature of the situation this is no longer possible").
284. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(a). The same principle is
applicable when the property has been devoted to public use, or when a substantial
expenditure has been made to adapt property for a particular function and it is in the
public interest that this function continue. See generally Property Statute, supra note 252,
§ 5.
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property "in an honest manner" (in redlicher Weise). 28 5 In these
cases the rights of the innocent third party purchaser are protected,
and the purchaser can keep the property. On the other hand, the
original owner receives a "socially acceptable exchange"-either
real property of comparable value or monetary compensation. 286
The same rule applies in cases in which a state trustee has sold real
property to a third person. 2 7 These provisions are clearly intended
to preserve reasonable expectations upon the transfer of property.
The provisions may also reflect the judgment that, in the case of
"honest" purchases of real property, special assurances of validity
are necessary in order to promote privatization.
The precise meaning of acquisition "in an honest manner,"
however, may raise difficult questions. Certainly it seems likely that
most purchasers of property knew or could easily have discovered
that what they were purchasing or receiving was property that had
originally been expropriated. On the other hand, whether that
knowledge-arising in a socialist legal order-should be held
against them is another question. 2 8 There is no requirement in the
Joint Declaration or the Property Statute that a person acquiring in
an honest manner must actually have paid value for the property; in
any case, the definition of "value" in a nonmarket society can be
elusive. Under the Property Statute, an acquisition is ordinarily
"dishonest" (unredlich) if it was inconsistent with the prevailing law
or administrative practice of the GDR (and the acquirer knew or
should have known of the inconsistency), or if the transaction was
influenced by corruption or exploitation of a personal position of
power, or otherwise the result of coercion or deception. 28 9 The
chief purpose of this provision may have been to deny SED and gov-
ernment officials valuable property acquired as a result of their posi-
285. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(b); Property Statute, supra
note 252, § 4(2).
286. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(b); Property Statute, supra
note 252, § 9(2). In the case of exchange of property, however, already difficult
problems of valuation may be further complicated because two pieces of property must
be assessed instead of one. See infra text accompanying note 297.
287. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 3(b).
288. See Fieberg & Reichenbach, supra note 260, at 327.
289. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 4(3). As defined in this section, the concept
of "dishonesty" seems to be different from the concept of bad faith (absence of "guter
Glaube") in the German Civil Code--a concept which, like the analogous concept in
Anglo-American law, primarily involves knowledge that the property belongs to a third
person. See BURGERLICHES GESETZBUCH 1027-31 (O.Jauernig 3d ed. 1984) (Section 932
of Civil Code and related commentary); Fieberg & Reichenbach, supra note 260, at 327-
28. It is not entirely clear, however, whether the definition in the Property Statute is
intended to be an exhaustive definition of "dishonesty."
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tions of power: in the last days of the Modrow government, for
example, high officials purchased villas in East Berlin and elsewhere
for what reportedly were, by any calculation, bargain prices. 290
Notwithstanding many difficulties, however, it may ultimately be
necessary to consider the reasonableness of a purchase price as evi-
dence of whether the property was acquired through corruption, co-
ercion, or deception.
29 1
In all of these exceptions to the principle of return, the alterna-
tive of compensation plays an important role. Indeed, with the
probable increase of property sales for investment purposes, the
role of compensation becomes even more crucial. The Joint Decla-
ration does not specifically state the ultimate source or sources from
which compensation will be derived. Under the Declaration the
GDR was required to establish a "legally independent compensation
fund, separate from the governmental budget,- 292 and the Federal
Republic is now required by statute to create a special fund for the
purpose of compensation.293 Presumably compensation will be
paid, in the first instance, by the public fund rather than by the per-
son or entity that is allowed to retain ownership of the property.
Although the Joint Declaration and statutes may not exclude a claim
by the fund against the present owner in some instances, it is not
clear that such claims are contemplated.294
The source of financing for the public fund must also be deter-
mined. Perhaps the fund may receive the proceeds of the sale of
certain former People's Property which is not being claimed by a
prior owner or which, for some other reason, is not returned to that
290. DER SPIEGEL, Oct. 8, 1990, at 54-55. In this connection, see also Property Stat-
ute, supra note 252, § 4(2) (excluding protection for persons acquiring real property
after October 18, 1989, under certain circumstances).
291. Two further provisions of the Joint Declaration address the likelihood that cer-
tain property relations in the GDR resulted from oppressive acts of the state and seek to
assure that the beneficiaries of such actions do not benefit under the Joint Declaration.
Section 8 states that in the case of property interests obtained by a person who engaged
in dishonest machinations ("unlautere Machenschaften") such as "misuse of power, cor-
ruption, extortion or fraud," there will be no claim for recovery of the property. See
Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment Ill, § 8. Although this provision may be
primarily directed against governmental misuse of power, it also apparently applies to
instances of private fraud between individuals. Section 9 requires the GDR to take legal
steps to undo criminal proceedings through which property was forfeited in a manner
contrary to the rule of law. Id. attachment II, § 9.
292. Id. attachment III, § 13(c).
293. See Property Statute, supra note 252, § 29a.
294. See generally Fieberg & Reichenbach, supra note 260, at 326; Gruson & Thoma,
supra note 275, at 560.
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owner.295 For example, many large apartment houses and factories
were held in the form of People's Property and the sale of these
buildings could provide funds for compensation of former owners
of other property. Ultimately it may also be necessary for the gen-
eral treasury of the Federal Republic to support the compensation
fund.
Another question left open in the Joint Declaration and statutes
is the level of compensation, or more generally, the principles on
which compensation is to be determined.296 One possibility would
be the value of the property at the time of confiscation, perhaps in-
cluding interest at a specified rate. This amount could be difficult to
ascertain because it might require the determination of a hypotheti-
cal past market value in the context of what was at the time a
nonmarket economy. Current value is also a possibility, but this res-
olution also raises problems. When property cannot be returned
because it has been merged into the site of a large factory, for exam-
ple, compensation according to current value would require that the
"value" of the underlying land somehow be separated from the
value added by the presence of the structures that made return of
the property impossible. Moreover, compensation at current value
might well impose an intolerable burden on the public treasury. 97
Although the point is not made explicitly in the Joint Declara-
tion or accompanying statutes, it would be consistent with a number
of existing provisions if compensation were to be paid according to
the value of the expropriated property at the time of expropriation.98
First, a special provision of the Property Statute regulating the re-
turn of expropriated businesses specifically states that, if the business
itself is not to be returned, compensation will be paid according to
"the value of the enterprise at the time it was transferred into People's
Property or [placed under] state administration."'299 There is little reason
to believe that the method of compensation for other expropriated
295. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 25, § 3; Badura, Der Verfassungsauftrag
der Eigentumsgarante im wiedervereinigten Deutschland, 1990 DVBI 1256, 1258.
296. The details of compensation are to be regulated in the future by statute. Prop-
erty Statute, supra note 252, § 9(3).
297. The burden of compensation will be further increased by the Constitutional
Court's recent decision finding that some degree of compensation should also be paid
for expropriations undertaken in 1945-1949 during the Soviet occupation regime. See
supra text accompanying notes 268-271.
298. Although the use of market value seems most defensible in theory-if market
value could be determined-it is also possible that the (ordinarily very low) tax assess-
ment value could ultimately be used.
299. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 6(7) (emphasis added); see infra text accompa-
nying notes 310-318.
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property should differ from that applicable to expropriated busi-
nesses. Moreover, a similar principle of compensation can be in-
ferred from those provisions of the Property Statute which, by
requiring certain compensating payments upon the return of prop-
erty, imply the principle that in many cases the value of the property
currently recovered by the former owner should not differ materi-
ally from the value of the property at the time of expropriation 3 0 0
If this principle governs the return of property, a similar principle
should probably prevail when the former owner recovers compensa-
tion instead of the property itself.
Although the provisions on compensation in the Joint Declara-
tion and accompanying statutes are already quite complex, funda-
mental questions relating to the basic principles of compensation
remain open .3" In the view of the Constitutional Court, the legisla-
ture generally has significant discretion in determining the princi-
ples of compensation for expropriations. Moreover, it seems clear
that on questions arising from unification the legislature will be ac-
corded, if anything, an even broader measure of discretion. Thus,
the exact principles of compensation remain unknown, and the bu-
reaucracy for determining specific amounts of compensation has not
yet been established. All signs indicate, therefore, that the quest for
compensation may be long, and the results may well be disap-
pointing. Accordingly, in the months following unification, claim-
ants with a choice between receiving property or compensation
often seek to recover the property. In contrast, claimants entitled to
receive a specified purchase price of property sold for investment
purposes may sometimes find this to be an attractive alternative. In
any case, many former owners are seeking to reach a private settle-
ment of all competing claims to specified property in order to avoid
the delays and uncertainties of the administrative and judicial
process.30 2
The great complexity of the return and compensation provi-
300. See Property Statute, supra note 252, § 7 (With respect to the return of property
other than businesses, "increases in value financed by the state budget after transfer [of
the property] into People's Property, as well as decreases of value that have occurred in
the interim, are to be determined and compensated for."); id. § 21(4) (If a prior owner
receives property in substitution for certain expropriated property, "differences in value
between the value of the substitute-property and the value of the [expropriated] prop-
erty at the time of expropriation or placement under state administration are to be com-
pensated for."). See also Investment Statute, supra note 253, § 3(3).
301. See supra note 296.
302. See Gruson & Thoma, supra note 275, at 564-65 (emphasizing advisability of
reaching settlement among competing claimants).
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sions suggests only one aspect of the enormous difficulties that arise
from the hundreds of thousands of claims that have now been filed
for the return of expropriated property. Up to this point the offices
of the state Trust Agency, as well as local offices dealing with prop-
erty questions, are totally unable to handle the massive numbers of
claims. Moreover, in addition to the problems of interpreting the
relevant rules, there are often factual problems of bewildering com-
plexity. The ravages of war and the passage of time have erased
whole streets or areas of cities. Under these circumstances, it may
be difficult or impossible to establish exactly where the boundaries
of a given piece of property now lie. Moreover, the previous land
registration system was often neglected by local offices under the
GDR government, as private ownership of real property and its vari-
ous incidents were generally neglected. Thus, even proof that a
particular person owned identifiable property at one point in the
past may not always be easy to establish.
3. Property Placed Under State Administration.-Before the Wall
was built in 1961, two and one-half million citizens of the GDR left
for the west. Even after 1961, a significant number left the GDR
legally or illegally.
Many of these individuals left houses and other forms of real
property behind. Some of this property was expropriated by the
state and converted into People's Property. Much of this property,
however, was not actually expropriated; rather it was transferred to
a state administrative trustee and held in the name of the original
owner-with limitations that effectively restricted the owner's use of
the property. In a typical case the state administrator then leased
the property-often a house-to a citizen of the GDR who paid low,
subsidized rates and had the benefit of strong GDR legislation for
the protection of tenants.
According to the Joint Declaration, this form of administration
is to be abolished and the property is to be returned to the original
owner:
Trustee administration, and similar measures involving
limitations on control, with respect to real property, busi-
nesses and other property are to be abolished. Thus those
citizens whose property was taken into state administration
as a result of flight from the GDR or on other grounds are
to recover the authority to control their own property.30 3
303. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 2; see also Property Statute,
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This provision raises difficult and potentially explosive social
problems because many thousands of GDR citizens have lived for
years in houses owned by former residents who departed for the
west. These tenants now face the prospect of eventual ejection from
their long-term homes by persons who may have long abandoned
any hope of recovering their former houses and any real interest in
those dwellings. Those who left for the west, and often prospered
there, can recover the dwellings of those who remained to face the
more difficult circumstances of the GDR.
The residents of the former GDR, however, are not totally with-
out protection. Under the Joint Declaration the tenants' protection
law of the GDR remained in effect, and the Property Statute makes
clear that existing leases will not be disturbed. 0 4 These provisions
may mean a period of continued residence for many tenants in the
east-but, most likely, under a progressively increasing rent.30 5
There is yet another issue of underlying importance that is not
expressly recognized by the Joint Declaration but is handled in an
accompanying statute. The state administrator often did little or
nothing to keep the houses of departed citizens in reasonable condi-
tion. In many cases, therefore, it was necessary for the GDR tenant
to expend substantial personal effort and savings in order to under-
take fundamental repairs and continuing maintenance of the prop-
erty. Without these efforts, many houses could have become
completely uninhabitable and therefore valueless (leaving the value
of the underlying land alone). To avoid the injustice that might
otherwise result, the Property Statute provides that the former GDR
tenant can recover compensation for certain of these expendi-
tures.3 0 6 Interestingly, it appears that liability for the tenants' ex-
penditures will be borne by the person entitled to own the property
and not by the state.30 7 This arrangement is rather unusual in the
supra note 252, § 1(4). In this case also,'the claimant has the option to choose compen-
sation instead of the return of property. Id. § 11 (1).
304. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 5; Property Statute, supra
note 2,52, §§ 16, 17; but see G6hring, supra note 137, at 318-19 (discussing landlords'
rights of eviction under applicable sections of Civil Code as modified by Unification
Treaty).
305. Under the Unification Treaty, however, most rents for apartments and other
dwellings were to remain frozen for an interim period. See Unification Treaty, supra note
203, attachment II, ch. V(A), para. III(l)(a)(dd); G6hring, supra note 137 at 320. There
has been substantial debate about the appropriate percentage increase of rents after this
period.
306. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 19.
307. See, e.g., id. § 19(3) ("If the [original owner] acknowledges the [tenants'] claims,
an agreement on this matter shall be entered into. In case of dispute, the procedure of
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structure of the regulations relating to expropriated property, be-
cause in many other cases claims for compensation seem to be di-
rected against the state and not against a private holder of
property. 0 8
4. Expropriated Businesses.-During the early period of the GDR
certain businesses of moderate size remained in private hands. In-
deed some owners of successful companies became quite prosper-
ous even though the government took steps to acquire a share of
private enterprises. In 1972, however, the government and Com-
munist Party changed course sharply, seeking greater conformity
with the economic structure of the Soviet Union.30 9 As a result, a
great wave of expropriations placed most private businesses under
government ownership, where they remained until the events of
1989-90.
Interestingly, even before the Joint Declaration, the GDR
Volkskammer sought to return some businesses nationalized in
1972 to private hands. In a statute enacted in March 1990, the
Volkskammer determined that the former private owners (or their
heirs) could reclaim these enterprises by returning the minimal
price paid by the government in 1972."' ° This was an early step
toward privatization, but the opportunities upon recovery were not
always so favorable as they may have seemed at the outset. Some
owners found, for example, that the businesses expropriated by the
government in 1972 had lost substantial ground in the intervening
years through poor management and insufficient capital investment.
Some of these owners found that what they received from the GDR
government in 1990 was a failing enterprise that could not compete
against its western counterparts. Perhaps one solution was to enter
into a joint venture with a western firm, but that was to risk losing
the civil courts is available."). In Germany, a reference to the civil courts ordinarily
indicates a cause of action between two private individuals, and not against a state entity.
308. See supra text accompanying note 294. The current tenants of a one- or two-
family house also have a right of first refusal if the property is sold. Property Statute,
supra note 252, § 20(1). Moreover, the tenant of a one-family house being reclaimed by
a prior owner can request the state administrator to offer the prior owner an equivalent
piece of property in the same area as a substitute. If the prior owner accepts the substi-
tute property, the original property can be sold to the tenant. Id. § 21.
309. See, e.g., Zieger, supra note 31, at 148.
310. Gesetz iber die Gruindung und Titigkeit privater Unternehmen und iber Un-
ternehmensbeteiligungen, of Mar. 7, 1990, §§ 17-19, GBI DDR 1 141, 143. These sec-
tions were later replaced by the Property Statute. See Property Statute, supra note 252,
§ 39(10).
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control of the enterprise itself.- l
In the case of expropriated businesses, the Property Statute ap-
plies principles that are similar to those underlying its other basic
provisions. In the case of businesses under state administration, the
owner can often recover full control of the property.31 2 Businesses
that were taken into People's Property in the great wave of expropri-
ations in 1972 (as well as in earlier GDR expropriations) may also be
returned to their owners if the enterprise remains "comparable" to
the business at the time of expropriation-taking into account inter-
vening changes in technology and general economic develop-
ments.31 3 Adjustments must be made, however, for changes in the
value of the business. Thus, in principle, if the value of the business
substantially declined after the point of expropriation, the property
owner may receive compensation for the decrease, in addition to the
property; if the value has materially increased, compensation could
be due to the state Trust Agency. 1 4 In many cases, a previous
owner can choose compensation instead of return of the enter-
prise. Compensation will equal the value of the enterprise at the
time of its expropriation, reduced by any compensation that was
paid at the time (the price in GDR-Marks being converted at the rate
of two GDR-Marks to one D-Mark). 1 6 The Property Statute sets
forth a number of extremely complex provisions designed to mea-
sure substantial increases or decreases in value and to regulate the
problem of joint owners and stockholders, and businesses that have
joined with other businesses, among other issues.
As in the case of other expropriated property, the statutory
amendments of March 199 1-designed to accelerate privatization-
will likely have an important impact on the return of expropriated
enterprises. First, the amendments provide for an accelerated pro-
cess by which a former owner-or even a claimant who appears to
be the former owner-can receive and operate the enterprise on a
temporary basis pending a final determination of the issue.317 On
the other hand, the special investment rules, discussed above in con-
nection with the return of other expropriated property, are now also
311. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1991, at D1, col. 3.
312. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 6; Property Statute, supra
note 252, §§ 11, 12.
313. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 6(1).
314. Id. § 6(1)-(4).
315. Id. § 6(6); see also Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment III, § 7.
316. Property Statute, supra note 252. § 6(7); see supra text accompanying note 299.
317. Property Statute, supra note 252, § 6a.
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applicable with some variations to expropriated enterprises.31 This
provision is not particularly favorable to the former owner of the
business, because it is possible that the former owner's rights may
be superseded by those of a purchaser with a preferable investment
plan and the former owner may be relegated to receipt of the
purchase price or other compensation.
In all, the new amendments add considerable complexity to an
already complex statute-indeed, the general description provided
here can only hint at these problems. In sum, the statute only seems
to scratch the surface of the difficulties that will attend the carrying
out of its provisions.
It is difficult to overestimate the enormous conceptual and
practical problems raised by this sweeping attempt to undo past
changes in property relationships extending over the decades since
1949. Inevitably, the ambiguities of the Joint Declaration and re-
lated statutes, together with the likelihood of considerable problems
of proof in individual cases, will ensure years if not decades of litiga-
tion on these property questions. The recent amendments seeking
to accelerate private investment may ease some problems but, even
on the most optimistic assessment, they may create many additional
claims for future compensation.
Moreover, the result of these provisions-even with the Consti-
tutional Court's decision that the 1945-49 expropriations are not to
be undone-will be a massive shift of effective control of real prop-
erty from residents of eastern Germany to their more prosperous
fellow citizens in the west. Against the backdrop of some of the
other economic problems of unification, the problems raised by the
Joint Declaration may indeed mean substantial social dislocation
over a number of years for the people in the east. Moreover there
seems little doubt that the uncertainty engendered by this realloca-
tion of property interests has deterred investment in the GDR: it
may be difficult to encourage people to invest in eastern Germany if
the property on which potential factories and offices are located may
ultimately be found to belong to someone else. It is too early to
know whether the statutory steps recently enacted to solve this
problem will be successful.
In general, the strong property principles of conservative ideol-
ogy have played a significant role in the development of these
problems. First, these principles prevailed in the basic decision to
318. See id. § 3a(1)(2); see supra text accompanying notes 280-281.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
undo all GDR expropriations. Second, strong property principles
were important in the basic decision to adopt a general principle of
return of expropriated property-rather than a general principle of
compensation-although the principle of return of property has
been qualified by significant exceptions. Whether these basic deci-
sions were wise on the whole cannot yet be determined. In general,
however, the positions adopted in the Joint Declaration and accom-
panying statutes-notwithstanding the exclusion of the expropria-
tions under the Soviet occupation--can be seen as a victory for
strong property principles supported over the years by the conserv-
atives in the Federal Republic.
C. Abortion
Along with the problem of expropriated property, questions
about the regulation of abortion in a united Germany evoked the
most bitter and prolonged dispute. The struggle over abortion was
the continuation of a political debate that had been prominent in
the Federal Republic before there was any real possibility of unifica-
tion, and the roots of this dispute extend back into the history of the
Weimar Republic.
From an American point of view, the key to an understanding of
this issue is the fact that the Constitutional Court in the Federal Re-
public of Germany has established a constitutionally required view
of abortion that is fundamentally different from that prevailing in
the United States. In 1973 in Roe v. Wade" l' the Supreme Court of
the United States held that a general right of privacy includes a wo-
man's right to an abortion. Under Roe, this right is essentially un-
qualified during the first three months of pregnancy; beyond that up
to the point of the fetus's viability (approximately six months), it is
qualified only by the state's power to regulate to preserve the health
of the mother. Although the Court may have eroded the strict rules
of the "trimester system" in the late 1980s,32" a woman's basic right
to an abortion has not yet been rejected.
In contrast, the West German Constitutional Court issued a de-
cision in 1975 that is, in theory at least, almost diametrically op-
posed to the American position. 321 In the German abortion case,
319. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
320. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
321. 39 BVerfGE 1 (1975). For an edited English translation of this case, see D. KoM-
MERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 348-
59 (1989). For comparative discussions of the German and American cases, see M.
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW 25-39 (1987); Kommers, Abortion
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the court held that the state is under a constitutional duty to protect
the life of the fetus and consequently the constitution requires that
abortion remain a punishable criminal offense, in basic principle. In
this case the court struck down a federal statute-enacted under a
coalition led by the Social Democrats-that would have allowed a
woman to obtain an abortion without criminal penalty during the
first three months of pregnancy as long as she underwent counsel-
ing beforehand. The court decided that the right to life contained
in article 2(2) of the Basic Law extends to fetuses and that the state's
duty to protect human dignity-set forth in article 1 ()-includes a
duty to protect human life. Moreover, the court decided that in
practice the only way the fetus could be adequately protected was
through criminal sanctions. Thus the court found that the state has
an obligation to protect the fetus through a combination of two pro-
visions, articles 2(2) and 1 (1) of the Basic Law. Among other things
the court indicated that a different basic resolution of the abortion
question would be particularly unfortunate in light of the Nazi gov-
ernment's destruction of "unworthy" life.3 22
The Constitutional Court also found, however, that the right to
life was not the only constitutional interest at issue. The court ac-
knowledged that the pregnant woman also has countervailing con-
stitutional interests, derived from the right to the free development
of her personality set forth in article 2(1) of the Basic Law. These
rights are presumably similar to those recognized by the Supreme
Court in Roe v. Wade, particularly in those passages of the Roe opin-
ion that refer to a woman's control over her family relationships and
her future life.3 23 In the view of the West German Constitutional
Court, however, those rights of personality are ordinarily out-
weighed by the state's duty to protect the life of the fetus. Only in
particularly exigent circumstances-cases of rape, serious medical
problems, congenital defects, or severe social problems for the
pregnant woman-can the woman's right of personality prevail.3 24
In sum, therefore, the Constitutional Court found that abortion
is constitutionally permissible only when certain circumstances or
"indications" are present, and the West German Parliament then
and Constitution: United States and West Germany, 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 255 (1977); Brugger,
Abtreibung-ein Grundrecht oder ein 'erbrechen?: Ein V'eygleich der Lrteile des United States
Supreme Court und des BJ'erfG, 1986 NJW 896.
322. See 39 BVerfGE at 36-37, 66-68.
323. 410 U.S. at 153.
324. See 39 BVerfGE at 48-51.
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enacted a statute basically adopting the court's solution. 25 Of the
court's indications, the most unclear-and the most sharply de-
bated-is the "social indication," allowing an abortion in the case of
severe social problems for the pregnant woman. In the Federal Re-
public the individual states ordinarily administer federal law and
consequently the actual enforcement of the abortion statute is sub-
ject to significant variations. In some conservative UInder (notably
Bavaria), the social indication may be comparatively difficult to as-
sert, while in some others (particularly those governed by the SPD)
it is often easier to establish. Even in the more liberal states, how-
ever, the circumstances supporting the claim must generally be cer-
tified by a physician, and the process of obtaining the exception can
be seen as inherently degrading.326 Even so, the relatively liberal
practice in some Lander has been bitterly criticized, and the state of
Bavaria has recently filed an action in the Constitutional Court ad-
vocating a narrower view of the social exception and seeking greater
rigor in its administration. 27 A decision in this case could indicate
whether the court's strict views of 1975 still retain currency. 28
In contrast with the West German duty of the government to
prohibit abortion (with noted exceptions), the GDR in 1972
adopted a statute that ordinarily allowed a woman to obtain an abor-
tion during the first three months of pregnancy if the abortion was
performed by a physician in an obstetrical clinic.3 2' This GDR stat-
ute thus bears some similarities to the result in Roe v. Wade and also
to the West German law struck down by the Constitutional Court in
325. See STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] §§ 218, 218a, 218b, 219. Under the statute, certain
"indications" can be invoked only at relatively early stages of the pregnancy. In the case
of violations, the statute more frequently imposes penalties on the physician than on the
woman obtaining the abortion. See generally Eser, Reform of German Abortion Law: First
Experiences, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 369, 374-80 (1986).
326. See, e.g., id. at 382 (procedure that must be followed by pregnant woman seeking
abortion).
327. See Wilms, Recbtsprobleme des Schwangerschaftsabbruchs im vereinten Deutschland, 1990
ZRP 470, 472. The action brought by the state of Bavaria also challenges aspects of a
statute providing that the costs of a legal abortion will be paid by national social insur-
ance. The Constitutional Court has previously rejected constitutional challenges by in-
dividuals against these financing provisions (or their enforcement) on grounds of
justiciability, see 78 BVerfGE 320 (1988); 67 BVerfGE 26 (1984), but this defense may
not be applicable in an action brought by a state.
328. According to recent statements of the Vice President of the Constitutional Court,
however, it seems unlikely that the case will be decided before 1992. See FAZ, Feb. 6,
1991, at 7, col. 2.
329. Gesetz uiber die Unterbrechung der Schwangerschaft, of Mar. 9, 1972, GBI DDR
I 89. The preamble of the statute refers to article 20, § 2 of the 1968/74 GDR Constitu-
tion-a provision that sets forth the principle of gender equality. See Wilms, supra note
327, at 473.
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1975.30
In their negotiations, therefore, the drafters of the Unification
Treaty were faced with a clash of statutory rules. According to the
law of the Federal Republic, an abortion is legal only if the presence
of certain "indications" can be established, while under the GDR
statute an abortion is generally permissible during the first three
months of pregnancy without further limitation. In many such stat-
utory conflicts, the Unification Treaty simply requires that the law of
the Federal Republic replace that of the GDR.33 ' In this case, how-
ever, such a resolution would have been difficult because of the
strongly held popular view in the GDR-among feminists and other
groups-that it was essential to retain the more liberal GDR abor-
tion rule. Indeed, as in the United States, a liberal abortion policy
had become an important social institution in the GDR. Moreover,
the western Social Democrats, whose votes were necessary for the
requisite two-thirds majority for the Unification Treaty, might have
balked at a resolution that simply extinguished the abortion policy
of the GDR. On the other hand, simply retaining the GDR rule in
eastern Germany would have raised its own serious difficulties. Af-
ter accession under article 23, the Basic Law-and presumably its
interpretation by the Constitutional Court-applies to the former
territory of the GDR and would appear to invalidate the GDR stat-
ute of 1972, just as it invalidated the West German statute of 1975.
When the drafters of the Unification Treaty addressed these
problems, they found themselves confronted by political forces that
seemed even more equally balanced than those relating to issues of
expropriated property. Those strongly in favor of retaining the
GDR rule-or perhaps even extending it to the west-were the bulk
of the population in the GDR and the Social Democrats in the west,
led by important women's organizations.33 2 On the other hand,
conservatives in the east and west could invoke the powerful role of
the Constitutional Court in arguing against the retention of the
GDR's first-trimester rule.
330. Interestingly, some members of the East German CDU, ordinarily a compliant
bloc party under the Communist Party government of the GDR, voted against the liber-
alized abortion statute of 1972. This vote marked one of the very few instances in the
history of the GDR-until the revolutionary days of 1989-that a legislative measure was
enacted by anything less than a unanimous vote. See H. ROGGEMANN, supra note 51, at
230.
331. See supra Part VIII(A).
332. See generally Frommel, Strategien gegen die Demontage der Reform der §§ 218ff. StGB in
der Bundesrepublik, 1990 ZRP 351 (arguing that the GDR rule could be extended to all of
Germany).
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Because any clear decision of this issue might have imperiled
the entire Unification Treaty, the drafters adopted a compromise
that postponed an ultimate resolution. In effect, the GDR will retain
its previous rule until the end of 1992 at the latest. During the in-
terim, the all-German legislature will have the task of deciding on a
new rule for all of Germany.333 The nature of this new rule, as
sketched in the Unification Treaty, is a masterpiece of ambiguity.
According to the Treaty, this regulation should "better guarantee
the protection of prenatal life and the constitutional resolution of
the conflicts faced by pregnant women, than is the case in both parts
of Germany at the present-above all, through legally assured
claims of women, particularly claims for counseling and social assist-
ance."3 3' 4 The provision goes on to require that a comprehensive
system of counseling offices be established in the former GDR with
the financial assistance of the federal government. These offices
must be able to give counseling and (apparently financial) assistance
to pregnant women even beyond the point of the birth of the child.
In this compromise, the territory of the GDR retains its former
rule for up to two years, but the establishment of the counseling
offices during this period is clearly intended to reduce the numbers
of abortions that would take place under the GDR rule. Although
the requirement of counseling offices in the first two years is rela-
tively clear, the nature of the ultimate regulation of abortions called
for by the Unification Treaty is highly unclear because the provision
does not state whether the future abortion statute must continue to
make abortions basically illegal. The fundamental question is which
side of the balance the extension of counseling and social assistance
in the future abortion statute is intended principally to affect. Per-
haps a sufficient network of counseling and extended social assist-
ance might-even in the eyes of the Constitutional Court-so
reduce the perceived likelihood of abortion that these measures
could permissibly replace the requirement of criminal penalties. On
the other hand, it could be argued that, with greater opportunities
for counseling and social assistance, a narrower exception for the
"social indication" could be constitutional and as a result more
abortions could be criminalized. The Unification Treaty is silent on
the choice between these contrary possibilities. 35
333. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 31, § 4.
334. Id.
335. The treaty was somewhat more successful in resolving a related issue that was
vigorously debated during the negotiations. An early proposal stated that during the
two-year interim period, the GDR's more liberal abortion rule would apply to residents
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The basic problem with this provision, however, is that the two-
year compromise of the Unification Treaty, without more, might
well be found to violate articles 1(1) and 2(2) of the Basic Law under
the Constitutional Court's abortion decision of 1975. The Unifica-
tion Treaty, after all, retains for up to two years a GDR statute
closely resembling the statute that was held unconstitutional in that
decision. In an attempt to deal with this and similar problems,
drafters of the Unification Treaty included a general provision that
seeks in effect to suspend certain of the provisions of the Basic Law
during an interim period, through an amendment of the Basic Law
itself."3 6 Although this provision has a bearing on numerous other
parts of the Unification Treaty, it will be discussed here because of
its application to this particularly contentious problem.
Through adoption of the Unification Treaty by the requisite
two-thirds margin, a new article 143(1) has been added to the Basic
Law, stating as follows:
For the period up to December 31, 1992 (but not longer),
law in [the territory of the former GDR and East Berlin]
can deviate from determinations of this Basic Law, so long
as and to the extent that, as a result of differing circum-
stances, full conformity with the order of the Basic Law
cannot yet be achieved. [Any such] deviations may not vio-
late article 19(2) and must be consistent with the principles
of the former territory of the GDR only, and the stricter western rule would continue to
apply to abortions obtained by western residents in the former GDR. See FR, July 20,
1990, at 1, col. 1. This provision was intended to discourage travel by women from the
west to the east for the purpose of obtaining an abortion. Opponents argued that this
proposed rule contravened the principle that criminality should be determined by the
law of the territory in which the act occurs, but proponents replied that the law of the
Federal Republic already prohibits citizens of the Federal Republic from obtaining abor-
tions even where they are legal, for example in Holland. Such a rule might also impose
onerous obligations on physicians to determine the residence of the patient seeking an
abortion and to examine whether an apparent residence was recently established in the
east for the purpose of circumventing the rule. The drafters of the Unification Treaty
ultimately decided to abandon the residency requirement in this instance, and sought to
provide that an abortion obtained in the east by a western resident would be measured
by the more liberal rule of the GDR. See Wilms, supra note 327, at 474 (arguing, how-
ever, that this resolution was not reflected with requisite clarity in the treaty language).
336. It is not entirely clear that an amendment of the Basic Law was strictly necessary
to accomplish this result. Some commentators argue that article 23 itself contemplates
the possibility of a gradual, incremental introduction of the Basic Law into the territory
that is acceding to the Federal Republic under that provision. See, e.g., 2 GRUNDGESETZ-
KOMMENTAR, supra note 7, art. 23, No. 27. When the Saarland acceded to the Federal
Republic, for example, certain provisions of the Basic Law were introduced into that
territory in an incremental manner. See Rauschning, supra note 10, at 401; Stern, supra
note 14, at 37-38.
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specified in article 79(3).337
Presumably the interim regulation on abortion meets the basic test
of the first sentence of article 143(1), if serious objections among
the population constitute the kind of "differing circumstances" that
prevent immediate conformity with the Basic Law. The second sen-
tence of article 143(1), however, presents more serious problems.
Article 19(2) of the Basic Law-referred to in that sentence-states
that "in no case may a Basic Right be disturbed in its essential con-
tent." This provision, which applies primarily to Basic Rights that
are subject to qualification by statutory law, indicates that each Basic
Right has a fundamental core that may not be disturbed. It could be
argued that the GDR law of abortion disturbs the Basic Rights set
forth in articles 1(1) and 2(2) of the Basic Law, "in [their] essential
content," and therefore is not saved by the two-year exception con-
tained in the first sentence of new article 143(1).
The provisions of article 79(3)-also referred to in article
143(1)-may raise an even greater obstacle. Article 79(3), a central
provision of the Basic Law, qualifies the power of constitutional
amendment.33 8 According to this provision, it is impermissible to
enact any amendment of the Basic Law "through which the division
of the federation into states, the basic participation of the states in
legislation, or the principles laid down in articles 1 and 20 [of the
Basic Law] would be affected."313 9 Because the West German abor-
337. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, § 5. As set forth in the Unification
Treaty, new article 143 of the Basic Law contains two other sections. Article 143(2)
extends the interim suspension of the Basic Law to December 31, 1995, in cases of non-
compliance with various structural provisions of the Basic Law such as those relating to
federalism, administration, the judiciary, and the financial system. This provision ap-
pears to rest on the assumption that in the case of governmental structure, deviations
from the Basic Law often do not evoke the most central constitutional concerns and can
be tolerated for a somewhat longer period than other deviations. Moreover, the crea-
tion of conforming governmental structures in the former GDR may be a long and diffi-
cult process. In contrast, deviations from any of the Basic Rights are subject to the two-
year interim period set forth in the new article 143(1).
The Unification Treaty also sets forth a new article 143(3) which seeks to confirm
the permanence of the 1945-49 expropriations in the Soviet occupation zone. See supra
Part VIII(B).
338. See supra note 267.
339. Articles 1 and 20-whose basic "principles" are preserved from amendment by
article 79, § 3--can be viewed as the cornerstones of the Basic Law. Article I protects
human dignity, and article 20 sets forth the basic characteristics of the Federal Republic
as a "democratic and social federal state" and also provides for popular sovereignty,
separation of powers, and the rule of law. Article 79, § 3 was adopted in reaction to the
denial of human rights and democracy under the Nazis. It reflects the view that some
principles of human rights (and some basic democratic organizational principles) are so
fundamental to a free society-and the consequences of deviation from these principles
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tion case rested in part on the guarantee of human dignity contained
in article 1(1), it is at least arguable that principles laid down in arti-
cle 1 would be "affected" by permitting any regulation of abortion
that is less stringent than the system required by the Constitutional
Court. As a consequence, it could be argued that no constitutional
amendment can change the decision of the Constitutional Court on
this point. Indeed, this would presumably be the case whether or
not article 79(3) were specifically mentioned in article 143(1).
s40
On the other hand, it could be argued that abortion regulations,
even if they implicate human dignity to some extent, do not affect
that constitutional concept in its essence, and therefore the legisla-
ture in enacting constitutional amendments on this subject has sub-
stantial discretion in striking an appropriate balance. Perhaps the
constitutional lawmaker should also have considerable latitude in
determining whether counseling or criminalization, or some other
form of regulation, would most effectively decrease the number of
abortions in accordance with the general imperatives of the Court's
decision.3
4 1
These issues-the meaning of the new article 143(1), and the
question of whether the interim abortion measure can be justified by
a constitutional amendment-may be debated before the Constitu-
tional Court. In any case, the resolution adopted in the Unification
Treaty is in reality no resolution at all. By 1992, it will be necessary
for the parliament to revisit the question of abortion. Shifting polit-
ical views in the Federal Republic may well suggest that there will be
substantial pressure for a new, all-German abortion law resembling
would be so dire-that these principles should not be alterable no matter what degree of
super-majority may be in favor of their amendment at any particular time.
340. See, e.g., Stern, supra note 135, at 290-91.
341. No case in the Constitutional Court has passed upon the status of the Court's
abortion decision under the limitations on amendment set forth in article 79, § 3 of the
Basic Law. In reviewing a constitutional amendment in another area, however, the Con-
stitutional Court interpreted the reach of article 79, § 3 quite narrowly and rejected a
claim that the amendment impermissibly affected human dignity. In the Security Sur-
veillance Case, 30 BVerfGE 1 (1970), article 10 of the Basic Law had been amended in
order to permit "national security" surveillance without requiring that the subject of the
surveillance ultimately be notified and without allowing review of the surveillance in the
ordinary courts. See infra note 419. The constitutional amendment was attacked as inva-
lid under article 79, § 3, in part on the ground that the amendment treated people
under surveillance as "objects" and consequently violated human dignity. The court
upheld the constitutional amendment, suggesting that article 79, § 3 only prohibited
amendments that moved more clearly in the direction of a totalitarian dictatorship. For
a more recent discussion of article 79, § 3, perhaps indicating a broader scope for its
provisions, see Decision of Constitutional Court, Apr. 23, 1991, supra note 268.
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the GDR statute. 42 If this is the case, the Constitutional Court will
once again be forced to confront a problem that in West Germany,
as in the United States, seems not only politically intractable, but
also in the forefront of popular consciousness. 43
D. The Civil Service in Eastern Germany
The problem of reforming the civil service in the GDR requires
an understanding of the special nature of the traditional civil service
as it now exists in the Federal Republic. The civil service (Beamten-
tum) has a special, guaranteed position in the Basic Law derived
from the concept of an orderly Rechtsstaat-a state based on expert
application of general legal rules that had its origin in eighteenth
342. Thus although the Free Democratic Party (FDP) is currently allied with the con-
servative CDU in the coalition government, FDP members of parliament are preparing a
draft statute that guarantees a woman's free choice of abortion (after counseling) within
a specified period following conception. See FAZ, Mar. 21, 1991, at 2, col. 2; FAZ, Feb.
6, 1991, at 7, col. 2.
343. At the time that the Unification Treaty was being negotiated, Bundestag Presi-
dent Rita Siussmuth (a member of the CDU) proposed a "third way" between the three-
month abortion period of the GDR and the "indication" exceptions of the Federal Re-
public. Sissmuth proposed that the Unification Treaty declare that a woman seeking an
abortion should undergo compulsory counseling and, if she has done so, should then be
free to choose an abortion. At the same time, both the nature of the counseling and the
opportunities for social assistance for mother and child should be improved. See FR,
July 31, 1990, at 10, col. I (text of Siissmuth proposal). This proposal gained the sup-
port of some important political figures-although not all supporters believed that it
should be inserted into the Unification Treaty. See, e.g., FR, July 30, 1990, at 4, col. 2.
The problem with this proposal, however, is that the three-month solution declared in-
valid by the Constitutional Court in 1975 also included a requirement of counseling
before an abortion could be performed. If the Siissmuth proposal lacked a three-month
period, it would seem even less likely to survive the Court's scrutiny-but in any case it
would seem invalid unless the Court were to change its position.
In March 1991, Siissmuth presented a refined version of her proposal which resem-
bled a resolution offered by the FDP. See FAZ, Mar. 9, 1991, at 4, col. 2; cf. supra note
342. Siissmuth's revised proposal made clear that an abortion would not be punishable
if it took place within the first three months of pregnancy and if the pregnant woman had
received mandatory counseling. The person doing the counseling must be someone
other than the doctor who would perform the abortion-this requirement would obviate
one serious flaw that the Constitutional Court had perceived in the statute found uncon-
stitutional in 1975. Moreover, the pregnant woman must certify that, in her "best con-
science," the abortion is necessary-another possible distinction from the earlier,
unconstitutional statute. Thus the pregnant woman would decide whether the requisite
social or psychological "situation of necessity" is present. DER SPIEGEL, May 13, 1991,
at 28-30. Suissmuth would combine this proposal with improved financial assistance for
a woman and child following birth. FAZ, Mar. 9, 1991, at 4, col. 2.
According to Siissmuth, the coming debate over abortion legislation may lead to
serious divisions in the CDU. Indeed many CDU members take positions on abortion
that are much more restrictive than Siissmuth's view. One important CDU figure, for
example, seeks to abolish public financing for legal abortions. Id.
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century absolutism.
44
The basic idea of the traditional Beamtentum is that the civil
servant (Beamter) owes a special duty of loyalty and devotion to the
state. In this way the modern state steps into the former role of the
monarch, who also received a high degree of loyalty from his offi-
cials. In return, the state provides the Beamter with life tenure-
after successful completion of an initial probationary period-as
well as a generous salary and an appropriate pension. The salary of
the Beamter must correspond to the social standing of the profes-
sion, and the Beamter has a constitutional claim for a salary at that
level, in addition to special supplements for children.3 45 A hierar-
chical structure in the public administration is intended to ensure
that individual decisions affecting citizens are made in accordance
with law, but some officials other than administrators, such as teach-
ers in public secondary schools and universities, are also part of the
Beamtentum. Moreover, judges are viewed as bearing some resem-
blance to civil servants-making more or less routine applications of
general rules to specific cases in many instances. While judges are
not considered part of the Beamtentum, a number of rules applica-
ble to judges are similar to those applicable to civil servants.
In contrast with this highly developed and formalized system of
administration, the public service of the GDR (which did not include
life tenure) was often under the direct control of party cadres. The
system of party control was dismantled after the revolutionary
events of autumn 1989, but many of the former administrators and
judges, including some who may have participated in instances of
political oppression, remained in their offices up to the point of uni-
fication and beyond.
It was clear, therefore, that a reform of the civil service in the
GDR was necessary. Questions relating to reform fell into two basic
categories: the general structure of the civil service in eastern Ger-
many, and the related but separate question of its future personnel.
With respect to the structure of the civil service, it seemed ad-
visable that the territory of the former GDR should ultimately have
the same administrative structure as the rest of the nation, including
344. See GG art. 33. Indeed, in the Parliamentary Council that drafted the Basic Law
in 1948-49-as in earlier constitutional assemblies-a significant number of representa-
tives were civil servants. The Weimar Constitution also protected the special role of the
Beamtentum. See WRV art. 129.
345. In the Basic Law, these and other rights are derived from an expansive interpre-
tation of article 33, which states that the "law of the public service is to be regulated in a
manner that takes into account the traditional principles of the professional civil service
(Berufsbeamtentum)." See GG art. 33, § 5.
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the same categories of administrative officers: the two sections of
the unified nation should not have different administrative systems,
beyond the variations generally permitted among the West German
Linder. Accordingly, the Unification Treaty indicates that the gen-
eral principles of article 33 of the Basic Law, authorizing and regu-
lating the Beamtentum, should extend to the former GDR.' 46 By
implication, therefore, the Unification Treaty distinguishes officers
that are "Beamte" from other government employees. In taking
this position, the framers of the Treaty rejected proposals to reform
or abolish the traditional civil service system, as a part of the process
of unification. Proposals for abolition have been made over several
decades, principally by the Social Democrats, on the ground that the
Beamtentum is an undemocratic and retrograde institution that pre-
serves a separate and distinct class of civil officers standing apart
from the population. These proposals have been singularly unsuc-
cessful over the years and they did not fare any better in the process
of unification. 47
An extension of the West German civil service system to the
former GDR provides both advantages and disadvantages for ad-
ministrative officials in the east. Life tenure and substantial salaries
were lacking in the GDR administration, and GDR officials therefore
pressed for the immediate adoption of the western system. Yet the
government of the Federal Republic was unwilling to extend the
benefits of tenured civil service to existing GDR officials on an auto-
matic basis. Two separate but related problems gave rise to these
concerns. First, the government of the Federal Republic feared that
many GDR officials lacked the qualifications necessary to perform
administrative functions at the level of the West German civil ser-
vice. These doubts were perhaps even more acute in the case of
judges, whose future tasks-applying the laws of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany-required thorough training in the West German
346. According to article 20 of the Unification Treaty, the task of carrying out public
functions is to be conferred on Beamten "as quickly as possible," in accordance with the
special interim rules set forth in attachment 1 of the Treaty. Moreover, a memorandum
accompanying the Unification Treaty emphasizes the importance of the general princi-
ples of the public service set down in article 33 of the Basic Law, and notes that in
principle this provision will apply to the GDR as soon as the GDR accedes to the Federal
Republic-although an interim period will be necessary before the provision can be fully
realized in practice. Denkschrifi zum Einigungsvertrag, Bundestag Drucksache
11/7760, at 364-65, reprinted in 2 K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, supra note 141, at
143-44. See generally Goerlich, Hergebrachte Grundsatze und Beitrittsbeamtentum, 1991 JZ 75.
347. See Nicksch, Die Einfiihrung des Berufsbeamtentums im Gebiet derfriheren DDR nach dem
Einigungsvertrag, 1990 DtZ 340, 341-42.
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legal system, an education that the GDR judges lacked.3 48  Even
more serious problems arose from the political past. Some judges
and other officials had taken part in acts of political oppression
under the old regime or had worked actively for the Ministry for
State Security (Stasi). There was general agreement that such offi-
cials should not be employed further in the public service.
3 49
In order to resolve these questions on a case-by-case basis, the
Unification Treaty requires that any present East German civil ser-
vant successfully undergo a three-year probationary period before
achieving the lifetime status of Beamter. 5 ° Supervisory officials in
the administration ultimately will decide whether the applicant has
348. Although in 1949 the statutory law of the Federal Republic and that of the GDR
bore numerous similarities, the legal systems grew apart over the years. The German
Civil Code was in use in the east as well as the west after 1949, for example, but the
Code was substantially amended and ultimately replaced in the east in 1975. See, e.g.,
Markovits, Socialist vs. Bourgeois Rights-An East-West German Comparison, 45 U. CHI. L.
REV. 612, 613 n.3 (1978). In consequence, after unification became a certainty, many
judges (as well as lawyers) in the GDR began to study the law of the Federal Republic in
the evening and on weekends, attending lectures delivered by lawyers from the west.
349. Similar questions had arisen at the outset of the Federal Republic, with respect
to members of the public service under the "Third Reich' '-many of whom were denied
jobs or pensions as a result of denazification proceedings or otherwise. In important
early decisions, the Constitutional Court held that these civil servants had lost their ten-
ure rights because the Nazi government transformed the public service into an organ
serving the Nazi party and its leader. This transformation was inconsistent with tradi-
tional ideas of neutral service to an abstract state, upon which the principles of life ten-
ure depended. See 6 BVerfGE 132 (1957) (Gestapo Case); 3 BVerfGE 58 (1953) (Civil
Servant Case); see generally Baade, Social Science Evidence and the Federal Constitutional Court
of West Germany, 23J. POL. 421 (1961). On the other hand, the government of the Fed-
eral Republic provided a measure of pension support or employment for most of these
former public employees. See id. at 433-34; GG art. 131.
350. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. III(3)(b). This
probationary period can be reduced on a case-by-case basis, but cannot be reduced to
less than two years. Moreover, all employees-not only those applying for permanent
civil service status-may be dismissed during the first two years after unification for fail-
ure to possess the required qualifications or for participation in past acts of oppression.
See infra text accompanying notes 352-355 and note 355.
The present judges in eastern Germany are subject to a somewhat more complex
procedure. According to the Unification Treaty, the former GDR judges are subject to
an initial screening by special "judicial appointments committees" composed of judges
and elected officials. A judge who is successful in this initial screening is then required
to undergo the three-year probationary period required of all GDR officials. See
Brachmann, Die Gerichtsverfassung im Ubergang-Zur Regelung auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen
DDR nach dem Einigungsvertrag, 1990 DtZ 298, 304. In the territory of the former GDR,
the present judges may continue to decide cases until they have been removed by the
judicial appointments committee or otherwise during the probationary period. See gener-
ally Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. III(A), para. III(8); FAZ, Nov. 8,
1990, at 14, col. 2; FR, Oct. 29, 1990, at 4, col. 1; FR, Oct. 12, 1990, at 8, col. 1. In
Berlin, however, from the date of unification, all judicial activity has been conducted by
the judges of West Berlin, and the judges of the former East Berlin will not decide cases
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met the stringent requirements for lifetime tenure, and special in-
terim rules are provided to take into account the fact that few (if
any) applicants from the GDR will have satisfied the specific require-
ments for education and training contained in West German law. 51
The difficult question of how to measure an official's participation in
oppressive political acts is approached in an interesting manner.
Under the Unification Treaty (Attachment I), it is possible grounds
for immediate dismissal if the employee has in the past
violated the principles of humanity or the rule of law, in
particular [if the employee] has violated the human rights
that are protected by the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights of December 19, 1966 or the principles
contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of
December 10, 1948.52
Thus, a candidate's participation in oppressive acts will be primarily
determined under the provisions of these United Nations human
rights instruments.3 13 Moreover, an official who "was active" on be-
half of the Ministry for State Security could also be subject to imme-
diate dismissal.3 54 The provision requires dismissal if retaining an
while their suitability for entry into the judiciary is individually examined. See Majer, Die
Uberprfung von Richtern and Staatsanwalten in der ehemaligen DDR, 1991 ZRP 171, 176.
In general, the procedure set forth for the initial screening ofjudges has proved to
be deeply problematic. Although the Unification Treaty required that the process be
completed by April 15, 1991, numerous problems in the formation of the judicial ap-
pointment committees made this deadline impossible to meet. See FAZ, Feb. 18, 1991,
at 5, col. 4; FAZ, Feb. 9, 1991, at 4, col. 3. Indeed one new state, Mecklenburg-West
Pomerania, has sought to do away with the judicial appointment committees entirely.
FAZ, June 6, 1991, at 4, col. 5. Moreover, a particularly difficult problem arises because
under a policy of the Modrow government, judges and prosecutors in the GDR had
access to their individual personnel files and were able to remove damaging items from
those files. See FAZ, Feb. 9, 1991, at 4, col. 3; FAZ Nov. 8, 1990, at 14, col. 2.
351. See Nicksch, supra note 347, at 343.
352. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. 111(l), § 5(1).
353. These two documents, which were adopted by the General Assembly of the
United Nations, contain comprehensive guarantees of fair procedures and prohibitions
against political discrimination and invasions of privacy-all of which might be relevant
in this context. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). (The GDR ratified the
1966 Covenant in 1974, but GDR leaders argued that the document was binding in
international law only and had no internal effect. Mampel, supra note 65, at 1379-80.)
Because these provisions are stated in very broad terms, judicial interpretation of their
scope may eventually be required in order to determine whether the attempted dismissal
of any given employee has been undertaken in accordance with law. If so, such adjudica-
tion could be a rare example of the interpretation of these United Nations human rights
instruments by a national court.
354. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. III(l), § 5(2).
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employee under such circumstances would be "unreasonable." '5 5
The text of the Unification Treaty, however, seems to leave one
crucial question unanswered-at least in any express manner. Ex-
cept for the provisions noted above, the Treaty does not specify how
the political past of former GDR officials should be treated. Indeed,
the provision allowing immediate dismissal of officials who worked
for the Stasi or participated in human rights abuses does not ex-
clude the possibility that other aspects of an official's political past
might be taken into account in determining whether the official
should be accepted into the Beamtentum.
From the beginning of the Federal Republic, and with particu-
lar rigor in the years following 1972, the institution of the public
service has been characterized by a strict application of the principle
of "loyalty to the constitution." The basic public service law of the
Federal Republic-coupled with a special "Radicals Decree" in
1972-has required that persons be excluded from the public ser-
vice if they cannot "guarantee that [they] will at all times support the
free democratic basic order." '56 Although this doctrine has some-
times excluded members of right-wing parties from the public ser-
Stasi records, which might otherwise be sequestered pending a final statutory regulation
of their disposition, are specifically made available for this inquiry. Id. attachment I, ch.
II(B), para. II(2)(b), § 2(l)2(b)-(c).
In addition to possible exclusion from the public service, individuals who undertook
espionage on behalf of the Stasi may remain subject to criminal penalties under the law
of the Federal Republic. A statute of amnesty, proposed by the Federal Justice Minister
before unification, was withdrawn by the government. FR, Sept. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
355. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. III(l), § 5.
Although this provision is directed in the first instance toward ordinary employees, a
separate section of the Unification Treaty also makes it applicable to Beamten. Id. at-
tachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. III(3)(d). See Nicksch, supra note 347, at 344.
356. Section 7 of the Federal Law of the Public Service states that "only those [per-
sons] may be taken into the Beamten relationship who.., can guarantee that [they] will
at all times support the free democratic basic order in the sense of the Basic Law."
Bundesbeamtengesetz, in the version of Feb. 27, 1985, BGBI I 479 (as amended). The
same requirement is contained in § 35 of the Public Service Framework Law, applicable
to the public service of the Lnder. Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz, in the version of Feb.
27, 1985, BGBI 1462 (as amended). Although the precise meaning of the phrase "free
democratic basic order" is debatable, it is generally taken to refer to a political order of
the western, liberal-democratic type, acknowledging the rule of law and affording pro-
tection of individual rights. See generally 2 BVerfGE 1 (1952).
In 1972 during a period of alarm over "radical" political activity, the government of
Chancellor Willy Brandt, along with the minister-presidents of the West German states,
issued the "Radicals Decree." This decree was based on the statutory provisions de-
scribed above, but appeared to contemplate particularly strict enforcement of those pro-
visions. The text of the Radicals Decree is reprinted in DER ABSCHIED VOM
EXTREMISTENBESCHLUSS 84 (H. Koschnick ed. 1979). For a decision of the federal gov-
ernment in 1979 relaxing aspects of the procedure that had grown up under the Radi-
cals Decree, see id. at 173-75.
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vice, its principal use over the past decades has been to exclude
members of the West German Communist Party (DKP), or members
of other Communist splinter groups, on the ground that the neces-
sary requirement of loyalty had not been met. 57
This invocation of the principle of loyalty, which has been com-
pared to aspects of the McCarthy period in the United States, has
been the subject of bitter political dispute over the years. Its appli-
cation has apparently been most vigorous and most significant in
the teaching profession, as almost all teachers and university profes-
sors in the Federal Republic must be members of the public service.
One interesting general issue for the future is the extent to which
this principle will continue to be applied against members of Com-
munist parties, now that the "danger" from those sources has been
shown to be without much strength.
For our purposes, however, the specific question is whether-or
how-these principles will be applied to applicants for the civil ser-
vice from the former GDR during their three-year probationary pe-
riod. A stringent application of these principles might result in
excluding a high percentage of former GDR civil servants because
of the prevalence of former SED members in their ranks.358 But the
wholesale exclusion of former GDR officials-and presumably their
(at least temporary) replacement by candidates from the west-
seems to be an unacceptable method of reconstituting east German
political life.3 59
It is unfortunate that the Unification Treaty gives no detailed
357. The Constitutional Court has found that these statutory and administrative rules
reflect a constitutional requirement of loyalty applicable to members of the public service.
For this view and the general constitutional principles applicable to these exclusions, see
39 BVerfGE 334 (1975) (Civil Servant Loyalty Case). An edited English version of this
case, along with commentary, appears in D. KoMMERS, supra note 321, at 232-38.
Although the special provisions of the Radicals Decree have been abandoned in a
number of West German UInder, the underlying loyalty principles relating to the public
service remain in effect in all German jurisdictions.
358. Although the controlling decision of the Constitutional Court suggested that
party membership is only one element to be taken into account in making the ultimate
judgment, see 39 BVerfGE 353-55, 359-60, membership in the Communist Party was
very often the primary factor in cases of exclusion.
359. Thus, the West German Interior Minister has stated:
Even if most of the two million persons active in the public administration of
the GDR have been members of the SED, they must have a fair chance to "find
themselves" again in the process of German unification. They too belong to a
unified Germany, and we do not want to exclude a chance for a better future,
even for them.
Debate in German Bundestag, quoted in Nicksch, supra note 347, at 343. But see FAZ,
Nov. 23, 1990, at 15, col. I (letter from West Berlin judge suggesting that East German
judges-because of their education, almost universal SED membership, and required
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guidance on the future application of the loyalty doctrine. The
Treaty states that the western public-service law will continue in ef-
fect in the territory of the former GDR with certain "modifications,"
two of which are the human rights and Stasi rules. As noted above,
this language does not state that the grounds contained in these
provisions constitute the only political or quasi-political grounds for
exclusion. Certainly, the general loyalty rules remain part of the
federal Civil Service Law. 6 °
Perhaps it could be argued that the human rights and Stasi
rules were intended to be the principal political qualifications appli-
cable to former GDR officials and that the more general loyalty rules
should apply only in extreme cases. It could also be argued that the
PDS-the successor of the SED-is now a reformed, democratic
party and that the revolutionary changes in the GDR (and subse-
quent unification) should neutralize damaging inferences that might
otherwise be drawn even from past SED membership. On the other
hand, according to the Constitutional Court, the judgment as to
qualifications is to be made with respect to each applicant individu-
ally; it would not be alien to the spirit of past patterns in the applica-
tion of the loyalty doctrine if former SED membership, for example,
were to suggest that the internal political culture of the applicant is
insufficiently democratic to permit acceptance into the public ser-
vice. Some might argue that similar inferences should arise from
present membership in the PDS. Parallels might even be drawn with
the Weimar Period in which, under a democratic constitution, the
undemocratic political views of many judges and civil servants were
said to have contributed to the weakening of the republic and the
later rise of a totalitarian system.3 6'
cooperation with the Stasi-most likely cannot "guarantee that they will at all times sup-
port the free democratic basic order in the meaning of the Basic Law").
360. Moreover, with respect to judges, a resolution of the reformed GDR-Volks-
kammer specifically required that a judge seeking continued employment possess "loy-
alty to the free, democratic, federal, social and ecologically-oriented state under the rule
of law (Rechtsstaat)." See BeschluB der Volkskammer der DDR zum Richtergesetz-
Ordnung iber die Bildung und Arbeitsweise der Richterwahlausschisse--of July 22,
1990, § 5(2), GBI DDR I 904, 905. This provision remains in effect under the Unifica-
tion Treaty. See Unification Treaty, supra note 203, attachment I, ch. III(A), para.
III(8)(o).
361. What inferences would ultimately be drawn from membership in the PDS re-
mained unclear in the months immediately following unification. In December 1990, a
majority of the directors of the internal security agencies of the Lander voted not to
subject the PDS to security surveillance, for the present at least. In this vote, however,
the important states of Bavaria and Baden-Wuirttemberg dissented. Moreover, the Ba-
varian Minister of the Interior argued that the PDS should be classified as "inimical to
the constitution" (verfassungsfeindlich). See FAZ, Dec. 15, 1990, at 5, col. 3; see also FAZ,
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In this connection, a provision in the documents accompanying
the conclusion of the Two Plus Four negotiations is of particular
interest.3 6 2 In a letter delivered to the foreign ministers of the four
Allied powers, GDR Prime Minister de Maizi~re and Foreign Minis-
ter Genscher of the Federal Republic made the following
representation:
In the united Germany, too, the free democratic basic or-
der will be protected by the Constitution. It provides the
basis for ensuring that parties which, by reason of their
aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or
abolish the free democratic basic order as well as associa-
tions which are directed against the constitutional order or
the concept of international understanding can be prohib-
ited. This also applies to parties and associations with Na-
tional Socialist aims. 63
The second sentence of this section basically repeats language con-
tained in articles 21(2) and 9(2) of the Basic Law, which authorize
the banning of political parties and other associations whose goals
are contrary to the fundamental principles of the "free democratic
basic order." Although these sections do not explicitly authorize
exclusions from the civil service, articles 21(2) and 9(2) are closely
related to the rules excluding applicants on political grounds be-
cause membership in radical political groups has generally formed
the centerpiece of evidence leading to exclusion." 6 The letter of de
Maizi~re and Genscher could thus raise an implication that the prin-
ciples of loyalty will in any case continue to exclude members of far
right-wing groups from the public service: such a result might be
inferred from the last sentence of the section, which specifically
mentions "parties and associations with National Socialist aims."
Dec. 17, 1990, at 4, col. 4. Such a classification could give rise to strong inferences
against the loyalty of PDS members applying for positions in the civil service. See also
FAZ, Mar. 15, 1991, at 2, col. 5 (Interior Minister of the State of Hesse also suggests that
there are grounds to suspect that the PDS "is directed against the free democratic basic
order and thus follows goals that are inimical to the constitution").
362. For these negotiations and the resulting treaty, see infra Part X(D).
363. Letter from Lothar de Maizire and Hans-Dietrich Genscher to the Allied foreign
ministers, Sept. 12, 1990, reprinted in Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany, S. EXEC. REP. No. 33, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1990) (as translated in S.
EXEC. REP.).
364. It was once argued that article 21 of the Basic Law prohibited exclusions from the
public service based on membership in a radical political party-until that party was
actually found unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, as provided for in article
21, § 2. This argument was rejected by the Constitutional Court in 1975. See 39
BVerfGE 334 (1975). In any event, the relationship between the principles lying behind
these articles and political exclusions from the public service remains clear.
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On the other hand, the language of the second sentence-referring
to the free democratic basic order-is general in nature and has
often been applied to left-wing groups in the Federal Republic.
This language, therefore, could raise the implication that the princi-
ples of loyalty might also be applied to exclude present members of
Communist parties and perhaps even former members of the SED
from the public service. 65
Throughout the recent history of the Federal Republic, the role
of the civil service-and in particular the difficult problem of the
Radicals Decree in the 1970s-has evoked bitter controversy. At
times it has seemed that the conservatives pushing to enforce the
Radicals Decree in such crucial institutions as the secondary schools
and universities were seeking not only to protect the state against
what they considered subversive influences, but also more generally
to ensure that the center of political discourse in the Federal Repub-
lic did not move further to the left. Now that any possible political
dangers from the East Bloc have faded-and the GDR has become a
part of the Federal Republic itself-it will be interesting to observe
how the loyalty principles are enforced in the Federal Republic in
the future. Continuation of vigorous enforcement could reinforce
suspicions that these principles were being used for more general
political purposes. These questions could be raised in a most insis-
365. The issue of banning political parties also assumed some prominence in the last
days of the GDR. Of course, under the SED regime, all parties except the SED itself and
the four traditional bloc parties were in effect banned. Indeed, the new reform parties
or movements initially faced the hostility of the Central Committee of the SED, which
declared that the reform group "New Forum" stood in opposition to the values of the
GDR Constitution. See WIR SIND DAS VOLK, supra note 14, at 78-80, 112. After the prin-
ciple of free formation of parties was in effect accepted in late 1989, many argued that
far right-wing parties should nonetheless be prohibited. This discussion focused princi-
pally on the "Republicans," a far right-wing group that had experienced some success in
the Federal Republic and sought to establish itself in the GDR. Indeed, this party was
banned from participation in the Volkskammer election of March 18, 1990, but its prohi-
bition was later rescinded. See Umschau, 1990 DA 1321, 1327.
This issue was also treated with some care in the Round Table draft of a new consti-
tution for the GDR. See supra note 67. The provision for excluding political parties in
the Round Table draft has a somewhat narrower focus and seems to be more qualified
than the rather sweeping provision in article 21, § 2 of the Basic Law. Under the Round
Table draft, a party can be prohibited or excluded from an election if it "systematically
and persistently attacks human dignity in its program or if, through [its] activity, [it]
similarly infringes the principles of an open and nonviolent process of the forming of
political will-so long as the dangers for the process of forming the political will cannot
otherwise be avoided." RT-ENTrWURF, supra note 59, art. 37, § 4. The constitutional
court is to decide upon exclusions and, before a party is so excluded, neither it nor its
members can suffer any governmental disadvantage; moreover, the civil and political
rights of party members are not to be affected by a judicial exclusion of the party. Id.
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tent manner by the necessity, over the coming years, of reviewing
and evaluating thousands of new applicants for the civil service from
the GDR.
One additional issue of great importance relating to the civil
service in the East German universities has developed in the months
following unification. Under the Unification Treaty the govern-
ments of the five new eastern Uinder have asserted the authority to
dissolve various "faculties" (departments) of the East German uni-
versities if they believe this step to be appropriate.3 The Treaty
required the Lander to take these steps by January 2, 1991. The
governments of the eastern Under have accordingly dissolved nu-
merous faculties in the social sciences and law-faculties that they
believed were susceptible to influence and control by the former
SED apparatus remaining in office. These governments apparently
believed that the faculties were (by virtue of their subject matter) so
deeply influenced by the political thought of the old regime, and in
general so unlikely to be reformed from within, that the preferred
response was total dissolution.
Accordingly, almost all of the law faculties in the former GDR
have been dissolved. At the Humboldt University in East Berlin, the
faculties of law, economics, history, education, and philosophy have
been dissolved.36 7 Here as elsewhere, however, certain dissolved
faculties are being swiftly reconstituted with new personnel, and the
former members of these faculties must now reapply for new posi-
tions. Although doubtless some of the former professors will be re-
employed, the chances for most do not seem bright. At the outset,
therefore, it seems likely that many of the open faculty positions will
be occupied-either on a temporary or permanent basis-by candi-
dates from the west.
This upheaval-only one of the many that face the citizens of
the east-has evoked protests and demonstrations by students in
Berlin and elsewhere. 368 Moreover, some commentators have ar-
gued that the technique of first dissolving a department, and then
immediately reconstituting the department with new personnel cho-
366. For general provisions authorizing the dissolution of certain GDR governmental
units (including those relating to education) on or after unification, see Unification
Treaty, supra note 203, art. 13; id. Protocol to art. 13. For the status of the personnel of
a dissolved governmental unit, see id. attachment I, ch. XIX(A), para. III(1), §§ 2-3; see
also infra note 369.
367. See FAZ, Dec. 27, 1990, at 8, col. 2.
368. See FAZ, Jan. 3, 1991, at 2, col. 2.
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sen by university or government officials, represents an illegal (or
even unconstitutional) attempt to evade other provisions of the Uni-
fication Treaty which contemplate an individual evaluation of each
official before a decision is made on dismissal or retention. 69
The debates over these dissolutions reflect a theme that recurs
in many other constitutional problems arising from unification: In
the process of attempting to merge the two parts of Germany, how
much of the eastern culture and society should be reformed as
worthless or malign, and how much should be retained as represent-
ing elements of value.
IX. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE FIRST
ALL-GERMAN ELECTION
The questions surrounding the first all-German Bundestag
election were closely related to some of the central issues of unifica-
tion. The forces prevailing in this election would guide the nation
through the crucial post-unification period-in which the principles
negotiated and set forth in the Unification Treaty and the Two Plus
Four agreement would actually be applied, and the enormous long-
369. For criticism of this technique of dissolution, see Konzen, Die "Abwicklung" und
der Rechtstaat, FAZ, Feb. 12, 1991, at 10, col. 1; Battis, Correspondence, FAZ, Dec. 27,
1990, at 6, col. 2; for a contrary view, see Meier, Lieber abwickeln, FAZ, Dec. 21, 1990, at
33, col. 1.
The dissolution of the university faculties can be viewed as a special aspect of a
broader problem. Because western authorities viewed the East German Civil Service as
grossly inflated, many administrative offices and bureaus were dissolved upon unifica-
tion. The result of this action was that between 300,000 and 600,000 employees-pre-
cise figures were not available-would receive 70 percent of their salary for six or nine
months, but after that period their government employment would end in most cases.
In a recent decision, the Constitutional Court held that these massive layoffs were
constitutional. See Decision of Constitutional Court (First Senate), Apr. 24, 1991, 1991
EuGRZ 133; see also FAZ, Apr. 25, 1991, at 1, col. 2. The Court acknowledged that the
Federal Republic was the legal successor of the GDR with respect to employment rela-
tions; therefore, these relations did not automatically cease at the moment of unification,
as the government had argued. Yet, in most cases, the importance of creating a healthy
economy in the east outweighed the rights of the former employees to the free choice of
workplace, guaranteed by article 12 of the Basic Law. 1991 EuGRZ at 136-39. Chal-
lenges based on the rights of property, GG art. 14, human dignity, GG art. 1, and equal-
ity, GG art. 3, § 1, were also rejected. Id. at 140. (The Court did create a special
exception for pregnant women and mothers of infants, who are constitutionally pro-
tected under article 6, § 4 of the Basic Law; they must be retained in their employment
positions.) Id. at 139-40. As in the Court's contemporaneous decision on the 1945-49
expropriations, see supra text accompanying notes 268-271, this decision accords sub-
stantial discretion to the legislature in the process of unification. The decision may not
resolve all questions relating to the dissolution of university faculties, however, because
the opinion did not discuss the special problem of dissolved units that were swiftly re-
constituted with new personnel.
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term political, economic, and social problems of integrating the for-
mer GDR into the western system would have to be confronted.
This election, moreover, would serve as a plebiscite on the process
of unification up to that point, affording the voters of the original
Federal Republic their first opportunity to express a judgment on
these issues by ballot.
During the summer of 1990, debates over the structuring of the
first all-German election-which had been set for December 2-be-
came curiously involved with the question of when the GDR should
accede to the Federal Republic under article 23 of the Basic Law.
The main issue was whether the GDR should accede before or after
the December 2 election. At the bottom of this peculiar imbroglio
was the most basic of political quarrels-a dispute over future parti-
san advantage. If the GDR acceded before the all-German elections,
most observers assumed that the general election law of the Federal
Republic would cover the entire country including the former GDR.
Under the Federal Election Law as it existed in the summer of 1990,
a party that failed to receive five percent of the total vote was, as a
practical matter, barred from entering the Bundestag.37 ° If this rule
would require parties to obtain five percent of the votes of the entire
unified nation-as was thought to be the case if accession occurred
before the election-the almost certain result would be the elimina-
tion of a number of significant parties in the GDR. These would
include the PDS (the former ruling Communist Party, whose sixteen
percent showing in the GDR Volkskammer election in March would
not amount to five percent of the entire German electorate);3 7 the
German Social Union (DSU), a conservative party most closely asso-
ciated with the Christian Social Union (CSU) of Bavaria; and certain
small reform parties that led the East German revolution in 1989
370. Bundeswahlgesetz, in the version of Sept. 1, 1975 (as amended), § 6(6), BGBI I
2325. A party could also achieve representation if it received the highest vote in three
electoral districts, id., but such local strength is unlikely to be shown by a party that fails
to receive five percent of the total national vote.
The German electoral system is particularly complex because it requires two votes
from each voter-a first ballot for a representative from a specified district and a second
ballot for a political party only. As a practical matter, it is the proportionate vote on the
second (party) ballot that determines each party's representation in the Bundestag, and
this ballot is also used to determine whether the five percent requirement has been met.
See generally D. KOMMERS, supra note 321, at 185-86.
371. Because the 16 million inhabitants of the GDR must be compared with more
than 60 million in the Federal Republic before unification, a significant number of votes
in the GDR could still fall below five percent of the total combined vote in an all-German
election.
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but whose electoral alliance "Biundnis 90" had received less than
three percent of the GDR vote in the Volkskammer election.
On the other hand, an accession that occurred only after the
December 2 Bundestag election would allow a separate election law
for the GDR with a separate minimum percentage requirement or
indeed, as in the March 18 Volkskammer election, no minimum re-
quirement at all. Under this system, some of the smaller parties in
the GDR would probably be represented in the Bundestag at least
for one legislative period.
Interestingly, the Christian Democrats, the largest party in the
GDR, and particularly their leader Prime Minister Lothar de
Maizi~re, fought strenuously for accession after the December 2 elec-
tion-a move that could have preserved some of the smaller par-
ties. 37 2 Commentators assumed that this was his (and Chancellor
Kohl's) way of paying a political debt by supporting a solution that
would preserve the conservative DSU. Moreover, many believed
that the continued existence of the PDS might siphon votes from the
Social Democrats-another advantage for the conservative coali-
tion.373 In contrast, the Social Democrats (SPD) argued that acces-
sion should occur before the election-a move that would presumably
eliminate the conservative DSU as well as the threat from the PDS.
The public arguments, however, were conducted on a consider-
ably more elevated plane. Pressing for an early accession, the SPD
argued that it was only logical to form a single state before con-
ducting elections for the government of that state;374 the SPD
sought to preserve the heritage of the 1989 opposition parties by
suggesting that Biundnis 90 might receive a number of places on the
SPD party list. In contrast, de Maizi~re maintained that a later ac-
cession was necessary in order to preserve the smaller parties of the
1989 revolution 37 5-although the primary beneficiary would not be
those parties but the successor of the SED. Perhaps more convinc-
ing was de Maizi~re's argument that accession-and indeed any
Volkskammer vote setting a definite future date for accession-
should be delayed in order to maintain the GDR's position in nego-
tiations on the Unification Treaty.3 76 De Maizi~re apparently be-
lieved that any remaining weight in the GDR's negotiating position
372. See FR, July 25, 1990, at 3, col. 3; id. at 1, col. 1.
373. Id. at 1, col. 1.
374. FR, July 9, 1990, at 1, col. 4. FDP leaders also took the position that the GDR
should accede before the election. Id.
375. FR, July 25, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
376. FAZ, July 21, 1990, at 1, col. 2.
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rested on its ability to refuse accession on inadequate terms; an
early accession-or even an early vote binding the GDR to a future
accession-would forfeit this advantage.
In August 1990 the Federal Republic and the GDR adopted an
election treaty that split the political advantage between the CDU
and the Social Democrats. 3 " Under the Treaty, accession would oc-
cur before the first all-German election, and the election would be
conducted pursuant to the requirement that a party must ordinarily
receive five percent of the votes of the all-German electorate in or-
der to enter the Bundestag. But the Treaty qualified the draconian
five percent rule in one important way. Small parties could improve
their chances of representation by joining with larger parties for
purposes of meeting the five percent requirement, but only if the
parties thus joining restricted their campaigns to separate Linder.
Thus, parties with candidates running in the same state (except Ber-
lin) could not join together for this purpose.
This qualification of the five percent rule was significant, but it
did not favor all of the small parties equally. For the PDS, for exam-
ple, the qualification appeared to be useless because the former rul-
ing party of the GDR would certainly be unable to attract any
western partner of significance. But for the conservative DSU-an
ally of the Bavarian CSU-this provision was a means of political
salvation. The political strength of the DSU was concentrated in the
former GDR, and the party had no plans to campaign in Bavaria-
the only state in which the CSU ordinarily registers its candidates.
Thus the DSU and CSU could easily mount a joint campaign under
the election statute. Indeed the purpose of this provision was so
transparent that it was viewed as a special law favoring the DSU and
the conservative coalition; accordingly, the provision was attacked as
"raising the impression of an unrestrained misuse of power.''378 In
contrast, under this provision the PDS would almost certainly fail to
meet the five percent requirement in an all-German election; it
therefore would not have been represented in the Bundestag-a re-
sult that was seen as yielding some benefit for the SPD.
Yet the PDS still represented a significant, if minority, position
in the former GDR and its exclusion from the Bundestag in this
377. Vertrag zur Vorbereitung und Durchfiihrung der ersten gesamtdeutschen Wahl
des Deutschen Bundestages zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der Deut-
schen Demokratischen Republik, of Aug. 3, 1990, BGBi II 822. The Treaty, along with
an accompanying statute, is reprinted in 2 K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLEIBTREU, supra note
141, at 191-206.
378. FAZ, Aug. 3, 1990, at 2, col. 5 (quoting Rhein-Neckar-Zeitung).
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manner raised serious questions. The ultimate effect of the statute
on the GDR reform parties was less clear because the western
Greens had entered into an alliance with a consolidated group com-
posed of the GDR reform parties and the separate eastern Greens.
Yet if this group failed to obtain five percent of the total vote, the
reform parties of autumn 1989 would also be excluded from the
Bundestag. In any case the Greens and other small parties contin-
ued to insist that the five percent clause-especially in this elec-
tion-was unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the Greens and the Left List/PDS filed an action
in the Constitutional Court, arguing that their rights of equality of
political opportunity were infringed by the provisions of the election
treaty and the first Election Statute. 79 Individual Bundestag candi-
dates of the Greens were also complainants. Argument in this case
was heard on an expedited basis, and in late September 1990 in its
first major opinion relating to unification-doubtless the first in a
series that could extend over years-the Constitutional Court unani-
mously held the Election Statute unconstitutional as a violation of
the equality of opportunity of political parties.38 °
From an early point in its history, the Court had found that con-
stitutional provisions guaranteeing the free formation of political
parties and equal electoral rights implied a general requirement that
the government treat political parties equally.38 ' Although any five
percent minimum requirement might infringe this principle of
equality-because small parties may sometimes receive no represen-
tation at all instead of their actual proportionate share-the Court
had held that a five percent requirement is constitutional in princi-
ple as a means of ensuring a stable and functioning parliamentary
system.382 In the Unification Election Case the Court continued to
379. The Left List/PDS was a western counterpart of the eastern PDS. See FAZ, Aug.
16, 1990, at 3, col. 3. The complainants were joined in the Constitutional Court action
by the Republicans, a far right-wing group that has experienced some success in local
elections in the Federal Republic in recent years. See supra note 365. The Republicans
also believed that their chances would be impaired by the imposition of a national five
percent requirement. Because the Republicans had been banned in the GDR from Feb-
ruary until August 1990, they did not take part in the March 18 Volkskammer election
and their electoral strength in the GDR was unknown. See id.
Although the GDR reform groups that formed Biindnis 90 were not parties to the
action, they (along with others) were allowed to participate in the oral argument. See 82
BVerfGE 322, 334-35 (1990).
380. 82 BVerfGE 322 (1990).
381. See GG art. 21, § 1; art. 38, § 1.
382. See, e.g., 6 BVerfGE 84 (1957) (Bavarian Party Case); for an edited English ver-
sion, see D. KOMMERS, supra note 321, at 187-89.
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adhere to this general doctrine but indicated that prior decisions
had involved ordinary elections in the Federal Republic and that the
constitutionality of any specific five percent provision must depend
upon the surrounding circumstances.383 It was the special circum-
stances of the unification election that made the all-German five per-
cent clause unconstitutional.
In this case-in contrast with prior elections in the Federal Re-
public-the reduction of electoral chances for certain small parties
seemed particularly drastic. From the point of view of political par-
ties in the GDR, unification represented a sudden expansion of the
relevant election territory and population, and these parties were
largely unprepared to compete on a broader scale. The disadvan-
tages were particularly acute in the case of the small reform parties
which, in contrast with the PDS and the former bloc parties (such as
the CDU), had been in existence for a few months only. 8 4 Under
these circumstances, expansion of the election territory would dras-
tically reduce the opportunities available to many parties in the
GDR. Indeed, extending the five percent clause across the entire
united country meant that the new parties of the east would be re-
quired to obtain a number of votes equal to more than twenty-three
percent of the voting population of the territory in which they had
previously campaigned and were best known. In contrast, the par-
ties of the west would need to receive votes equaling only six per-
cent of the previous western electorate.3 8 5 Thus the unequal impact
of the all-German five percent clause on the eastern and western
parties was evident. The government argued that the provision al-
lowing combined party lists would mitigate this unfairness, but the
Court noted that, because of its narrow limitations, very few parties
would be able to take advantage of this provision. Consequently,
this exception worked its own unconstitutional inequality. 86
In its opinion striking down the first Election Statute, the Court
383. 82 BVerfGE at 337-39.
384. The Court emphasized that, under the 1968/74 GDR Constitution, associations
were only permitted to exist if they conformed to the "principles of the socialist order of
society," and political parties could only be formed within the "National Front" of the
GDR. 82 BVerfGE at 340-42. As noted above, the National Front (which was abolished
in one of the early amendments of the GDR Constitution in 1990) was an organization
designed to further electoral control by the SED. See supra text accompanying note 75.
385. 82 BVerfGE at 340.
386. Id. at 342-45. Indeed, the Court went on to find that any joint list among parties
would be unconstitutional if it was entered into for purposes of a particular election
only. In contrast, an actual consolidation of parties for common action-not just to pool
votes in an election-is not unconstitutional. Id. at 345-47. Indeed, the Court sug-
gested that, due to the discrimination against new parties that existed until recently in
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suggested that a constitutionally acceptable alternative would be a
statute instituting separate minimum requirements, at an equal per-
centage level, in the two parts of Germany.-8 7 Because a new statute
had to be enacted within a few days if the election was to be held as
planned on December 2, the Bundestag almost immediately enacted
a second election statute, adopting separate five percent clauses for
the two parts of Germany, as suggested by the Court. 88
Although the Greens voted against this statute on the ground
that any five percent clause was an unfair and unnecessary impair-
ment of the democratic principle, they did not file an action in the
Constitutional Court. The election of December 2, therefore, was
conducted with two separate electoral regimes for elections to the
Bundestag.3s 9 But subsequent elections to the Bundestag-the first
of which will probably be held in 1994-may well be conducted
under a statute extending the five percent provision across the en-
tire nation; it seems unlikely that the special principles of the unifi-
cation election would be found applicable to an election occurring
four years thereafter. Thus, the PDS and the small reform parties of
the former GDR seem to have gained a four-year grace period in
which they may try to establish themselves as factors on the national
scene.
3 90
the GDR, it would be permissible (and perhaps constitutionally required) to allow par-
ties in the GDR to consolidate in this manner. Id. at 349-50.
387. Id. at 348-49.
388. 1990 BGBI I 2141, repinted in 2 K. STERN & B. SCHMIDT-BLIEBTREU, supra note
141, at 207-08.
389. In the election of December 2, a strong vote for the CDU/CSU seemed to indi-
cate approval of the results of unification up to that point. In something of an electoral
surprise, the western Greens received less than 5 percent of the vote in West Germany,
thus failing to achieve the minimum necessary for representation in the Bundestag.
FAZ, Dec. 4, 1990, at 2, col. 4. The eastern Greens (allied with the reform parties of
Biindnis 90) did obtain more than five percent of the vote in the former GDR, however,
and the Greens will therefore continue to be represented in parliament. The PDS will
also be represented, because its vote exceeded five percent of the electorate of the for-
mer GDR, although it did not approach five percent of the entire country. The DSU,
which was basically dependent on its alliance with the CSU, received less than five per-
cent of the votes in eastern Germany and thus will not be represented in the Bundestag.
390. The special circumstances of the unification election led to another decision of
the Constitutional Court based on principles of equality. 82 BVerfGE 353 (1990).
Under the federal election law, parties that were not represented in a parliamentary
organ (in East or West Germany) were required to submit petitions with signatures of
specified numbers of registered voters in order to achieve a place on the ballot. Two
small West German parties (including the right-wing NPD) challenged this provision on
the ground that it was easier for small East German parties to have achieved a place in
the GDR Volkskammer (in the election of March 18, 1990) than for small West German
parties to be seated in the state or federal parliaments-because the Volkskammer elec-
tion had been conducted without the five percent requirement that was almost universal
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Many commentators in the Federal Republic and the GDR have
criticized what they viewed as the pettiness and cynicism of the polit-
ical disputes regarding the structure of the first all-German election.
In contrast, the decision of the Constitutional Court seemed to in-
ject a measure of reason and principle into an otherwise unedifying
spectacle. In the context of broader and more principled disputes
over matters such as property and abortion, the dispute over the
election law illustrates-on a somewhat less elevated level-how
unification provided other occasions for the further unfolding of
continuing political differences in the Federal Republic of Germany.
X. THE LEGAL STATUS OF DIVIDED GERMANY AND THE ROLE OF
THE WORLD WAR II ALLIES IN THE PROCESS OF
UNIFICATION
German unification did not depend upon actions taken under
German law alone. The same historical events that resulted in the
division of Germany created certain rights in the victorious powers
of World War II that qualified German sovereignty. The Allies re-
tained a measure of authority to approve or disapprove of plans for
unification and to settle the question of a united Germany's eastern
border-the debated question of the Oder-NeiBe line. Moreover, in
the course of the Cold War, both German states had become essen-
tial parts of separate and hostile military alliances-NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. Unification of the two German states, therefore,
would also require adjustments of these relationships.
Thus, at the same time that the Federal Republic and the GDR
were negotiating the internal terms of unification in the first State
Treaty and the Unification Treaty, the two German states were also
negotiating certain external terms of unification with the Allied
powers in the so-called "Two Plus Four" talks. The Two Plus Four
process concluded with a treaty between the two German states and
the four Allied powers, effectively extinguishing the Allies' reserved
rights on the date of German unification, confirming the Oder-
Neibe line as the permanent eastern border, and acknowledging
that a unified Germany would become a member of NATO.
As some historical background is necessary to understand the
in the west. The complainants argued that this system represented an inequality, disfa-
voring small West German parties. Moreover, the government had unduly delayed dis-
tributing the necessary petitions for collecting signatures. The Constitutional Court
found that these arguments had sufficient weight for a preliminary injunction to issue,
and therefore these parties were allowed a position on the election ballot.
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import of these arrangements, the history of these three issues will
be discussed separately, and their resolution in the Two Plus Four
Treaty will then be analyzed.
A. Reserved Rights of the Allies
At the end of World War II, the Allies completely occupied
German territory, and any effective German government ceased to
exist upon the Germans' capitulation in May 1945. At that point,
therefore, the victorious Allies exercised full sovereignty over Ger-
man territory.
This sovereignty, however, was not to be exercised in a totally
uniform manner. Even before the end of the war the Allies agreed
at the Yalta Conference that Germany would be temporarily divided
into a separate occupation zone for each of the four victorious pow-
ers. A Control Commission of the Allied military commanders,
however, would exercise "coordinated administration and
control."3 9
In the course of time the Allies returned substantial rights of
sovereignty to the two German governments, but certain Allied
rights were reserved up to the point of unification. Because the re-
served rights pre-existed the founding of the Federal Republic and
the GDR, those rights were arguably superior to any governmental
powers exercised by the two German states.
1. The Occupation.-The original Allied rights of occupation
were reflected in a declaration of the four victorious powers "re-
garding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of supreme au-
thority with respect to Germany," issued in Berlin on June 5,
1945.39 This declaration stated that, as a result of its unconditional
surrender, "Germany has become subject to such requirements as
may now or hereafter be imposed upon her." Because there was no
391. Report of the Crimea (Yalta) Conference, Feb. 11, 1945 [hereinafter Yalta Re-
port], reprinted in 3 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, at 1005, 1007 (C. Bevans ed. 1969) [Bevans]. The Yalta
Report reflected an agreement on future occupation zones, entered into by Great Brit-
ain, the United States, and the Soviet Union in London in 1944. See Protocol on the
Zones of Occupation in Germany and the Administration of "Greater Berlin," and
amending agreement, Sept. 12 & Nov. 14, 1944, 5 U.S.T. 2078, T.I.A.S. No. 3071, 227
U.N.T.S. 279; see also Mosely, The Occupation of Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were
Drawn, 28 FOREIGN AFF. 580 (1950). France was not a party to the Yalta Conference but
the Yalta Report contemplated that France would also administer an occupation zone,
and France was ultimately granted portions of the British and American zones.
392. Berlin Declaration ofJune 5, 1945, 60 Stat. 1649, T.I.A.S. No. 1520, 68 U.N.T.S.
189.
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German government capable of acting effectively under the circum-
stances, the Allies "hereby assume supreme authority with, respect
to Germany, including all the powers possessed by the German
Government, the High Command and any state, municipal, or local
government or authority." 9 ' The declaration made clear, however,
that an annexation of German territory was not intended. 94
The Berlin Declaration was followed by the Potsdam accord (or
"report") approved by Truman, Stalin, and Attlee on August 2,
1945, after a conference in the outskirts of Berlin. 95 In the Pots-
dam accord, the Allies restated their assertions of full governmental
power in Germany, noting that
supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions
from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-
in-Chief of the armed forces [of the Allied powers], each in
his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters af-
fecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members
of the Control Council. 96
According to the agreement, one of the purposes of the occupation
was to "prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political
life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in
international life by Germany" 97-and to this end the Allies con-
templated the swift re-establishment of local self-government.5 98
The use of the word "Germany" in the Potsdam accord seems
to assume the eventual re-establishment of a single country-
although during the war the Allies had discussed various plans for
the permanent partitioning of Germany. Indeed, for the purposes
of the occupation, Germany was to be "treated as a single economic
unit, ' 99 notwithstanding its division into four separate zones.4 ° °
Nonetheless, it was clear that any future unified Germany would
be significantly smaller than the prewar Germany of the Weimar Re-
393. 60 Stat. at 1650.
394. Id.
395. Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin (Potsdam), Aug. 2, 1945, 3 Bevans
1224 [hereinafter Potsdam Report]. For important memoirs of the Potsdam Confer-
ence, see W. CHURCHILL, TRIUMPH AND TRAGEDY 630-76 (1953); 1 H. TRUMAN,
MEMOIRS: YEAR OF DECISIONS 343-414 (1955). For general commentary, see, e.g., W.
BENZ, POTSDAM 1945 (1986).
396. Potsdam Report, supra note 395, at 1227.
397. Id. at 1228.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 1229.
400. The Potsdam accord also stated that "for the time being no central German gov-
ernment shall be established." Id. This language implies that at some future point a
central German government might be created.
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public. At Yalta and Potsdam, the Allies effectively recognized the
transfer of K6nigsberg and a substantial part of East Prussia to So-
viet control.4"' At Potsdam the Allies also agreed that former Ger-
man territory east of the Oder-NeiBe line should be placed under
the "administration" of Poland-an adjustment that was to remain
in effect pending "the final delimitation of the western frontier of
Poland" in a future peace settlement.4 "2
Contrary to the original expectations of the Allies, however,
hostility and mistrust between the western and Soviet governments
hardened, and the separate occupation zones developed in 1949
into two German states, marking one of the fundamental steps in
the development of the Cold War. From an early point, therefore,
the Allies had begun to exercise their occupation rights in a divided
manner and, when those rights were partially relinquished, they
were relinquished to two separate German states.
2. The Allies' Reserved Rights and the Creation of Two German
States.-
a. Reserved Rights and the Adoption of the West German Basic Law.-
The western Allies carefully preserved their occupation rights in the
process that led to the drafting and adoption of the Basic Law.
Thus, in the so-called "Frankfurt Documents," authorizing the con-
vocation of a parliamentary council to draft the Basic Law, the west-
ern military governors set forth the general principles necessary for
a German constitution and made clear that they must approve the
constitution (and any subsequent amendments) before ratifica-
tion.40 3 Moreover, the Frankfurt Documents noted that even after a
new German government was established, the military governors
''reserve to themselves such powers as are necessary to ensure the
401. See Yalta Report, supra note 391, at 1010 (Poland's eastern frontier should gener-
ally follow the Curzon line); Potsdam Report, supra note 395, at 1232-33 (Konigsberg
and adjacent territory should ultimately pass to the Soviet Union; the American and
British leaders state that they will support this change at the peace conference).
402. Potsdam Report, supra note 395, at 1234. In the report of the Yalta Conference,
the three heads of government acknowledged that eastern Polish territory should be
given to the Soviet Union and recognized that "Poland must receive substantial acces-
sions of territory in the north and west," although "final delimitation" of Poland's west-
ern border must await a peace conference. Yalta Report, supra note 391, at 1010-11.
Thus the Allies seemed to agree that "substantial" German territory must be finally
transferred to Poland, and it seems likely that it was the extent of that transfer (rather
than the principle) that was to await the peace conference. See, e.g., W. CHURCHiLL, supra
note 395, at 647-48.
403. Frankfurt Documents, July 1, 1948; reprinted in I DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at
88, 89-91.
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fulfillment of the basic purpose of the Occupation. '40 4 Among
other things, these powers included control over Germany's foreign
relations, certain aspects of foreign trade, reparations, disarma-
ment, and security of the occupation forces, and the authority to
ensure the German government's observance of its own constitu-
tion. Indeed, the "Military Governors will resume their exercise of
their full powers in an emergency threatening security, and if neces-
sary to secure compliance with the constitutions or the occupation
statute. ' 40 5 When the military governors approved the draft West
German constitution for submission to the states, they were to issue
an "Occupation Statute" incorporating broad principles discussed
among the military governors and the parliamentary council so that
the people "may understand that they accept the constitution within
the framework of this occupation statute. "406
In their letter approving the Basic Law for submission to the
states in May 1949, the western military governors reiterated that its
adoption was to be subject to the provisions of the Occupation Stat-
ute.4 °7 The Occupation Statute, in turn, reserved a number of spe-
cific areas to the occupation authorities-including foreign affairs,
404. Id. at 90.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 91.
407. See Letter from the Three Western Military Governors to the President of the
Parliamentary Council, May 12, 1949, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 130.
Although § 1 of the Occupation Statute emphasized that the new German federal gov-
ernment and Lnder shall have "full legislative, executive and judicial powers in accord-
ance with the Basic Law" and state constitutions (subject to the limitations of the
Occupation Statute), the statute also noted that it was made in "the exercise of the
supreme authority which is retained by" the Allied governments. See Occupation Statute
Defining the Powers to be Retained by the Occupation Authorities, Apr. 8, 1949, effec-
tive Sept. 21, 1949, 63 Stat. 2819, T.I.A.S. No. 2066, 140 U.N.T.S. 202 [hereinafter
Occupation Statute].
A contemporaneous memorandum of the three Allied governments noted that they
"retain the supreme authority assumed by them under the [Berlin Declaration], includ-
ing the right to revoke or alter any legislative or administrative decisions in the three
western zones of Germany." Agreed Memorandum Regarding the Principles Governing
Exercise of Powers and Responsibilities of US-UK-French Governments Following Es-
tablishment of German Federal Republic, Apr. 8, 1949, 63 Stat. 2818, T.I.A.S. No. 2066,
140 U.N.T.S. 200. Thus although the Allies intended that "military government will
disappear, and that the function of the Allies shall be mainly supervisory," id. at 2818,
they clearly retained ultimate control.
In accordance with this basic principle, the Allies retained power to disapprove leg-
islation of the federal government or the states, but noted in the Occupation Statute that
they would not exercise this authority "unless in their opinion [the legislation] is incon-
sistent with the Basic Law, a Land Constitution, legislation or other directives of the
occupation authorities themselves or the provisions of [the Occupation Statute], or un-
less it constitutes a grave threat to the basic purposes of the occupation." See Occupa-
tion Statute, supra, at 2820.
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foreign trade and exchange, disarmament, and reparations-and
also reserved the right "to resume, in whole or in part, the exercise
of full authority if [the occupation authorities] consider that to do so
is essential to security or to preserve democratic government in
Germany or in pursuance of the international obligations of their
governments. ' 40 8 The military governors' letter of approval also
qualified certain provisions of the Basic Law and reiterated the Al-
lied position that Berlin could only have observers, not voting mem-
bers, in the two houses of the West German parliament.4 °9
b. Allied Reserved Rights and the Founding of the GDR.-The pro-
cess that led to the founding of the GDR followed a similar pattern.
In October 1945, the Soviet military commander Zhukov empow-
ered the provincial and Under administrations within the Soviet
zone to enact binding laws and regulations and exercise other gov-
ernmental powers, "if they are not contrary to the laws and orders
of the Control Council or the orders of the Soviet Military Adminis-
tration. "410 In November 1949, shortly after the adoption of the
first constitution of the GDR, the Soviet Military Administration was
converted into the Soviet High Commission with the function of
overseeing the measures of the new government. 4 11 According to
the Soviet "Declaration," the provisional administration of the Ger-
man Democratic Republic could freely exercise its activity on the
basis of the constitution of the German Democratic Republic, "so
long as this activity does not violate the Potsdam decisions and the
obligations that arise from the joint decisions of the four
powers." 4 12
408. Occupation Statute, supra note 407, at 2819-20. Moreover, under the Occupa-
tion Statute, any amendment of the Basic Law required "the express approval of the
occupation authorities before becoming effective." Id. at 2820. For adverse reaction in
Germany to the broad powers reserved by the Allies in the Occupation Statute, see T.
SCHWARTZ, AMERICA'S GERMANY: JOHN J. McCLoY AND THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GER-
MANY 38-39 (1991).
409. See Letter from the Three Western Military Governors to the President of the
Parliamentary Council, May 12, 1949, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 130;
GG art. 23; art. 144, § 2.
410. Directive of the Supreme Commander of the Soviet Military Administration in
Germany, Oct. 22, 1945, reprinted in I DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 294.
411. See H. KOCH, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF GERMANY IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 345 (1984). This move substantially paralleled steps that had
been taken earlier in 1949 by the western Allies before the adoption of the Basic Law.
Id. at 343; see Message to the Bonn Parliamentary Council from the Foreign Ministers of
the US, UK and France, Apr. 8, 1949, 63 Stat. 2825, T.I.A.S. No. 2066, 140 U.N.T.S.
218.
412. Declaration of the Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission with Respect to
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3. The "General Treaty" and the Further Release of Sovereign
Rights.-The great change in the occupation status occurred in 1955
when the "General Treaty" between the western Allies and the Fed-
eral Republic came into force.4'" This treaty declared the end of the
occupation regime and lifted the Occupation Statute: As a result,
the treaty announced, "[t]he Federal Republic shall have... the full
authority of a sovereign State over its internal and external af-
fairs." 414 Even though the General Treaty marked an extremely im-
portant step in the extension of the sovereignty of the Federal
Republic, the western Allies' relinquishment of authority was not
complete. As a result of the international situation-which made
unification of Germany impossible-the western Allies "retain[ed]
the rights and the responsibilities, heretofore exercised or held by
them, relating to Berlin and to Germany as a whole, including the
reunification of Germany and a peace settlement. '4 15 It is this lan-
guage-reserving rights relating to (a) Berlin, and (b) Germany as a
whole, including questions of reunification and a peace settlement-
that formed the basis of the occupation rights that the western Allies
continued to hold up to the point of German unification. The rights
relating to Berlin will be noted below; the rights with respect to
"Germany as a whole" have been interpreted (at least in the Ger-
man literature) to include authority over the total geographical
structure of the country-particularly the territorial extent of a uni-
fied Germany-but not to include internal political issues, such as
the precise process by which unification would be achieved.
41 6
the Transfer of Administrative Functions to German Officials, Nov. 11, 1949, reprinted in
I DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 325-27.
413. The General Treaty (Generalvertrag or Deutschland Vertrag) was originally
signed in 1952 but its ratification was delayed when a companion treaty on the European
Defense Community was rejected by the French National Assembly. After modification,
the treaty was signed again in 1954 and came into effect in 1955 after ratification by the
signatory parties. See Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4251, T.I.A.S. No. 3425, as amended
Oct. 23, 1954, 6 U.S.T. 4121, T.I.A.S. No. 3425 [hereinafter General Treaty]. As one of
the "Paris Treaties," the General Treaty was accompanied by another declaration ac-
cepting the Federal Republic as a member of NATO. In response to West German re-
armament and entry into NATO, the Soviet Union established the Warsaw Pact in May
1955. SeeJ. SOWDEN, THE GERMAN QUESTION 1945-1973, at 158-62 (1975); Stem, supra
note 14, at 12-13.
414. General Treaty, supra note 413, art. 1, para. 2.
415. Id. art. 2.
416. See generally Rauschning, supra note 10, at 397; v. Goetze, supra note 1, at 2165.
The joint Allied responsibility for "matters affecting Germany as a whole" can be traced
back to a three-power "Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany," signed by the
United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union in November 1944. See I DOKUMENTE,
supra note 110, at 29. See also Rauschning, supra note 10, at 397.
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The General Treaty contained two other provisions of lasting
importance. Article 3 pledged the Federal Republic to make its pol-
icy conform to the principles of the United Nations Charter and to
the goals set forth in the Statute of the Council of Europe.4 17 Per-
haps even more important for our purposes, all of the parties to the
General Treaty-including the Allies-pledged to pursue the goal
of a "reunified Germany enjoying a liberal-democratic constitution,
like that of the Federal Republic, and integrated within the Euro-
pean Community."4 '8 A number of German scholars have argued
that by agreeing to this language, the western Allies pledged not to
use their reserved rights to deny consent to German unification. 4 9
Also in 1954-before the final release of the General Treaty but
in contemplation of its adoption-the Soviet Union issued a docu-
ment recognizing the GDR's sovereign rights over "domestic and
foreign affairs" and declaring that it would enter into the same rela-
417. See General Treaty, supra note 413, art. 3, para. 1. This pledge accords with the
Preamble of the Basic Law, which sees the Federal Republic as an "equal member of a
united Europe." The pledge to observe the principles of the United Nations can be seen
in part as a less rigorous version of the Allies' attempts under the occupation regime to
ensure that Germany would not be in a position again to threaten aggressive war. See
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 (no "threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state").
418. General Treaty, supra note 413, art. 7, para. 2. The parties to the Treaty were to
pursue this goal until a peace treaty was signed. Presumably, the Allies contemplated
that a peace treaty would contain similar guarantees.
419. See, e.g., Hailbronner, V6oker- und europarechtliche Fragen der deutschen Wiederver-
einigung, 1990 JZ 449, 450; Klein, An der Schwelle zur Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, 1990
NJW 1065, 1067.
One other reservation in the General Treaty is worth noting. The Allies reserved
their previous rights with respect to the stationing of troops in the Federal Republic-a
subject that was also covered by a separate agreement. General Treaty, supra note 413,
arts. 4-5. Moreover, in order to ensure the safety of stationed troops, the western pow-
ers in effect reserved the right to undertake certain security measures-until the German
government obtained legal authorization under German legislation to undertake those
security measures itself. Id. art. 5, para. 2. Among other things, this somewhat guarded
passage apparently implied a reference to secret electronic surveillance--an activity that
was arguably prohibited by the Basic Law unless the subject of the surveillance had the
ability to contest the surveillance in court. In 1968, in connection with other constitu-
tional amendments and legislation intended to tighten security measures, the Basic Law
was amended to permit surveillance without informing the subject of the surveillance-
and without providing a possible judicial remedy-if the "free democratic basic order"
would thus be protected and if parliamentary committees exercised a degree of review.
See GG art. 10, § 2; art. 19, § 4. The Constitutional Court upheld this amendment
against claims that it was invalid as violating certain basic ideas of human dignity, GG
art. 1, and principles of the rule of law, GG art. 20. See GG art. 79, § 3; 30 BVerfGE 1
(1970); D. KoMMERS, supra note 321, at 230-31; see also supra note 341. The Allies relin-
quished their reserved rights to undertake security measures upon enactment of the
relevant amendments and legislation by the Bundestag. See Note, Recent Emergenc, Legis-
lation in West Germany, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1704, 1707 n.25 (1969).
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tions with the GDR "as with other sovereign nations. ' 420 On the
other hand, the Soviet Union retained those functions that related
to the "guaranteeing of security" as well as functions that arose
from the obligations growing out of the four-power agreements-
including matters affecting Germany as a whole.4 2' In this docu-
ment, the Soviet Union referred to the western Occupation Statute
as "one of the main obstacles" to German unification and, in reply,
the western Allies denied that the Soviet Union had actually relin-
quished sovereignty to the GDR.4 2 2
By 1955, therefore, the Allies' reserved rights had assumed the
contours that they would retain until they were finally relinquished
pursuant to the Two Plus Four agreement among the Allies and the
two German states. Even before their relinquishment, however,
some German commentators had raised a number of questions
about the Allied reserved rights. Some suggested that these rights
were not properly established in the first place. Another view was
that occupation rights under international law could not remain in
effect after the occupation forces had left. Since Berlin was the only
part of Germany that remained theoretically subject to a true occu-
pation, this argument would suggest that by the 1980s the Allies
possessed no more occupation rights with respect to the unification
of Germany, except for Berlin.423 Others suggested that even if
these rights had been properly established at the outset, their foun-
dation in principles of self-defense had become obsolete and that
they had been qualified by other principles and agreements of inter-
national law, such as the principle of self-determination and the
Helsinki Final Act.4 24
Even though these questions were raised in the German litera-
ture, all practical political action of the German states and the four
Allied powers proceeded from the premise that the Allied reserved
rights were always valid and continued to be so-until their final
relinquishment by agreement.
420. Declaration of the Government of the USSR Concerning the Granting of Sover-
eignty to the German Democratic Republic, Mar. 25, 1954; reprinted in I DOKUMENTE,
supra note 110, at 329-3 1; see Stern, supra note 14, at 14.
421. 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 330.
422. Id. at 330-31.
Additional statements preserving the Allied reserved rights can be found in the pre-
amble of the four power treaty on Berlin (1971), see infra note 436, and in a four-power
declaration concerning the applications of the Federal Republic and the GDR to join the
United Nations. See Rauschning, supra note 10, at 395-96.
423. See, e.g., Rauschning, supra note 10, at 396; but see v. Goetze, supra note 1, at 2162-
63 (arguing that all of the remaining reserved rights of the Allies are occupation rights).
424. See Hailbronner, supra note 419, at 450-51.
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4. The Separate Status of Berlin.-With respect to the Allied re-
served rights-as well as in many other areas-the legal status of
Berlin raised special problems.4"' From the beginning, the Allies
viewed Berlin as the former center of German political and military
power and sought to reserve special rights over that area. Indeed,
this view animated the western Allies' desire to occupy their own
sections of Berlin, even though that city lay deep within the Soviet
occupation zone.
Accordingly, when the western Allies began to contemplate the
reconstitution of federal political authority in Germany, Berlin was
in substantial respects excluded from the new political structure.
During the deliberations over the Basic Law in 1948- 49, the western
Allies objected to the inclusion of West Berlin as a state of the Fed-
eral Republic, although they were willing to permit Berlin to send
nonvoting observers to the Federal Parliament.4 26 Article 23 of the
Basic Law does list greater Berlin as a state of the Federal Republic,
but article 144 declares that any state remaining under "limitations"
may send (nonvoting) representatives to the German parliament.
Accordingly, in their letter to the President of the Parliamentary
Council approving the Basic Law, the western military commanders
interpreted "the effect of [articles 23 and 144] as constituting ac-
ceptance of our previous request that while Berlin may not be ac-
corded voting membership in the Bundestag or Bundesrat nor be
governed by the Federation she may, nevertheless, designate a small
number of representatives to attend the meetings of those legisla-
tive bodies. ' 42 7 This statement of the military commanders was
generally taken as prohibiting the Federal Republic from exercising
"governing" power in West Berlin. Instead, political authority in
Berlin was to be exercised by its own political organs, pursuant to its
own constitution.
Berlin's first postwar constitution was adopted as a provisional
document on August 13, 1946, and approved by the Allied Kom-
mandatura, then composed of representatives of all four Allied pow-
ers. 4 2 1 In 1950, after the effective division of Berlin into two
separate parts, West Berlin adopted a new constitution. Before its
425. See generally Stem, Grundfragen der Rechtslage Berlins, in G. BRUNNER, T. SCHWEIS-
FURTH, A. USCHAKOW & K. WESTEN (ed.), SOWJETSYSTEM UND OSTRECHT (FESTSCHRIFT
FOR BORIS MEISSNER) 793-803 (1985) [hereinafter FESTSCHRIFT FOR BORIS MEISSNER].
426. See generally 2 GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR, supra note 7, art. 23, Nos. 7-8.
427. Letter from the Three Western Military Governors to the President of the Parlia-
mentary Council, May 12, 1949, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 130 (em-
phasis added).
428. See Provisional Constitution For Greater-Berlin, Aug. 13, 1946, reprinted in 1
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adoption, the western military commanders made clear that any new
constitution would "require the express approval of the Allied Kom-
mandatura before becoming effective." '429 Moreover, in accepting
this constitution, the Allied Kommandatura (now composed of the
three western commanders only)430 set aside provisions proclaiming
that Berlin was a state of the Federal Republic of Germany and that
the Basic Law and statutes of the Federal Republic were binding on
Berlin. The Allied military commanders further required that an-
other section be interpreted so that, during the transitional period,
"Berlin [would] possess no characteristics of a twelfth state" of the
Federal Republic. The West German Basic Law could prevail over
contrary provisions of the Berlin Constitution, but a federal law
would only apply if it was separately enacted by the legislature of
Berlin.43 ' Thus, the Allied view that Berlin remained occupied ter-
ritory, and not an integral part of the Federal Republic, was
maintained.
In subsequent years, the West Berlin government and the Fed-
eral Republic sought close relations-perhaps even closer than con-
templated by the Allies. The Berlin legislature adopted federal laws
as the law of Berlin and, after some hesitation, the Constitutional
Court proclaimed that Berlin was indeed a state of the Federal Re-
public (although subject to certain Allied reserved rights) and began
to exercise judicial review of certain classes of cases arising in Ber-
lin.43 2 In reaction to this creeping rapprochement of the Federal
Republic and Berlin, the Allied commanders in 1967 delivered a
sharp note to Berlin officials, rejecting the Constitutional Court's
DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 138, and accompanying Note of Allied Commanders, id.
at 149.
The Allied Kommandatura was the highest legislative and executive organ of occu-
pied Berlin, originally composed of one representative of each of the four Allied com-
manders-in-chief. In June 1948 at a time of increasing tensions, the Soviet
representative withdrew from the Allied Kommandatura, which continued to function
with the three remaining representatives, exercising authority over the western part of
Berlin only. See generally I. HENDRY & M. WOOD, THE LEGAL STATUS OF BERLIN 57-59
(1987). Until the point of unification, the law of the Allied Kommandatura (and other
Allied law) superseded German law in Berlin. Id. at 83-90.
429. Declaration of the Allied Kommandatura of the City of Berlin Concerning the
Principles of the Relationship of the City of Greater-Berlin to the Allied Kommandatura,
May 14, 1949, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 151, 154.
430. See supra note 428.
431. Note of the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin Concerning the Approval of the
Constitution of Berlin, Aug. 29, 1950, reprinted in I DOKUMENTE, supra note 110, at 172.
The 1950 Constitution of Berlin is reprinted in id. at 158-71.
432. See, e.g., 7 BVerfGE 1 (1957) (Berlin is a state of the Federal Republic); 19
BVerfGE 377 (1966) (Constitutional Court may decide certain cases arising in Berlin).
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decision in a case that had arisen in Berlin and reiterating their view
that "Berlin is not to be regarded as a Land of the Federal Republic
and is not to be governed by the Federation."4 ' The Allied com-
manders stated their view that the Constitutional Court "does not
have jurisdiction in relation to Berlin" and therefore could not re-
view the constitutionality of actions of Berlin's officials or laws of
Berlin-even those laws that incorporated federal legislation.4 s4
In the General Treaty, in which the western Allies released a
substantial degree of sovereignty to the Federal Republic, they re-
tained rights over Berlin.4" 5 Although a Four-Power Treaty with re-
spect to Berlin in 1971, adopted in the general context of
Chancellor Brandt's new eastern policy, had some effect in mitigat-
ing tensions,43 6 Berlin remained a special focus of concern, and the
western Allies were assiduous in exercising their reserved rights in
the city. In the Treaty of 1971 the western powers declared that ties
between West Berlin and the Federal Republic would be "main-
tained and developed," but they also acknowledged that West Ber-
lin would "continue not to be a constituent part of the Federal
Republic of Germany and not to be governed by it."' 43 7 Certainly, it
would be necessary for the Allies to release their rights with respect
to Berlin, as well as those relating to Germany as a whole, if Berlin
was to be included within the political structure of the country upon
unification.
B. The Oder-Neie Line
The second important aspect of the status of Germany in inter-
national law-an issue intimately related to the question of Allied
reserved rights-was the bitterly debated subject of the western bor-
der of Poland, the so-called Oder-Nei~e line. This issue arises from
the history of the last days of World War II, although it has an even
more remote background.
During the Weimar period, the map of central Europe looked
significantly different than it does today. In addition to the territory
433. Note of the Allied Kommandatura of Berlin, May 24, 1967, Concerning the Deci-
sion of the Constitutional Court of Jan. 20, 1966, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note
110, at 200-01. The case that evoked this note can be found at 19 BVerfGE 377 (1966).
434. Note of the Allied Kommandatura, supra note 433.
435. See supra text accompanying notes 415-416.
436. See Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, Sept. 3, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 283, T.I.A.S.
No. 7551, 880 U.N.T.S. 115; the text of the Treaty and accompanying documents are
reprinted in I. HENDRY & M. WOOD, supra note 428, at 335-50.
437. Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, supra note 436, part II(B). See generally
Schiedermair, Die Bindungen West-Berlins an die Bundesrepublik, 1982 NJW 2841.
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that later became the Federal Republic and the GDR, Germany in-
cluded two additional areas farther to the east. The first of these
was territory adjacent to the present eastern border of Germany,
including the province of Silesia and parts of Pomerania and Bran-
denburg-a region approximately the same size as the GDR. Even
farther to the east-and separated from the rest of Germany by the
"Polish corridor" created by the Treaty of Versailles-was a large
island of German territory bordering on Poland and Lithuania, con-
taining parts of East Prussia and the important city of K6nigsberg.
At the end of World War II the Russian Army occupied these
eastern territories. The Soviet Union annexed the northern part of
East Prussia including K6nigsberg (now Kaliningrad), as well as the
eastern portion of Poland-representing almost one-half of the area
of that country as it had existed before World War II. The Soviet
annexation of eastern Poland (east of the so-called "Curzon line")
was ratified by the Allies at the Yalta Conference with the under-
standing that Poland would be compensated for this loss by "sub-
stantial accessions of territory in the north and west."'438 At the
Potsdam Conference, therefore, the previously German territory
east of a line formed by the Oder and the Western Neile Rivers-
comprising Silesia and parts of Pomerania, Brandenburg and East
Prussia-was placed under Polish administration pending a final set-
tlement at a future peace conference.43 9 Although this declaration
was provisional, the understanding at Yalta that Poland would re-
ceive territory in compensation for regions annexed by the Soviet
Union suggests that the transfer of at least a significant part of this
territory was intended to be final. The Potsdam Conference also
agreed in principle to the transfer of K6nigsberg and part of East
Prussia to the Soviet Union, and the American President and British
Prime Minister pledged to support this settlement at a future peace
conference.440
Because of the increasing tensions of the Cold War, which fol-
lowed almost immediately after the conclusion of hostilities in Eu-
438. Yalta Report, supra note 391, at 1010. See supra note 402. Various proposals for
the Soviet acquisition of eastern Polish territory, and for compensation to be accorded
to Poland from German lands, were debated throughout the war. For the complexities
of these arguments as well as an analysis of the positions taken at Yalta and Potsdam, see
J. SOWDEN, supra note 413, at 228-41; see alsoJ. LALOY, YALTA: YESTERDAY, TODAY, To-
MORROW (1988); 2 N. DAVIES, GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 488, 504
(1982).
439. Potsdam Report, supra note 395, at 1234; see also supra text accompanying note
402.
440. Potsdam Report, supra note 395, at 1232-33.
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rope, the peace conference contemplated at Potsdam was never
held. Thus it remained open to German governments to maintain
that some or all of the territory placed under Polish "administra-
tion" at Potsdam was still German territory and should be returned
to Germany at a final peace conference or otherwise.44 ' (The return
of K6nigsberg and the northern part of East Prussia was less fre-
quently mentioned.) This position received significant political sup-
port from large groups of "expellees"-German speaking persons
who were expelled or who fled from the former German territories
east of the Oder-NeiBe line when these territories were transferred
at the end of World War II. Nonetheless, by the 1980s it seemed
clear to most-including most German politicians-that this was
one result of World War II that was not to be undone and, as dis-
cussed below, treaties entered into as part of Chancellor Brandt's
Ostpolitik in 1970 seemed to concede the permanence of the Polish
and Russian borders.
Yet in a series of bizarre episodes in the course of unification
discussions, Chancellor Kohl refused to relinquish unconditionally
all claims to the former German territory east of the Oder-NeiBe
line.442 Many believed that Kohl was principally seeking to prevent
the ranks of the expellees from leaving the CDU en masse for some
alternative further to the right.44 Yet Kohl's argument, oddly, also
had a constitutional background. To understand this background
and to understand the role that these territories played in the pro-
cess of unification, it is necessary to return to article 23 of the Basic
Law, the provision under which the GDR acceded to the Federal
Republic.
Article 23-it will be recalled-declared that at the outset the
Basic Law was to cover the specified original Liinder of the Federal
Republic. The provision then went on to state that in "other parts
of Germany, [the Basic Law] will be put into effect after their acces-
sion." '444 The GDR constituted "another part" of Germany under
this provision-as did the Saarland, which acceded to the Federal
441. Under Soviet and Polish law, in contrast, the territory in question was apparently
treated-from a very early point- as fully incorporated territory of the Soviet Union
and Poland, and not merely as territory remaining under provisional administration. See
40 BVerfGE 141, 158-59 (1975).
442. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1990, at A8, col. 1; see also N.Y. Times, Mar. 3,
1990, at A6, col. 3 (Kohl argues that German ratification of Polish border should be
accompanied by Poland's waiver of any rights to war reparations).
443. See, e.g., Note, supra note 4, at 275-76.
444. See supra text accompanying note 114.
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Republic in 1957.445 An important question, however, was whether
the GDR and the Saarland constituted all of the other parts of Ger-
many mentioned in article 23, or whether there were yet other re-
gions that at least theoretically might accede under article 23.
Specifically, did the former German territories lying east of the
Oder-NeiBe line constitute "other parts" of Germany that could ac-
cede to the Federal Republic under article 23?
Apparently the prevailing response of the German constitution-
alists to this question was yes.446 Neither article 23 nor any other
provision of the Basic Law defines the term "Germany" for the pur-
poses of the Basic Law; it was not entirely clear, therefore, what was
to be included within the other parts of Germany. Certainly the
concept of "Germany" had certain clear limitations; it did not in-
clude, for example, parts of the German Empire ceded to Poland by
the Treaty of Versailles in 1919 in a manner clearly recognized by
international law. On the other hand, article 116(1) of the Basic
Law, in defining the concept "German person," refers to the "terri-
tory of the German Empire [Reich] as of December 31, 1937," and a
number of authors have taken the position that "Germany" for the
purposes of article 23 also included this territory. 447 The borders of
December 31, 1937 encompassed all the territory of Germany rec-
ognized in the Versailles Treaty-before the occupation of Austria
and Czech territory in 1938 and other aggressive territorial expan-
sions of the Nazi regime. Under this view, therefore, the "other
parts of Germany" referred to in article 23 included the territory
east of the Oder-NeiBe line.
On the other hand, by the 1970s both German governments
had arguably recognized the Oder-NeiBe line as the western border
of Poland. In the Warsaw Declaration of June 1950-followed by
the more formal G6rlitz Treaty a month later-the provisional gov-
ernment of the GDR recognized the Oder-Neie line, as described
in the Potsdam agreement, as the permanent border between Po-
land and Germany.448 In a bitter response, a majority of the West
German Bundestag (excluding representatives of the Communist
Party) rejected the Warsaw Declaration, arguing that the territory in
445. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
446. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 419, at 1072.
447. See, e.g., Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 120, at 427-29.
448. See Warsaw Declaration, June 6, 1950, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra note 110,
at 496; Agreement Concerning the Demarcation of the Established and Existing Polish-
German State Frontier, July 6, 1950, 319 U.N.T.S. 93, reprinted in 1 DOKUMENTE, supra
note 110, at 497-99.
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question remained a part of Germany and that, under the Potsdam
agreement, Poland only exercised "temporary administration" over
that territory. The Bundestag also declared that the "so-called pro-
visional government" of the GDR was in fact acting on behalf of the
Soviet Union in "shameful bondage" to a foreign power.4 ' The
western Allies vigorously rejected the G6rlitz agreement as well.450
The position of the Federal Republic in 1950 reflected the ten-
sions of the Cold War, but that position was relaxed in the late
1960s. This process culminated in the accommodations of the new
"eastern policy" (Ostpolitik) adopted by the SPD government of
Willy Brandt. In two cornerstones of this policy, the Moscow and
Warsaw Treaties of 1970, the government of the Federal Republic
appeared to recognize the Oder-NeiBe line. According to the Mos-
cow Treaty-entered into between the Federal Republic and the So-
viet Union-the parties "consider as inviolable, today and in the
future, the borders of all states in Europe as they exist on the day of
the signing of this Treaty, including the Oder-NeiBe line which
forms the western border of the People's Republic of Poland
.... ,451 Moreover, under the Warsaw Treaty between the Federal
Republic and Poland, the parties declared that the Oder-Neige line
formed the western border of Poland, confirmed the inviolability of
existing borders, pledged unrestricted observance of each other's
territorial integrity, and declared that they had no present or future
claims to each other's territory.4 52 Unqualified as this language may
have seemed, however, it was not clear that the Federal Republic
possessed the authority to settle this question definitively. Indeed,
both the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties made clear that they did not
affect earlier international agreements,45 and both treaties were ac-
companied by a note of the Federal Republic explicitly pointing out
that no agreement of the Federal Republic could affect the reserved
rights of the four occupation powers. Since the question of the
449. See Declaration of Bundestag, June 13, 1950, reprinted in I DOKUMENTE, supra note
110, at 496-97.
450. J. SOWDEN, supra note 413, at 244-45.
451. See Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR, Aug. 12,
1970, art. 3; 1972 BGBI II 354, 355 [hereinafter Moscow Treaty].
452. Treaty Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Peoples Republic of
Poland Concerning the Basis of the Normalization of their Mutual Relations, Dec. 7,
1970, 1972 BGBI II 362 [hereinafter Warsaw Treaty].
453. According to article 4 of the Moscow Treaty, the treaty "does not affect bilateral
and multilateral treaties and agreements previously entered into by [the parties]." Mos-
cow Treaty, supra note 451, art. 4. Article 4 of the Warsaw Treaty states that the treaty
"does not affect bilateral or multilateral international agreements entered into by the
parties or relating to them." See Warsaw Treaty, supra note 452, art. 4.
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Oder-NeiBe line remained open in the Potsdam and other four-
power agreements pending a final peace settlement, these provi-
sions (and accompanying notes) suggest that the four occupation
powers retained authority to make adjustments of the western Po-
lish border-regardless of anything contained in agreements be-
tween the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union and Poland.45 4
Moreover, even without fully relying on the reserved rights of
the Allies, some German authors argued that the Oder-NeiBe terri-
tory could not be effectively relinquished before unification of the
Federal Republic and the GDR-even by vote of both German par-
liaments. Apparently, this was the position originally adopted by
Chancellor Kohl. According to this argument, the Federal Republic
and the GDR represented only parts of the "entire" German state
and therefore could not act on its behalf in relinquishing its terri-
tory. Only the parliament of a united Germany could effectively un-
dertake this task.455 This position may seem inconsistent with the
claims of the Federal Republic that it represented the entire German
state in other instances.456
In any case, as part of the general settlement upon unification-
which would also include relinquishment of the Allies' reserved
rights-it was to be expected that these vestigial German claims to
long-lost territory would also be definitively relinquished. Certainly
the Soviet government would insist upon this action. Accordingly,
in votes that accompanied the adoption of the first State Treaty,
both the West German Bundestag and the East German Volks-
kammer enacted resolutions confirming the Oder-NeiBe line as the
western border of Poland.457
Nonetheless, the government of Poland insisted on a separate
treaty confirming the Oder-NeiBe line, and the World War II Allies
supported Poland's position. Accordingly, the Polish government
was invited to present its views at the Two Plus Four discussions. At
454. This position seems to have been taken by the Brandt government, seeJ. SOWDEN,
supra note 413, at 337-38, and may be implied by the Constitutional Court's discussion
of this aspect of the treaties. See 40 BVerfGE 141, 171-75 (1975). See also Hailbronner,
supra note 419, at 449-51 (noting that the federal government made this point clearly in
negotiations over its East Bloc treaties, but that the GDR did not make similar reserva-
tions with respect to its treaties with Poland). That the problems of these treaties can
still evoke passionate responses is demonstrated by recent newspaper correspondence.
FAZ, Sept. 3, 1990, at 8, col. 1 (discussion of political background of treaties).
455. See Klein, supra note 419, at 1072. In this argument, the Allies' reserved rights
with respect to Germany as a whole played a secondary role.
456. See Klein, Wiedervereinigungsklauseln in Vertreigen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in
FESTSCHRIFT FUR BORIS MEISSNER, supra note 425, at 775, 783-91.
457. See supra Part VI.
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first, Poland insisted that such a treaty be signed before German
unification, but at the Two Plus Four conference in Paris on July 17
the Polish government indicated that it would accept a treaty ap-
proved by the all-German parliament after 'unification.458 In light of
the theory discussed above, this was the safer course. In any case,
when an adequate treaty is ultimately ratified,45 9 this persisting
problem of World War II will finally disappear as a legal issue-
although it will leave a legacy of bitterness among some groups in
Germany. Although the conservatives generally prevailed in the
main issues surrounding unification, this is one area in which they
were required to defer to unanimous international opposition. Kohl
was correct in referring to the relinquishment of the eastern territo-
ries as a price that had to be paid for unification.
C. NA TO
The international status of Germany is affected not only by
events occurring before the establishment of the two German states,
but also by international treaties entered into by those states. As
part of its task of establishing the Federal Republic as an "equal
member of a united Europe,""46 the Basic Law contemplates that
the Federal Republic may become not only part of a European polit-
ical organization like the European Economic Community, but may
also join an organization providing for a collective military defense.
This authority could possibly be derived from article 24(2) which
provides that:
the Federal Government can be included in a system of
mutual collective security, for the purpose of preserving
peace; it will thus agree to the limitation of its sovereign
rights for the purpose of establishing and assuring a peace-
ful and lasting order in Europe and among the peoples of
the world.46 '
According to the Constitutional Court, however, authority to join a
western military alliance actually flows from article 24(l)-also em-
ployed to authorize participation in the EEC-which simply allows
the Federal Republic, acting through a statute, "to transfer sover-
eign rights to international institutions. '462
It was not until 1955 that the Federal Republic exercised this
458. FR, July 18, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
459. See infra note 490 and accompanying text.
460. GG Preamble.
461. GG art. 24, § 2.
462. GG art. 24, § 1; see 68 BVerfGE 1 (1984) (Pershing Rockets Case).
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authority by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) after a bruising internal dispute over rearmament. 463 The
Soviet Union responded by forming the Warsaw Pact in May 1955,
and the GDR became a member. 4 1 By 1955, therefore, the two
German states had become parts of a pact system that reflected the
division of Europe into two hostile military blocs, perhaps the most
visible manifestation of the Cold War. Over the years, the armies of
both German states became important parts of the pact system and
were essential aspects of military planning on both sides.
By the time that German unification became a real possibility in
1990, the Warsaw Pact had lost much of its effectiveness. With the
revolutionary changes in the governments of Poland, Hungary, and
Czechoslovakia, it was most unlikely that forces of those countries
would take part in planning significant military exercises with the
Soviet Union in the future.465 Therefore, any remaining obligations
of the GDR to the Warsaw Pact were not a serious impediment to
unification. Although the GDR's membership in the Warsaw Pact
would probably have ended automatically upon its accession to the
Federal Republic, 466 the GDR formally withdrew from the pact a few
days before unification.4 67
The real problems for unification raised by the vestiges of the
pact system surrounded the issue of a united Germany's future
membership in NATO. It was clear from the outset that the political
leadership of the Federal Republic would insist that a united Ger-
many remain a member of NATO. Other western countries-and
indeed some former East Bloc countries like Poland-also strongly
advocated that a united Germany remain in NATO. In part at least,
these views reflected anxiety over the possible military role that a
"neutral"-but not disarmed-Germany might play without the re-
straint of being embedded in the western security system.
463. The document admitting the Federal Republic to NATO was issued as part of
the "Paris Treaties" of 1954, which went into effect in 1955; perhaps the most important
of these accords was the General Treaty discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 413-419. For the political struggles surrounding rearmament, see, e.g., T.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 408, at 145-55.
464. See Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance, Signed at War-
saw, May 14, 1955, 219 U.N.T.S. 3. The Preamble of the Warsaw Pact refers specifically
to the rearming of West Germany and its inclusion in NATO.
465. See, e.g., FAZ, Sept. 13, 1990, at 4, col. 1 (Czechoslovak army to cease participa-
tion in large-scale military exercises of Warsaw Pact). Indeed, the Warsaw Pact has sub-
sequently dissolved its military alliance completely. N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1991, at A9, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1991, at AI, col. 1.
466. See Hailbronner, supra note 419, at 452.
467. N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1990, at A10, col. 3.
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With respect to the NATO Treaty itself, German unification
presented few serious problems. Since the GDR was to join the
Federal Republic under article 23 of the Basic Law, no additional
state would be joining the NATO alliance; rather, an expanded Fed-
eral Republic would continue on as a member of the alliance under
the principle of "moving treaty boundaries. 46 8 Instead, it was vig-
orous Soviet opposition to NATO membership for united Germany
that raised real difficulties. This opposition seemed to be based less
on a calculation of international advantages and disadvantages than
on domestic Soviet political considerations. If a united Germany
were to join NATO-with a concomitant withdrawal of Soviet forces
from the territory of the former GDR-it might seem that the Soviet
participation in the victory in World War II had gone for naught: no
more Soviet troops would be occupying Germany, and the territory
of the Soviet Union's former ally, the GDR, would henceforth be
included in an alliance that the Soviet Union had always seen as di-
rected against itself.469 For a substantial period, therefore, the So-
viet government refused to agree to NATO membership for a
united Germany, threatening in effect to invoke its reserved rights
over Germany as a whole in order to prevent unification if NATO
membership for the united Germany was to remain a possibility.
Subsequently-apparently as part of a gradual process of retreat
from its original view-the Soviet Union suggested that a united
Germany could remain a member of both alliances, a proposal that
met with unanimous rejection in the West. 47 0
From a practical point of view the problem was particularly seri-
ous because the Soviet Union had 380,000 troops stationed in the
GDR4 71 -the largest contingent of Soviet troops outside of the So-
viet Union. The continued presence of these troops had led to sub-
stantial tensions with the population of the GDR. Immediate
withdrawal, however, was a practical impossibility: the Soviet Union
468. See Hailbronner, supra note 419, at 452. Perhaps such a significant change in the
borders might justify other states in leaving NATO, but no such action was contem-
plated. See id. For a different perspective on this issue, see Tomuschat, A United Germany
within the European Community, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 415, 422 (1990).
469. On the other hand, final acceptance of the Oder-NeiBe line would in effect put a
permanent seal on substantial Soviet annexations of Polish territory and part of East
Prussia at the end of the War. See generally supra Part X(B).
470. See generally Hailbronner, supra note 419, at 453 (double membership for united
Germany "would actually be the dissolution of both pact systems through an all-Euro-
pean security system").
471. See FAZ, Oct. 13, 1990, at 3, col. 3. Including family members of military person-
nel, a total of 600,000 Soviet citizens were stationed in the GDR. Id.
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could not afford the expenditures involved in moving the troops,
nor could it house them if they returned immediately.
The Soviet government's ultimate acquiescence in NATO mem-
bership for a united Germany must be viewed in the context of the
groundbreaking "London Declaration" issued by the NATO heads
of government on July 6, 1990.472 The Declaration suggested that
NATO had been transformed from an alliance that was basically in-
tended to confront the Warsaw Pact into a group that sought coop-
erative arrangements with the countries of eastern Europe. The
signatories reaffirmed the defensive nature of NATO and empha-
sized that its actions would remain consistent with the United Na-
tions Charter and with the Helsinki Final Act adopted by the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). The
Declaration also invited President Gorbachev to address the NATO
Council, requested the Soviet Union and the countries of eastern
Europe to "establish regular diplomatic liaisons with NATO," and
announced moves designed to reduce the threatening military pos-
ture of NATO.473 In a press conference immediately following the
London Declaration, President Bush acknowledged the Soviet
Union's fears with respect to NATO and expressed the hope that
the London Declaration would allay these fears, with the result that
the Soviet Union might accept the concept of a united Germany as a
member of NATO.474
The London Declaration apparently had this desired effect. On
July 16, 1990-little more than a week after the Declaration was is-
sued--Chancellor Kohl and President Gorbachev announced an
agreement through which the Soviet Union would allow a united
Germany to enter NATO.4 75 Although the agreement was basically
favorable to Germany, it also contained concessions to Soviet con-
472. London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, July 6, 1990, re-
printed in 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1041 Uuly 9, 1990).
473. The Declaration emphasized the reduction of forces, and announced a new mili-
tary strategy "moving away from 'forward defense' " and modifying the strategy of
"flexible response" to de-emphasize nuclear weapons, id. at 1044, including a proposal
for reciprocal removal of nuclear artillery shells from Europe, id. at 1043.
474. 26 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1048-49 (July 9, 1990) (President's news confer-
ence following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit in London, July 6, 1990).
475. This eight-point agreement was announced by Chancellor Kohl in a press con-
ference in the Soviet Union on July 16, 1990; see FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1; id. at 2,
col. 2; see also FR, July 18, 1990, at 2, col. 4. In his remarks following the meeting with
Kohl, President Gorbachev explicitly acknowledged the significant impact that the
London Declaration had on his government's view of NATO membership for united
Germany. According to Gorbachev, "what took place in London was indeed something
like the beginning of a new historical development." Id.
608 [VOL. 50:475
1991] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
cerns. First, although united Germany could choose the alliance to
which it would belong-and Chancellor Kohl made clear that that
choice would be NATO-Soviet troops would be allowed to remain
in eastern Germany during a period of gradual withdrawal that
would last from three to four years after unification.4 76 As long as
Soviet troops remained in the former GDR during the period of
withdrawal, the jurisdiction of NATO would not be extended to this
area and no NATO forces could be stationed there. Yet this condi-
tion was qualified in two respects. First, the provisions of articles 5
and 6 of the NATO Treaty-providing for collective defense of any
NATO member against attack-would extend to the territory of the
former GDR upon unification.477 Thus, in the event of an attack by
a non-NATO member upon this territory, NATO forces presumably
could intervene in eastern Germany even while Soviet troops re-
mained there. Second, units of the German army that have not be-
come part of NATO-so called "units of territorial defense"-
would be permitted to enter eastern Germany immediately after
unification and also could be stationed in Berlin.47 Although Chan-
cellor Kohl's communiqu6 expressly excluded the "NATO struc-
tures" from the former GDR only during the three to four years of
the Soviet troop withdrawal, Gorbachev at the same press confer-
ence seemed to suggest that this territory would remain free of
"other foreign troops," even after the Soviet withdrawal.479
As long as Soviet forces remained in eastern Germany, troops
of the three western Allies could remain in Berlin.4"' Upon the final
Soviet withdrawal, however, these occupation units presumably
must leave. (On the other hand, army units of the western Allies
doubtless will remain in Germany to the extent that they constitute
NATO troops stationed there.)
The Kohl-Gorbachev agreement contained two other points
clearly intended to quiet Soviet anxieties. In the current Vienna ne-
gotiations over reduction of conventional forces, the Federal Re-
public would declare itself ready to reduce its military strength to
370,000 troops within three to four years after the effective date of
476. FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1; id. at 2, col. 2. The German and Soviet govern-
ments were to enter into a treaty regulating the details of withdrawal and also providing
for German payments with respect to withdrawal. Indeed, much of the cost of with-
drawal will be borne by Germany. For these treaties, see infra note 500.
477. FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 2, col. 2. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, arts. 5-6,
63 Stat. 2241, 2244, T.I.A.S. No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246-48.
478. FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 2, col. 2.
479. FR, July 18, 1990, at 2, col. 4.
480. FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 2, col. 2.
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the first Vienna Treaty. Second, the German government would
promise not to manufacture, possess, or control atomic, biological,
or chemical weapons, and would promise to remain bound by the
nuclear nonproliferation treaty.48'
Given the present geopolitical realities-particularly the eco-
nomic and political weakness of the Soviet Union-this agreement
seems to be balanced and well conceived. It did not force the Rus-
sians into an economically damaging immediate troop withdrawal,
and to some extent at least, it allayed other Soviet concerns.
Yet the agreement raised a number of questions. Most obvi-
ously, for example, the agreement seemed to make dispositions of
western Allied troops in Germany-as well as German NATO
troops-without consultation with the western Allies. This in-
dependent process was presumably a harbinger of things to come,
as a "sovereign" Germany begins to make an increasing number of
fundamental decisions on its own, albeit within the framework of the
western alliance and the European Economic Community.
A subordinate but nonetheless important theme that accompa-
nied the negotiations over Germany's choice of a military alliance
was the increasing importance of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe. This conference of eastern and western
European states and the United States and Canada concluded its
1975 deliberations with the adoption of the so-called "Helsinki Fi-
nal Act."'482 In this document, the parties agreed to observe the ter-
ritorial integrity of the signatory nations; the principles of
independence, national self-determination, and nonintervention
under international law; the renunciation of force for the settlement
of disputes; and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms,
and the protection of minorities. Moreover, the parties pledged fur-
ther cooperation on these and other issues. Some politicians and
commentators have viewed the Conference as representing the pos-
sible beginning of an all-European security system, which would
eventually replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Such a result would
of course be consistent with article 24(2) of the Basic Law, which
allows the Federal Republic to join "a system of mutual collective
security" for the purpose of ensuring "a peaceful and lasting order
in Europe and among the peoples of the world." Indeed member-
ship in such an organization seems more fully consistent with the
481. Id.
482. Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975,
14 I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act].
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basic aspirations of article 24 than does the Federal Republic's
membership in an alliance such as NATO which covers only a part
of Europe. Although frequently discussed, however, any such de-
velopments do not seem close at hand; rather they remain goals for
the future.48 3
D. The Two Plus Four Treaty and the Legal Status of Germany
The remaining questions relating to the status of Germany in
international law were largely resolved in the Treaty on the Final
Settlement with Respect to Germany,4  signed by the four World
War II Allies and the two German states on September 12, 1990, at
the conclusion of the "Two Plus Four" negotiations. 485 The princi-
pal parties in these negotiations were the Federal Republic on one
side and the Soviet Union on the other-although the United States,
through its strong support of unification, also played an important
role.486 The government of the GDR, in this as in other negotia-
tions, was largely guided by the Federal Republic.
This important agreement-which can be viewed as the legal
conclusion of World War II in Europe-effectively settled the issues
of German sovereignty, the Oder-Neile line, and the membership
of a united Germany in NATO. In the agreement, the Federal Re-
public obtained Allied-principally Soviet-agreement to its posi-
483. On November 21, 1990, representatives of the nations of eastern and western
Europe, along with the United States and Canada, signed the "Charter of Paris for a
New Europe," providing for democracy and human rights throughout Europe. 30
I.L.M. 190 (1991). This agreement, which was adopted under the auspices of the Con-
ference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, was a direct outgrowth of the process
begun in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Although the agreement established a secreta-
riat of the organization in Prague, and offices in Vienna and Warsaw, it did not establish
enforcement mechanisms for its provisions and fell far short of the creation of a new
security system to replace NATO and the Warsaw Pact, as sought by the Soviet Union.
See N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1990, at A1, col. 3; id. at A17, col. 1. At the same Paris Confer-
ence, the NATO and Warsaw Pact leaders signed a Treaty on Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe, providing for substantial reductions of tanks, combat aircraft, and
other military equipment stationed throughout Europe. The leaders also signed a decla-
ration rejecting previous relations of hostility and pledging to "establish new relations
of partnership and mutual friendship." N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
484. Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany, Sept. 12, 1990, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 20, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1186 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter Two Plus Four Treaty].
485. These negotiations commenced with a declaration by the foreign ministers in
Ottawa on February 13, 1990, and continued with meetings in May (Bonn), June (Ber-
lin), and July (Paris), before the concluding meeting in Moscow on September 12. The
foreign minister of Poland participated in the meeting in Paris in July. See id. at
Preamble.
486. Kaiser, supra note 13, at 190.
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tion on the remaining issues of German legal status. The Allies
would completely relinquish their remaining reserved rights over
Berlin and Germany as a whole, thus basically according Germany
the same sovereignty as any other western European nation; more-
over, this united Germany would be permitted to be a member of
NATO and, as a result, Soviet forces would completely withdraw
from the former territory of the GDR over a period of years. In
return for these crucial concessions, the Soviet Union received effec-
tive confirmation of the Oder-NeiBe line, as well as agreement on a
number of other important points. Indeed, the Two Plus Four
Treaty (as well as its predecessor, the Kohl-Gorbachev declaration)
can be viewed as an attempt to allay Soviet fears through a carefully
devised series of concessions-some of them actually protecting the
security of the Soviet Union, and others serving as face-saving de-
vices for the Soviet government. The structure of the agreement,
which emphasizes provisions designed for the security of Poland
and the Soviet Union, seemed clearly designed to have this rhetori-
cal force.
In the preamble of the Treaty, the signatories note that Europe
has lived in peace since 1945 and that recent changes in Europe
have allowed the division of the continent to be overcome. The pre-
amble also invokes the principles of the United Nations and the Hel-
sinki Final Act. Perhaps referring to the NATO London Declaration
ofJuly 1990, the signatories also declare that they are ready to cease
viewing each other as opponents and to work toward a relationship
of trust and cooperation. In light of these factors-and because of
German unification on a democratic and' peaceful basis-"the rights
and responsibilities of the Four Powers relating to Berlin and to
Germany as a whole lose their function. '
After this general introduction, the Treaty itself begins with a
resolution of those issues that were most important to the security
of the Soviet Union-particularly the issue of the Oder-NeiBe line.
Article I declares that united Germany will consist of the territories
of the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, and Ber-
lin, that these borders are final and that confirmation of the perma-
nence of these borders is essential for peace in Europe.488
Moreover, "united Germany has no territorial claims whatsoever
against other states and shall not assert any in the future," '489 and
united Germany and Poland will confirm their present border in a
487. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, at Preamble.
488. Id. art. 1, § 1.
489. Id. art. 1, § 3.
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treaty binding under international law.4 0
To make this point even more clearly, the agreement goes on to
require that the Federal Republic and the GDR ensure that the con-
stitution of a united Germany will not contain any provision con-
trary to these principles.49" ' Specifically, this section requires
amendment or deletion of the Preamble of the Basic Law (foresee-
ing future unification), article 23 (allowing "accession" of "other
parts of Germany") and article 146 (also foreseeing future steps for
unification). At the time this agreement was signed, the Unification
Treaty had already required deletion of article 23 and amendment
of the Preamble and article 146 in an appropriate manner.492 The
signing of the Two Plus Four Treaty, however, required united Ger-
many to retain the principle of these changes permanently. Any fu-
ture amendment seeking to revert to the previous provisions of the
Basic Law would be a violation of a treaty obligation binding in in-
ternational law. 493
Thus, in these interesting provisions, the two German states
agreed that when they are united, their joint constitution will con-
form to certain principles. Yet this is not the only section of the
Treaty in which the Allies sought to ensure that the constitution of a
united Germany would contain specified provisions. In article 2, the
German states declared that "only peace will emanate from German
490. Id. art. 1, § 2. On November 14, 1990, the foreign ministers of Germany and
Poland signed the border treaty called for by the Two Plus Four agreement. Adopting
the border agreed upon by the GDR and, Poland in the G6rlitz Treaty, see supra text
accompanying notes 448-450, and also invoking Brandt's Warsaw Treaty of 1970, the
parties declared the inviolability of the Oder-Neige line, now and in the future, and
pledged that neither would raise any territorial claim against the other. See FAZ, Nov.
15, 1990, at 2, col. 4. The ratification of the treaty by the German and Polish parlia-
ments was to await the signing of a friendship treaty between the two states. See FAZ,
Nov. 16, 1990, at 2, col. 4; FAZ, Nov. 15, 1990, at 2, col. 2. The friendship treaty was
signed on June 17, 1991, and the two treaties will be submitted jointly for ratification.
FAZ, June 18, 1991, at 1, col. 2.
491. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 1, § 4.
492. Unification Treaty, supra note 203, art. 4, §§ 1, 2, 6. See supra Part VIII(A).
493. A question may arise concerning whether a treaty signed by the two separate
German states can bind the united Germany. Because unification was accomplished
through accession of the GDR to the Federal Republic under article 23 of the Basic Law,
unification occurred when the GDR became part of the Federal Republic. Therefore,
the Federal Republic clearly continues on as a legal subject, and its obligations before
unification should (in general) also continue. Some German constitutionalists have ar-
gued, however, that only a united Germany may make binding agreements with respect
to questions of territory. See supra text accompanying notes 455-456. Perhaps to meet
this argument, the Two Plus Four Treaty requires that its provisions be ratified by the
all-German parliament after accession of the GDR. See Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note
484, art. 8, § 1. This step was accomplished in October 1990.
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soil," and noted that "[a]ccording to the constitution of the united
Germany, acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb
the peaceful relations between nations, especially to prepare for ag-
gressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence.
494
This is almost a word-for-word quotation of article 26(1) of the Ba-
sic Law, and article 2 of the Treaty accordingly appears intended to
ensure that this provision will remain in any future German consti-
tution. Also according to article 2, the two German states declared
that a united Germany will not use weapons except in accordance
with its own constitution and the Charter of the United Nations.
Thus even though a united Germany has theoretically become "sov-
ereign," the signatory Allied powers have extraordinary rights
under international law to ensure that the provision referred to in
article 2 of the Treaty remain in the constitution of the new united
Germany and that this provision be observed.49 5
Article 3 of the Treaty contains additional important measures
of security for the Soviet Union. Article 3, section 1 declares in ef-
fect that a united Germany will continue to renounce the manufac-
ture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons496 and that the rights and duties of the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will also apply to united Ger-
many.497 Moreover, as part of the Vienna negotiations with respect
to conventional forces in Europe, the Federal Republic has already
declared its obligation to reduce its troops to a maximum of
370,000, although the German government expects the signatory
Allies to make a contribution to European security, by limiting the
number of their own armed forces.498
The limitation of German forces reflected a principle already
adopted in the Kohl-Gorbachev agreement ofJuly 1990, 499 and arti-
cles 4, 5 and 6 of the Two Plus Four Treaty essentially developed
certain other provisions of that agreement. Article 4 contemplates
that a united Germany will enter into a treaty with the Soviet Union
494. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 2.
495. Moreover, of course, Germany (and many other countries) have relinquished
substantial "sovereign" rights by joining NATO and the European Economic
Community.
496. Cf R. DOLZER, supra note 115, at 23 (Federal Republic had previously renounced
those weapons).
497. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 3, § 1. For the Non-Proliferation
Treaty, see Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T.
483, T.I.A.S. No. 6839, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
498. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 3, § 2.
499. See supra text accompanying note 481.
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relating to the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the
GDR and Berlin. Instead of the more general three to four year
period for withdrawal of Soviet troops mentioned in the Kohl-
Gorbachev discussions, the Two Plus Four Treaty contemplates that
Soviet troops be withdrawn by the end of 1994, but appears to
couple that date with the concomitant reduction of the size of the
German armed forces contemplated in article 3, section 2.500
Articles 5 and 6 regulate the complicated subject of the pres-
ence of western forces in former GDR territory-before and after
the ultimate departure of Soviet troops. These provisions add con-
siderable detail to the general statement in Kohl's communique of
July 16 that as long as Soviet troops remain in the territory of the
GDR the "NATO structures would not be extended to this part of
Germany." 50 ' Article 5, section 1 of the Treaty makes clear, as did
Kohl's communique, that until all Soviet troops are withdrawn (no
later than 1994), only German units of territorial defense-which
are not integrated into the NATO structure-can be stationed in
eastern Germany. Moreover, during this period, other nations may
not station forces in this territory and may not undertake other mili-
tary activities there.
As the Kohl communiqu6 indicated, French, British and Ameri-
can troops can remain stationed in Berlin as long as Soviet troops
remain in eastern Germany. The number of troops of the western
Allies cannot exceed their present amount, and no new categories of
weapons can be introduced into Berlin. by the foreign troops.
50 2
These provisions give a certain leeway to the German government:
there is no requirement that during this period French, British and
500. The German-Soviet Treaty with respect to the gradual withdrawal of Soviet
troops was signed on October 12, 1990. See FAZ, Oct. 13, 1990, at 3, col. 3. As part of
this process, the two countries also entered into an agreement through which the Fed-
eral Republic agreed to defray substantial costs incurred by the Soviet Union for troops
temporarily remaining in Germany, as well as for their return transportation and addi-
tional housing for the troops in the Soviet Union. These payments will total 12 billion
D-Marks, together with an additional 3 billion D-Mark five-year interest-free loan. See
Treaty Concerning Transitional Measures, Oct. 9, 1990, BGBI H 1655.
The process of rapprochement took a dramatic step on November 9, 1990 when
Germany and the Soviet Union signed a comprehensive "Treaty on Good-Neighborli-
ness, Partnership and Cooperation." See FAZ, Nov. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 2; FAZ, Sept. 14,
1990, at 7, col. 1 (text of Treaty as initialed); for an English translation of the text, see 30
I.L.M. 504 (1991). Among other things, this treaty contains guarantees that neither
state shall be the first to attack the other-although this agreement is presumably sub-
ject to the primacy of NATO obligations. See Blumenwitz, Der Vertrag vom 12.9.1990 tiber
die abschliefende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland, 1990 NJW 3041, 3047 & nn. 67-68.
501. FAZ, July 17, 1990, at 2, col. 2; see supra text accompanying note 477.
502. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 5, § 2.
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American troops must remain in Berlin; rather, they are permitted to
do so "upon German request," pursuant to agreement between the
united German government and the western Allies.5 °3
Article 5, section 3 seeks to spell out the possible military role
of eastern Germany after the withdrawal of Soviet troops-a subject
not specified in Kohl's communiqu6, although referred to in very
general terms by Gorbachev on July 16." According to article 5,
section 3, German troops, including German troops integrated in
NATO, can be stationed in former GDR territory after the with-
drawal of Soviet troops, but foreign troops may never be stationed
in that territory, nor may they be "deployed" there. Thus after the
departure of Soviet troops, only German NATO forces-but not
NATO forces of other nations-may be stationed or deployed in
eastern Germany.5 °5
Article 5, section 3 also reveals the great sensitivity of the Soviet
government with respect to the stationing of nuclear weapons in the
former territory of the GDR: foreign nuclear weapons and carriers
for nuclear weapons may not be stationed or deployed there.50 6
Moreover, German NATO troops stationed in that territory may not
possess carriers for nuclear weapons. (Of course, under article 3,
united Germany will not possess its own nuclear weapons; therefore
German nuclear weapons are not expressly excluded.) A significant
dispute arose on the question of weapons carriers because certain
conventional weapons systems can also be used as nuclear weapons
carriers, and NATO apparently believed that German NATO forces
should eventually be free to use those conventional systems in east-
503. Id. For agreements relating to the continued stationing of Allied forces in Berlin
during this interim period, see Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany,
S. EXEC. REP. No. 33, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 28-54 (1990).
504. See supra text accompanying note 479.
505. It is not clear, however, whether it might be possible for foreign NATO troops to
engage in relatively short maneuvers in that territory after the Soviet withdrawal: the
issue rests on the meaning of the word "deployed." This question was apparently de-
bated in the final Two Plus Four negotiations because the British government wished to
preserve the possibility of joint NATO maneuvers in former GDR territory. See
Blumenwitz, supra note 500, at 3046. The problem was ultimately resolved by a separate
addendum providing that, should questions arise, the word "deployed" will be inter-
preted by the united German government "in a reasonable and responsible way taking
into account the security interests" of the signatories of the agreement. See Two Plus
Four Treaty, supra note 484, Agreed Minute; see also N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1990, at Al,
col. 3.
506. But foreign forces might be permitted to bring nuclear weapons into eastern
Germany during any maneuver that is interpreted not to constitute a "deployment"
under article 5, § 3 of the Treaty and the related addendum. See supra note 505.
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ern Germany.50 7 This problem was resolved by a provision stating
that the German NATO forces may possess conventional weapons
systems that could be used for nonconventional (nuclear) purposes
in eastern Germany, so long as the systems are armed solely with
conventional weapons and only designated for such use.508
Yet by the very nature of the NATO structure, the provisions of
the Two Plus Four Treaty with respect to eastern Germany might
not necessarily prevail in all foreseeable instances. Cutting across
all of the limitations of the Two Plus Four agreement are the provi-
sions of articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty, which allow (and re-
quire) members of the alliance to come to the defense of NATO
territory invaded by other states. 50 9 Article 6 of the Two Plus Four
agreement permits united Germany to belong to "alliances, with all
the rights and responsibilities arising therefrom." It seems clear,
therefore, that the Two Plus Four Treaty itself recognizes that the
obligations of NATO-the alliance to which united Germany be-
longs-will take precedence over other sections of the Two Plus
Four Treaty. That result would apply, at least, to those NATO obli-
gations existing at the time of the signing of the Two Plus Four
Treaty. Presumably, therefore, if there was an attack on former
GDR territory, articles 5 and 6 of the NATO Treaty would allow
German and other NATO forces to come onto that territory to repel
the attack-before or after the departure of the Soviet troops sta-
tioned there-notwithstanding any contrary provisions in the Two
Plus Four agreement.5"0
Not all of the concessions to the Soviet Union (and perhaps to
the other Allies) were contained in the actual Two Plus Four Treaty.
GDR Prime Minister de Maizi~re and West German Foreign Minis-
ter Genscher supplied the Allies with a separate letter containing
additional points. 5 1 The letter first noted that the two German
states had made a representation in the Two Plus Four negotiations
to the effect that they had agreed (in the Joint Declaration and Unifi-
cation Treaty) that expropriations on the basis of occupation meas-
ures from 1945 to 1949 were not to be undone, and that the Federal
Republic would not enact any legal rules inconsistent with that prin-
ciple, but that the all-German parliament might provide for com-
507. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1990, at AI, col. 3.
508. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 5, § 3.
509. See North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, arts. 5-6, 63 Stat. 2241, 2244, T.I.A.S.
No. 1964, 34 U.N.T.S. 243, 246- 48.
510. See supra text accompanying note 477.
511. Letter from de Maizi~re and Genscher, supra note 363.
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pensation. It is difficult to assess the effect of this representation
incorporated in a letter rather than in the text of the treaty.512
Viewed at its strongest, however, this statement could bind a united
Germany to the observance of the Joint Declaration's position on
the 1945-49 expropriations, through an obligation enforceable by
the signatories of the Two Plus Four agreement (including the So-
viet Union) in international law.
It is not entirely clear why the Soviet government apparently
remained so determined to preserve the property relationships cre-
ated by the 1945-49 expropriations. Perhaps as a domestic political
matter the Soviet Union was anxious to show some permanent so-
cial change accomplished by its period of occupation in Germany
after the war. The Soviet Union may also have sought to avoid any
declaration that its acts during the occupation violated international
law or treaty obligations. Most likely, as indicated by the Modrow-
Gorbachev correspondence discussed above,5 13 the government of
the GDR feared serious political unrest in the event that the 1945-
49 land reform was undone, and the Soviet Union sought to support
this deeply held wish of its former ally.
In a second point in the letter, the signatories declared that war
memorials and graves on German soil-presumably those of the Al-
lies, principally the Soviet Union-are protected under German
law. 5 14 In an extremely interesting third point, the signatories de-
clared that "the free democratic basic order" would be protected by
the constitution of a united Germany and that, on this basis, it
would be possible to prohibit political parties "which, by reason of
their aims or the behavior of their adherents, seek to impair or abol-
ish the free democratic basic order as well as associations which are
directed against the constitutional order or the concept of interna-
tional understanding. ' 15 As noted above, this language tracks pro-
512. The legal effect of this letter may not be entirely clear because it is not actually
set forth in the Treaty. Yet it must have been intended by the parties to have some
binding effect. Cf. Blumenwitz, supra note 500, at 3048. For example, when President
Bush sent the Two Plus Four Treaty to the Senate, he specifically called attention to the
letter and noted that it formally conveyed "additional assurances." See 26 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. Doc. 1443, 1444 (Oct. 1, 1990).
513. See supra text accompanying notes 259-260.
514. Letter from de Maizi~re and Genscher, supra note 363, at 21. This has been a
longstanding concern of the Soviet government, reflected in a significant number of
treaties entered into by the Soviet Union over the years. A similar provision appears in
the Soviet-German partnership treaty. See supra note 500; Blumenwitz, supra note 500, at
3048.
515. Letter from de Maizi~re and Genscher, supra note 363, at 21 (as translated in S.
EXEC. REP., supra note 363).
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visions of article 21(2) and article 9(2) of the Basic Law, providing
for the prohibition of "unconstitutional" political parties and as-
sociations."6 These provisions have a long and controversial his-
tory but, in essence, they have been directed to a significant extent
against the left-particularly the Communist Party-and only to a
lesser extent against movements of the right. The Soviet Union's
apparent insistence on this provision is therefore deeply ironic. Yet,
in the present political circumstances, the Soviet Union may well
have believed that the successor of the SED, or any left-wing party
that may arise in united Germany, will be sufficiently imbued with
liberal ideals that it would not violate the "free democratic basic or-
der." In any case, this provision seems to be directed principally
toward the danger of new right-wing movements in a united Ger-
many and, indeed, the letter goes on to state specifically that these
provisions include "parties and associations with National Socialist
aims.'"517
In light of articles 1 through 6 of the Two Plus Four Treaty-
and perhaps also in light of the points in the letter of de Maizi~re
and Genscher-the four Allied powers declared that they "hereby
terminate their rights and responsibilities relating to Berlin and to
Germany as a whole," and all related four-power agreements, deci-
sions, practices, and institutions were dissolved.5  Consequently,
"the united Germany shall have ... full sovereignty over its internal
and external affairs." '' t9 Unification would therefore be accompa-
nied by the achievement of practical sovereignty by the unified
country.
At the insistence of the Soviet Union, the Two Plus Four agree-
ment ultimately took the form of a treaty, and it was therefore neces-
sary that the text be ratified by the legislatures of the participating
states. From the German side, ratification would come from a
united Germany-an action that could take place only after unifica-
tion. Moreover, ratification by the four Allied powers also required
legislative procedures that would last beyond the point of unifica-
tion. In order to confer practical sovereignty on a united Germany
at the point of unification, therefore, the four Allies declared that
516. See supra text accompanying notes 363-364.
517. Finally, the letter also incorporates the provision of the Unification Treaty that
sets forth the principles by which it will be determined whether treaties of the former
GDR will be preserved as treaties of the united Germany. Letter from de Maizi~re and
Genscher, supra note 363, at 21-22. See supra Part VIII(A).
518. Two Plus Four Treaty, supra note 484, art. 7, § 1.
519. Id. art. 7, § 2; but see supra note 495 and accompanying text.
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they would "suspend" all of their reserved rights from the date of
unification until the final ratification of the treaty, and the Allies
signed a document effecting the suspension in New York on Octo-
ber 1, 1990.520
XI. UNIFICATION AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The European Communities, which include most of the coun-
tries of western Europe, were created through the adoption of three
treaties-the European Coal and Steel Agreement (1951), the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Agreement (Euratom) (1957) and, by far the
most important, the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community (1957). Indeed, the European Economic Community
(EEC) has come to assume an extremely important role in the eco-
nomic and legal life of Europe. A significant portion of the internal
law of the member states-extending far beyond direct economic
regulation into areas such as environmental control-is determined
by treaty, legislation or judicial interpretation of the EEC.
The Federal Republic was a founding member of the European
Economic Community. Its membership is consistent with the Basic
Law and indeed perhaps even mandated by that document. Accord-
ing to the Preamble, the German people are "animated by the will
to serve world peace as an equal member of a united Eu-
rope, '52 and article 24(1) authorizes the Federal government to
transfer "sovereign rights to international institutions. 522  The
Federal Republic joined the European Community under that
authority.523
520. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1990, at A 1l, col. 1. The United States Senate approved
the Two Plus Four Treaty by a unanimous vote on October 10, 1990. FAZ, Oct. 26,
1990, at 1, col. 3. The Federal Republic completed its process of ratification on October
8. See Blumenwitz, supra note 500, at 3041 n.3.
On March 4, 1991, the Soviet Union became the last of the parties to ratify the Two
Plus Four Treaty. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1991, at A3, col. 4. Certain related Soviet-
German treaties, see supra note 500, were ratified or approved by the Soviet Parliament
on the same date. FAZ, Mar. 5, 1991, at 1, col. 1; id. at 2, col. 4. Along with the instru-
ments of ratification, the Soviet Parliament issued a statement declaring that the Parlia-
ment "proceeds from the proposition that human rights will be seriously observed in
unified Germany and that, in particular, discrimination against citizens of the former
GDR from political and similar motives will be barred." FAZ, Mar. 9, 1991, at 4, col. 4.
This interesting statement presumably seeks to protect former members of the SED
from exclusion from the public service and may also seek to prevent criminal trials of
former GDR officials. Cf. FAZ, Mar. 19, 1991, at 5, col. 6.
521. GG Preamble.
522. GG art. 24, § 1.
523. See, e.g., 2 GRUNDGESETZ-KoMMENTAR, supra note 7, art. 24, No. 24; Stern, supra
note 14, at 14-16.
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From the beginning of the Federal Republic's relationship with
the EEC, the parties recognized the special legal status of Germany
and particularly the constitutional goal of unification. In negotia-
tions over the EEC Treaty, for example, the leader of the West Ger-
man delegation made clear that in the event of German unification,
the EEC Treaty would be open to re-examination. 24 Although this
remark was not made part of the Treaty, it did not encounter contra-
diction and therefore may have been tacitly accepted by the other
delegations, with the result that it may have a measure of binding
legal effect. Some have argued, therefore, that the Federal Republic
(or perhaps any other member state) could require renegotiation of
the Treaty upon German unification.52 5 In any event, no member
state has sought to make use of this possibility. 26
Moreover, as noted above, the constitutional theory of the Basic
Law held that the German "Reich" continued in existence and
therefore the GDR could not constitutionally be treated as a sepa-
rate country. Accordingly, the Federal Republic always treated
trade with the GDR as domestic trade. Yet EEC rules would ordi-
narily have compelled the Federal Republic to create a customs
frontier that would have imposed the Common Customs Tariff and
other restrictions on trade with the GDR. To avoid that result, a
"protocol on internal German trade" was made an integral part of
the EEC Treaty in 1957.527 Under the protocol, the Federal Repub-
lic could continue to treat intra-German trade as domestic trade.
The ordinary EEC rules on trade with non-EEC countries would
thus not apply to goods traveling between the GDR and the Federal
Republic-although such rules would apply to goods traveling be-
tween the GDR and other EEC countries. In this way the GDR has
always received some benefits of quasi-membership in the EEC.
In the early months of 1990, as German unification became in-
creasingly probable, attention turned to prospective problems of in-
corporating the territory of the GDR into the structure of the EEC.
Some issues turned on the constitutional method of unification that
524. See, e.g., Grabitz & v. Bogdandy, Deutsche Einheit und europdische Integration, 1990
NJW 1073, 1076.
525. See Randelzhofer, Deutsche Einheit und europdische Integration, 49 VVDStRL 101,
112-13 (1990); cf. Sedemund, Deutsche Einheit und EG, 1990 EUROPAISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr
FOR WIRTSCHAF-rSRECHT [EuZW] 11, 12.
526. See Tomuschat, supra note 468, at 425.
527. Protokoll fiber den innerdeutschen Handel und die damit zusammenhangenden
Fragen, of Mar. 25, 1957, BGBI II 984. For commentary, see Beise, Deutsche Einheit und
Europdische Integration, in EUROPA-LEITFADEN: EIN WEGWEISER ZUM EUROPXISCHEN BIN-
NENMARKT 1992, at 205, 206-08 (T. Oppermann & E.-W. Moersch 2d ed. 1990).
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would be chosen. If German unification had proceeded through a
substantial interim period of cooperation in a form of confederation
or "treaty community"-as originally suggested by Chancellor Kohl
and by then-Prime Minister Modrow-the GDR might have peti-
tioned for associate status in the EEC under article 238 of the EEC
Treaty. The GDR might even have sought full membership under
article 237-a complex process requiring unanimous approval of
the European Council, a majority vote of the European Parliament,
and approval of a related agreement or treaty by each member state.
Because the GDR "acceded" to the Federal Republic under ar-
ticle 23, however, neither of these independent actions was neces-
sary. Upon accession, the GDR became part of the existing Federal
Republic and lost its independent legal status. Moreover, under the
doctrine of "moving treaty boundaries," the EEC Treaty applies to
new territory incorporated into the boundaries of a member state,
without any requirement that the Treaty be amended. After acces-
sion, therefore, the Federal Republic-now including the territory
of the former GDR-remains a party to the Treaty.528 Because the
Treaty will not be amended, however, the Federal Republic must
remain content with its present number of votes on the Council and
representatives in the European Parliament, and the present
number of judges on the European Court-even though its popula-
tion increased substantially upon unification. Although changes of
representation on these bodies may eventually take place, they will
require an amendment of the EEC Treaty or subsequent
agreements .529
Because the GDR became part of the Federal Republic upon
accession, it would seem to follow that EEC law would henceforth
apply in the former GDR to the same extent as it applies in the rest
528. See, e.g., Beise, supra note 527, at 213-14; Sedemund, supra note 525, at 11-12.
The European Council decided on April 28, 1990 that German unification could occur
without amendment of the EEC Treaty. Schmidt-Bleibtreu, supra note 141, at 141.
If German unification had occurred with the adoption of a new, all-German consti-
tution under article 146 of the Basic Law, the problems might have been more difficult.
Under those circumstances, the resulting entity may not have been viewed as the contin-
uing Federal Republic but rather as a new all-German state. But see supra text accompa-
nying note 108. In that case, perhaps, the doctrine of state "succession" could have
been applied for the purpose of finding that the new entity assumed the role of the
Federal Republic in the EEC. Otherwise, the new entity would presumably have had to
apply for membership under article 237 of the EEC Treaty. See, e.g., Randelzhofer, supra
note 525, at 115-17.
529. See Tomuschat, supra note 468, at 427 (European Parliament); Note, supra note 4,
at 307 n.299.
622 [VOL. 50:475
1991] CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF GERMAN UNIFICATION
of the Federal Republic.5"' Here as elsewhere, however, some of
the hardest problems were not constitutional or legal, but eco-
nomic. It was clear that the economy of the GDR was not strong
enough to accept immediate application of all aspects of EEC law.
Enterprises in the east could not withstand unrestricted competition
from other EEC countries and were not equipped to comply with all
applicable EEC environmental and product quality standards.
Rather, it was necessary to devise a series of special measures for an
interim period.53 '
In order to accomplish a smooth transition that would take
these serious problems into account, the process of German unifica-
tion was marked by close cooperation with the relevant Community
institutions.5 3 2 Accordingly, the State Treaty contained a number of
provisions specifically acknowledging the authoritative role of the
law of the European Communities.533 In this cooperative spirit, the
Economic Community allowed most goods from the GDR to have
free access (without tariff barriers) to the countries of the EEC, even
before unification. Thus "a de facto customs union.. . existed be-
tween the Community and the German Democratic Republic since 1
August 1990. '1531
These measures, however, did not resolve the necessity of ex-
cepting the former GDR from the rigor of certain rules of the Eco-
nomic Community. In order to deal with these problems adequately
in light of the accelerated pace of German unification, the Council
authorized the European Commission to recommend certain excep-
530. See generally Rengeling, Das vereinte Deutschland in der Europdischen Gemeinschaft:
Grundlagen zur Geltung des Gemeinschaftsrechts, 1990 DVBI 1307, 1309-11.
531. As noted above, article 10 of the Unification Treaty sets forth the basic structure
for the relationship between the European Communities and the unified Germany for an
interim period. See supra notes 228-229 and accompanying text. Article 10, § I of the
Unification Treaty extends the treaties of the European Communities to the territory of
the former GDR, but article 10, § 2 notes that other legal measures taken by the EC will
extend to that territory only insofar as EC law itself has not made exceptions to the
application of these measures.
532. Indeed, representatives of the EC were present at treaty negotiations between
the two German governments. Schauble, supra note 23, at 301.
533. See State Treaty, supra note 141, Preamble; art. 11, § 3; Joint Protocol, supra note
141, part A, art. I, § 1; supra text accompanying notes 147 & 160; note 160. See also The
Community and German unification: implications of the Staatsvertrag, reprinted in THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 20 (Bulletin of the European Commu-
nities Supp. 4/90).
534. The Community and German unification, Communication presented by the
Commission to the European Council on Aug. 22, 1990, reprinted in THE EUROPEAN COM-
MUNITY AND GERMAN UNIFICATION 38 (Bulletin of the European Communities Supp.
4/90).
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tions for this purpose. Pursuant to this authorization, the Commis-
sion proposed measures dealing particularly with agriculture,
transportation policy, energy, environment, and the law relating to
food and protection of workers. 535 The government of the Federal
Republic, in turn, issued regulations adopting these proposed ex-
ceptions as internal German law.536
In December 1990 the Council accepted these proposed rules
and they accordingly became part of Community law.537 In light of
continuing economic uncertainties in the five eastern Uander, addi-
tional EEC measures may be needed, but the Community foresees
that this transitional period should in general be concluded by the
end of 1992.538
CONCLUSION
With the interim "suspension" of the Allies' reserved rights on
October 1, 1990, the final step necessary for effective unification
had taken place. In an extraordinary period of less than one year,
the process of unification had proceeded from vague proposals for a
treaty community or confederation, through the March 18 Volks-
kammer election, the fundamental amendments of the GDR Consti-
tution, and the State Treaty and currency reform of July 1, to the
crucial Unification Treaty and Two Plus Four agreement. On Au-
gust 23, 1990, the Volkskammer had declared that the GDR's acces-
sion under article 23 of the Basic Law would take place on October
3, 1990, and the President of the Federal Republic had received offi-
cial notice of this action.53 9 In consequence, at a moment after mid-
night on October 2/3, the GDR ceased to exist, becoming part of
the Federal Republic of Germany.
Accession completed the requisite constitutional steps for unifi-
cation-although, as noted above, constitutional and other legal is-
sues will continue to be presented over the coming years by the
decisions that were adopted in 1990. Yet, even though constitu-
tional issues will persist, the focus of attention will turn toward very
serious problems raised by attempts to incorporate what remains of
535. For an analysis of measures proposed by the Commission, see Carl, Die Gemein-
schaft und die deutsche Einigung, 1990 EuZW 561.
536. See Schiiuble, supra note 23, at 301.
537. See Priebe, Die Beschliisse des Rates zur Eingliederung der neuen deutschen Bundesleinder in
die Europdischen Gemeinschaften, 1991 EuZW 113. These measures replaced certain provi-
sional regulations that had been in effect since October 3, 1990. Id. at 114 & n.10.
538. Id. at 113-15.
539. See 1990 BGBI I 2057-58.
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the GDR's economy into that of the Federal Republic and the social
and psychological problems raised by the spiritual "Wall in the
head" which is likely to separate eastern and western society in Ger-
many for some years to come. Moreover, in facing these issues-
and future constitutional issues also-German politics may turn de-
cisively inward in an attempt to resolve these problems arising out
of the course of German history.
Indeed, one of the most striking aspects of the year's debates
on problems of unification was the extent to which these problems
raised-in many cases perhaps more sharply than before-impor-
tant issues of political and constitutional principle that had been
present in the Federal Republic long before unification appeared to
be a real possibility. Although, in form, the negotiations surround-
ing unification involved reconciling the positions of the Federal Re-
public and the GDR-and to a lesser extent, those of the Federal
Republic and the Allies (principally, the Soviet Union)-some of the
most important disputes over unification actually focused on domes-
tic political issues within the Federal Republic. Some of these dis-
putes raised issues that have formed points of political tension
within the Federal Republic for decades (and, in some instances,
have a history reaching back into the disputes of the Weimar
Republic).
Indeed, the goal of unification itself has been viewed rather dif-
ferently from differing political positions in the Federal Republic.
The idea of a single "German Reich" that demanded continuing
government action toward unification seemed over time to become
much more congenial to the conservative CDU/CSU than it was to
the Social Democrats. Although Chancellor Brandt protested that
his Ostpolitik did not impair the goal of unification, for most practi-
cal purposes the Basic Treaty was indeed a step toward normalizing
the recognition of two separate states on the territory of the former
"Reich." In their political characterization of the Basic Treaty,
therefore, the conservatives were not too far from the mark.
Tension between views traditionally supported by the
CDU/CSU and views generally attributed to the Social Democrats is
also evident in many of the specific constitutional issues arising from
unification. The choice of a method of unification is a prime exam-
ple. Having succeeded in securing accession under article 23 as the
method of unification, the conservatives seemed at the outset to
have preserved the Basic Law generally intact and to have avoided
what they saw as the dangers of including social guarantees and ele-
ments of direct democracy in the constitutional structure. These el-
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ements might have made their way into a new, all-German
constitution if unification had been accomplished under article 146
of the Basic Law. Yet, inclusion of social and ecological elements in
the GDR constitutional amendments of June 17, 1990--even
though promulgated by a government in which the eastern CDU
was the controlling factor-seemed to suggest that this particular
debate was not over. Indeed, the CDU was required to adopt a Uni-
fication Treaty that at least contemplated the possible insertion of
"state goals" in a constitution that might be adopted by plebiscite
under article 146 even after unification. In future debates about
constitutional reform, it is likely that the SPD (along with the Greens
and Biindnis 90) will support expanded social and ecological guar-
antees, as well as increased participation of the people in lawmaking
through plebiscites. In many respects, the constitutional draft of the
GDR Round Table may well provide a model for constitutional dis-
cussions of this kind.
The specific disputes over the civil service, abortion, and prop-
erty rights also furnish fascinating examples of the persistence of
political themes deeply embedded in the history of the Federal Re-
public as important aspects of the process of unification. Argu-
ments over the future of the GDR's abortion regulation form merely
the latest chapter in a dispute whose origin lies deep in the history
of the Weimar Republic, with conservative forces seeking strict leg-
islation limiting abortions and groups associated with the SPD-in
particular, feminist and women's groups-supporting liberalization
of the rules relating to abortion.
Political tension surrounding the role of the German public ser-
vice (Beamtentum) is at least as longstanding as that relating to
abortion. Indeed, from the nineteenth century on, many on the left
viewed the Beamtentum as an element of the polity which, along
with the army, was fundamentally hostile to basic republican ideas.
This aspect of the traditional public service may have faded in re-
cent years, but disputes over the exclusion of members of radical
political parties (and primarily left-wing radical parties) from the
public service have played a major role in the political life of the
Federal Republic over the last two decades. Here again, the con-
servative CDU and CSU have sought most vigorously to enforce
these exclusions, while the Social Democrats-notwithstanding
Willy Brandt's leading role in issuing the Radicals Decree-have re-
cently taken a considerably more tolerant position. Applications for
the Beamtentum from former officials of the GDR may bring these
issues to the fore once again.
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More broadly, these questions may be related to differing views
of the value of the former GDR on the whole. The conservatives are
more likely to reject the former eastern political system as totally
worthless, whereas the Social Democrats-in accordance with some
of their attempts at rapprochement in the few years preceding unifi-
cation-are more likely to search for occasional virtues or
achievements.
While the connections are not quite so direct, disputes over the
status of expropriations by the Soviet occupation authorities and by
the government of the GDR reflect differing conceptions of prop-
erty that also have their parallels in constitutional disputes in the
Federal Republic. Conservatives have often asserted a strong con-
ception of property, including hard requirements of restitution or
compensation for expropriation of property or the diminution of its
value. In contrast, a weaker view of property suggests willingness to
emphasize the social requirements of property and to be more flexi-
ble about requirements of restitution or compensation. Disputes
over expropriation raise these points in very sharp form, but they
have echoes in debates of past decades in the Federal Republic, such
as those relating to co-determination. Even such disputes as those
over the Oder-NeiBe line-which, in the context of unification, prin-
cipally involved negotiations between Germany and the Soviet
Union-also had domestic political implications. The quest for the
return of these territories has generally been confined to the right-
wing sections of the CDU and CSU; the Brandt government of the
SPD was willing in practical effect to concede the permanence of
those boundaries at a relatively early point.
In many of the domestic political issues arising from unification,
the conservative forces of the CDU appear to have prevailed-as be-
fits its strong political position, particularly as a result of the GDR
elections of March 18, 1990. Yet, even so, a surprising amount re-
mains open. It is not impossible, for example, that political and ju-
dicial shifts might ultimately permit the practical extension of the
GDR's abortion rule to all of Germany. Certainly the proposal of
Bundestag President Rita Siissmuth-a proposal coming from the
ranks of the CDU-would come very close to having this effect.
Moreover, on the more general question of the revision of the Basic
Law to include social and environmental guarantees and more ele-
ments of direct democracy, the debate now occurring within the
Federal Republic demonstrates a continued high level of public con-
cern on these issues. Positions currently being taken by members of
the FDP-a crucial coalition partner of the CDU-apparently favor
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some constitutional amendments and may suggest the possibility of
future constitutional change. Thus, as many of the disputes over
unification implicate political struggles of the past, political disputes
in the course of unification itself-as well as the shifts in economic
and political organization that are certain to occur-will shape the
domestic political future of the Federal Republic in important ways
that are still developing.
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APPENDIX A
CALENDAR OF EVENTS - THE BACKGROUND OF
GERMAN UNIFICATION
1. The End of World War II in Europe
Feb. 1945 - Yalta Conference
May 1945 - German capitulation; end of World War II in
Europe
June 1945 - Berlin Declaration
July-August 1945 - Potsdam Conference
2. Creation of Two German States
July 1948 - Frankfurt Documents, authorizing parliamentary
council to draft West German constitution.
May 1949 - Promulgation of Occupation Statute by Western
Allies (effective Sept. 1949); adoption of West German
Basic Law.
Oct. 1949 - Adoption of 1949 Constitution of GDR.
July 1950 - G6rlitz Treaty; GDR recognizes Oder-NeiBe line.
3. German Re-armament and the Restoration of Qualified Sovereignty
Oct. 1954 - General Treaty, between western Allies and Fed-
eral Republic of Germany (effective May 1955).
May 1955 - Federal Republic enters NATO.
May 1955 - Warsaw Pact signed; GDR a member.
4. Brandt's Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik)
Aug. 1970 - Moscow Treaty, between Federal Republic of
Germany and USSR.
Dec. 1970 - Warsaw Treaty, between Federal Republic of
Germany and Poland.
Sept. 1971 - Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.
Dec. 1972 - Basic Treaty, between Federal Republic and
GDR.
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APPENDIX B
CALENDAR OF EVENTS - 1989-1990
1989
Summer - GDR citizens cross Hungarian border into Austria and
seek refuge in West German embassies in Prague,
Budapest, and Warsaw.
Sept. 10 - First GDR opposition group, "New Forum", is
founded.
Oct. 7 - 40th anniversary of founding of GDR; visit of
Gorbachev to Berlin.
Oct. 18 - Erich Honecker resigns as General Secretary of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party.
Nov. 9 - Opening of the Berlin Wall.
Nov. 13 - Hans Modrow elected Prime Minister of the GDR.
Nov. 28 - West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposes 10-
point plan for confederation of the two German states.
Dec. 1 - GDR Constitution amended to abolish leading role of
Communist Party.
Dec. 7 - First meeting of GDR Round Table.
1990
Jan. 30 - Gorbachev concedes likelihood of German unification.
Mar. 18 - Election for GDR Volkskammer.
May 18 - State Treaty signed.
June 17 - GDR Constitution amended to adopt general principles
similar to those of West German Basic Law.
July 1 - Effective date of State Treaty and currency reform.
July 6 - London Declaration of NATO heads of government.
July 16 - Kohl-Gorbachev agreement on NATO membership for
united Germany.
Aug. 3 - Treaty between Federal Republic and GDR regulating
first all-German Bundestag election.
Aug. 31 - Unification Treaty signed.
Sept. 12 - Two Plus Four Treaty signed.
Sept. 29 - Constitutional Court invalidates law regulating first all-
German Bundestag election.
Oct. 1 - Allies suspend reserved rights.
Oct. 3 - GDR accedes to Federal Republic.
Oct. 8 - Second Election Law enacted.
Oct. 14 - Election for parliaments of five eastern lUnder.
Nov. 14 - German-Polish Border Treaty signed.
Dec. 2 - First all-German Bundestag election.
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APPENDIX C
GLOSSARY OF FREQUENTLY USED TERMS
Bundesrat House of parliament of the Federal Republic of
Germany, representing the governments of the Luder.
Bundestag Popularly elected house of parliament of the Federal
Republic of Germany.
Btindnis 90 Alliance of reform parties that led the 1989-90
revolution in the GDR.
CDU Christian Democratic Union, the leading party in the
coalition currently governing the Federal Republic of
Germany.
CSU Christian Social Union, a counterpart and ally of the
CDU, active only in Bavaria.
DSU German Social Union, conservative East German party
allied with the CSU.
FDP Free Democratic Party, currently a coalition partner of
the CDU/CSU. Though a relatively small party, the
Free Democrats have for many years held the balance
of power between the CDU and the SPD.
Greens German political party which concentrated originally on
ecological issues but has expanded its interests to cover
all areas of politics.
Ldnder The German states. Uander is the plural form; Land is
the singular.
PDS Successor of the SED.
Round Table Council of GDR parties and other groups that
exercised a measure of control over the SED
government in late 1989 and early 1990.
SED The Communist Party of East Germany. In the course
of the revolutionary events of 1989-90, it changed its
name to SED-PDS (Party of Democratic Socialism) and
then dropped the initials SED entirely.
SPD Social Democratic Party, currently the main opposition
party in Germany.
Stasi Ministry of State Security, the secret police of the GDR.
Volkskammer Single-house parliament of the GDR.
